Byron Williams v. State of Arkansas

Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 412 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV

No. CR-25-542

Opinion Delivered September 16, 2026

APPEAL FROM THE POPE

BYRON WILLIAMS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

APPELLANT

[NO. 58CR-24-632]

V.

HONORABLE JAMES DUNHAM,

JUDGE

STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE AFFIRMED

CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge

Byron Williams was convicted by a Pope County jury of driving while intoxicated (seventh offense) and Class C felony fleeing. He was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment on the DWI charge and thirty years’ imprisonment as a habitual offender on the fleeing charge for a combined fifty years in the Arkansas Division of Correction. He appeals his convictions, asserting there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and that the circuit court erred in instructing the jury that voluntary intoxication was not a defense to his alleged crimes. We affirm.

On September 21, 2024, Atkins Police Officer Cody Hubbard was stationed in his marked patrol car conducting radar checks for speeding when he saw a white passenger vehicle driven by Williams swerve, leave its lane of travel, and head directly toward him. After Williams’s car got back onto the road and passed his patrol car, Officer Hubbard

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activated his lights and attempted to initiate a traffic stop. When Williams failed to pull over, Officer Hubbard activated his sirens to alert Williams to his presence. However, Williams continued to drive the vehicle for approximately seven minutes before turning into a space in the Sonic parking lot. At that time, Officer Hubbard ordered him out of the car and arrested him. Williams was subsequently charged with both DWI and fleeing in a vehicle.

At trial, Officer Hubbard, the sole witness at trial, testified to the foregoing and also that, during his pursuit of Williams, he had watched Williams’s vehicle weave in its lane of traffic and, on multiple occasions, cross the double yellow lines of the highway and touch the fog line. He further informed the jury that Williams had to pass and maneuver around twenty-seven other cars and that, at times, he exceeded the posted speed limits. When Williams finally stopped at the Sonic, Officer Hubbard ordered him to exit the vehicle with his hands in the air and to back toward him. He stated that Williams appeared to struggle with those instructions and that instead of exiting the vehicle as instructed, Williams shut the car door and faced him. When he finally obeyed Officer Hubbard’s commands, Williams stumbled and appeared to drag his feet. Officer Hubbard noted that Williams’s eyes were bloodshot and watery and he smelled strongly of alcohol. Officer Hubbard’s observations led him to believe that Williams was impaired. Williams was then placed in handcuffs and placed in the back of the patrol vehicle. Due to his condition, Williams had to be helped into the police vehicle. All of this was recorded by Officer Hubbard’s dash camera. The dashcam video and another video showing Williams falling asleep in the back of the patrol vehicle while being transported to the police station were introduced into evidence and

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played for the jury.1 Officer Hubbard stated that it was unusual for a suspect to fall asleep during transport. When an inventory search was completed on Williams’s car, a thirty-pack carton of beer was found inside.2 Officer Hubbard further testified that he did not conduct any field sobriety tests at the Sonic because he was concerned for Williams’s safety given the parking-lot dynamics and Williams’s inability to stand or walk on his own. Williams later refused to submit to a breathalyzer test or to participate in field sobriety tests at the police station.

At the close of Officer Hubbard’s testimony, Williams moved for a directed verdict challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on each charge, which the court denied. The court then instructed the jury on the elements of each charge and, over Williams’s objection, that voluntary intoxication was not a defense to any criminal offense. The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts, and Williams has now appealed these convictions.

Williams first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict on his convictions for DWI—seventh offense and fleeing. In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we assess the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Lockhart v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 216, 712 S.W.3d 372. We will affirm a judgment of conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty,

1 In these videos, Williams denied he had consumed any alcohol.

2 This information was listed in the inventory log, and Officer Hubbard was unable to testify as to whether any of the cans had been opened or were missing.

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compel a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. Circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Collins v. State, 2021 Ark. 35, 617 S.W.3d 701. Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury to decide. Id. Further, the credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury, not the court; the trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any witness's testimony and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Lockhart, supra.

As for Williams’s DWI conviction, he argues that the State failed to prove he was intoxicated at the time he operated or was in actual physical control of a vehicle. He first notes that law enforcement did not administer any field sobriety tests at the scene; thus, the jury was not presented with any objective or contemporaneous testing to demonstrate his alleged impairment. He next claims that his subsequent refusal to submit to field sobriety or blood-alcohol-concentration testing occurred only after he was advised of his Miranda rights and that the State failed to present any evidence clarifying whether the refusal was willful and intoxication-based or was simply an exercise of his constitutional rights. Finally, Williams asserts the evidence taken as a whole required the jury to speculate as to his intoxication at the time he operated the vehicle. He claims that the evidence presented consisted primarily of Officer Hubbard’s subjective observations that he smelled of alcohol, appeared unsteady, and was swerving prior to the stop. However, there was other evidence negating his intoxication: his statements in the video denying the consumption of alcohol; Officer Hubbard’s testimony on cross-examination that the spotlight he shined into the back

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of Williams’s vehicle during the pursuit could have acted as a blinding mechanism; and Officer Hubbard’s testimony that he never personally observed any alcohol in Williams’s car. He asserts that, for these reasons, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree.

It is unlawful to operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-

103(a)(1) (Repl. 2024). “Intoxicated” means “influenced or affected by the ingestion of alcohol, a controlled substance, any intoxicant, or any combination of alcohol, a controlled substance, or an intoxicant, to such a degree that the driver’s reactions, motor skills, and judgment are substantially altered and the driver, therefore, constitutes a clear and substantial danger of physical injury or death to himself or herself or another person.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-102(4) (Repl. 2024). Opinion testimony on whether an individual is intoxicated is admissible, and it is the fact-finder’s role to determine the testimony’s weight and credibility. Rogers v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 340, 690 S.W.3d 465; Mace v. State, 328 Ark. 536, 944 S.W.2d 830 (1997).

As we stated in Lockhart, supra, opinion testimony regarding intoxication is admissible, and the observations of police officers with regard to the smell of alcohol and actions consistent with intoxication can constitute competent evidence to support a DWI charge. Id. Moreover, the refusal to submit to a breath test is also admissible evidence on the issue of intoxication and may indicate the defendant’s fear of the results of the test and the consciousness of guilt. Id.

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Here, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is that Officer Hubbard testified and dashcam video showed Williams’s vehicle swerve as he drove it down the highway. Officer Hubbard testified that Williams smelled of alcohol, that his eyes were bloodshot and watery, and that he was unsteady on his feet. Again, the jury was able to view Williams’s movements on the dashcam video to determine the accuracy of Officer Hubbard’s testimony in that regard. Officer Hubbard then testified that he did not conduct field sobriety tests at the scene because of safety concerns. Williams’s subsequent refusal to perform any field sobriety tests or a breathalyzer test at the police station was admissible on the issue of intoxication and his consciousness of guilt. We hold that this evidence amounted to substantial evidence that Williams was intoxicated while in control of his vehicle. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support Williams’s conviction for DWI— seventh offense.

As for his fleeing conviction, Williams argues that the State failed to present sufficient proof evidencing an intent to flee rather than a “cautious search for a safe stopping point” and, in the alternative, that he engaged in conduct creating a substantial danger of death or serious injury to either himself, Officer Hubbard, or other motorists. He notes that he maintained a safe and reasonable speed and did not attempt to outrun Officer Hubbard’s vehicle. He did not run any red lights or stop signs and was able to successfully pass twenty- seven other vehicles without a collision. He further notes that the stop occurred after dark and that Officer Hubbard acknowledged that there were no well-lit areas for him to safely pull over. When he turned into the Sonic parking lot, he activated his turn signal and

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immediately complied with Officer Hubbard’s instructions—all actions that comport with the recommendations of the Arkansas Driver’s License Study Guide.

Here, Williams was convicted of fleeing by a vehicle pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated sections 5-54-125(a) and (d)(3) (Supp. 2025). Section 5-54-125(a) provides that “[i]f a person knows that his or her immediate arrest or detention is being attempted by a duly authorized law enforcement officer, it is the lawful duty of the person to refrain from fleeing, either on foot or by means of any vehicle or conveyance.” Fleeing by means of a vehicle is a Class C felony “if, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, a person purposely operates the vehicle or conveyance in such a manner that creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-125(d)(3).

First, a person who operates an automobile while intoxicated does so under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Turner v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 476, 588 S.W.3d 375. Moreover, a person who is intoxicated to such a degree that his reactions, motor skills, and judgment are substantially altered, by definition, presents a “clear and substantial danger of physical injury or death to himself or herself or another person.” See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-102(4) (Repl. 2024) (defining “intoxicated”).

Here, the pursuit in this case began when Willliams’s vehicle crossed the fog line and was traveling toward Officer Hubbard’s parked patrol car before it corrected and continued down the highway. There was further evidence that, during the pursuit, Williams exceeded the posted speed limit on occasion; did not appear to have complete control over his vehicle

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as he continued to weave over the double yellow lines and fog line while passing other vehicles; and when finally stopped, appeared to be intoxicated. The jury watched a video of the pursuit and his behavior after he was stopped. As such, the jury had before it sufficient evidence upon which to find Williams guilty of felony fleeing.

Williams also argues that the circuit court erred in giving Arkansas Model Jury Instruction–Criminal 605.1 at the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, which informs the jury that “[v]oluntary intoxication is not a defense to any criminal offense in Arkansas.” He contends that the instruction should not have been given because he never asserted voluntary intoxication as an affirmative defense. He also asserts that the instruction was misleading because intoxication was a contested element of a charged offense. Williams claims he affirmatively argued that he was not, in fact, intoxicated and that the instruction seemingly absolved the State from proving that contested element.

A party is entitled to a jury instruction when it is a correct statement of the law and when there is some basis in the evidence to support giving the instruction. Vidos v. State, 367 Ark. 296, 239 S.W.3d 467 (2006). We will not reverse a circuit court’s decision to give an instruction unless the court abused its discretion. Id. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to either the charges of DWI or fleeing; thus, the instruction itself was a correct statement of the law.

Moreover, it is well settled that a voluntary-intoxication instruction may be given even if the defendant does not raise the defense of intoxication where such an instruction will help avoid jury confusion. See Standridge v. State, 329 Ark. 473, 951 S.W.2d 299 (1997);

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Gilkey v. State, 41 Ark. App. 100, 848 S.W.2d 439 (1993). The giving of that instruction does not, itself, constitute a comment on the evidence or on whether Williams was intoxicated at the time of the alleged offenses; it merely instructs the jury that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to either offense under Arkansas law. See Standridge, supra. It also served to inform the jury that Williams’s alleged intoxication could not be used as an excuse for his failure to stop when considering his fleeing conviction. For these reasons, we cannot say the circuit court abused its discretion in so instructing the jury.

Affirmed.

GLADWIN and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

Ogles Law Firm P.A., by: John Ogles, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Michael Zangari, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.