08/12/2025
DA 24-0661 Case Number: DA 24-0661
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 181N
DOUGLAS W. BYRON, CAROL ANN BYRON, DENNIS D. BYRON, CINDY BYRON, MARK GOLDADE, LELAND GOULET, DOUGLAS R. KIRKPATRICK, GERI KIRKPATRICK, MITCHELL FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST dated 9/11/2018, PIERCE J. SCHMAUS, BARBARA A. SCHMAUS, CRAIG SICKLER, MICHELLE SICKLER, and MURRAY VESTER,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
RAINBOW ESTATES HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Defendant,
MATTHEW G. TIEDJE, and TARA D. TIEDJE,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Dawson, Cause No. DV-2024-28 Honorable Yvonne Laird, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Chris Walker, Silverman Law Office, PLLC, Helena, Montana
For Appellees:
Albert R. Batterman, Batterman Law Offices, P.C., Baker, Montana Submitted on Briefs: June 4, 2025
Decided: August 12, 2025
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk
2 Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, we decide this case by memorandum opinion. It shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Matthew and Tara Tiedje appeal the Seventh Judicial District Court’s order granting
a preliminary injunction that prohibits them from conducting commercial activity on their
property in the Rainbow Estates Subdivision. We affirm.
¶3 Rainbow Estates is a residential subdivision in Dawson County. The Subdivision’s
property owners are members of Rainbow Estates Homeowners Association and subject to
the HOA’s Bylaws. The Bylaws provide that, with one exception not relevant here, all lots
in the Subdivision shall be used solely for residential purposes. The Tiedjes own property
in the Subdivision and operate a thrift store called “Montana Hidden Treasures” from their
garage and surrounding property.
¶4 In January 2024, Matthew Tiedje sent the other lot owners an e-mail soliciting
feedback on his plans to construct a storage unit business with seventy-two units on his
property. After receiving e-mail feedback, Matthew thought he had the support of at least
seventy-five percent of lot owners to amend the Bylaws. His proposed amendment allowed
the Tiedjes to conduct commercial activity on their property. Matthew went door-to-door
collecting signatures from his neighbors who had e-mailed their support for the
3 amendment, but he avoided those who had not responded or responded with a “no” vote to
the e-mail. The Tiedjes recorded the amendment with the Dawson County Clerk and
Recorder.
¶5 In preparation for the storage unit business, the Tiedjes brought in truckloads of
gravel, filling in a cul-de-sac and several of their adjacent lots. The Tiedjes had
construction materials for the storage units delivered, including dozens of metal roll-up
doors that they stored outside.
¶6 A group of lot owners (Neighbors) filed an application for preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order, seeking to enjoin the Tiedjes from using their property for
commercial purposes. The District Court granted a temporary restraining order in May
2024. After holding a hearing on the application for preliminary injunction in September
2024, the District Court concluded that Neighbors were entitled to a preliminary injunction.
¶7 This Court reviews a district court’s grant or denial of a preliminary injunction for
a manifest abuse of discretion. Montanans Against Irresponsible Densification, LLC, v.
State, 2024 MT 200, ¶ 8, 418 Mont. 78, 555 P.3d 759 (citation omitted) (MAID). A court
abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious
judgment, or exceeds the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. MAID, ¶ 8
(citation omitted). A manifest abuse of discretion is one that is obvious, evident, or
unmistakable. MAID, ¶ 8 (quoting Driscoll v. Stapleton, 2020 MT 247, ¶ 12, 401 Mont.
405, 473 P.3d 386) (internal quotation marks omitted). We apply de novo review to a
district court’s decision on a preliminary injunction to the extent it was based on legal
4 conclusions. Cross v. State, 2024 MT 303, ¶ 12, 419 Mont. 290, 560 P.3d 637 (citation
omitted).
¶8 The Tiedjes first argue that the District Court should not have considered the
impacts from Montana Hidden Treasures in deciding Neighbors’ application for a
preliminary injunction. First, the Tiedjes assert that Neighbors’ application for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction did not give them notice that it sought relief
against Montana Hidden Treasures. The Tiedjes contend that testimony at the preliminary
injunction hearing centered around the storage unit business, not Montana Hidden
Treasures.
¶9 Neighbors’ application for injunctive relief, however, requested a temporary
restraining order
prohibiting the Rainbow Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. . . . and Matthew Tiedje and Tara Tiedje . . . from violating the HOA Bylaws, including but not limited to constructing, building, developing, or operating a commercial business on any lot within the Rainbow Estates Subdivision pursuant to any purported Bylaw amendment or otherwise, without further order from the Court.
When it issued the temporary restraining order, the District Court used the same language,
enjoining the Tiedjes from “violating the HOA Bylaws, including but not limited to
constructing, building, developing, or operating a commercial business” on any lot in the
Subdivision. The Tiedjes do not dispute that Montana Hidden Treasures is a commercial
business, nor do they argue that this term is ambiguous as used in Neighbors’ application
or the temporary restraining order. The application and restraining order—issued months
before the preliminary injunction hearing—gave the Tiedjes notice that the District Court
5 would consider “commercial” business, which encompassed Montana Hidden Treasures,
in determining the preliminary injunction request.
¶10 The Tiedjes also examined witnesses about the impacts of Montana Hidden
Treasures by, for example, asking several of Neighbors’ witnesses whether they had
shopped there. The Tiedjes chose not to object to Neighbors introducing testimony on
Montana Hidden Treasures. “Generally, we will not review an issue to which a party has
failed to object and preserve for appeal because the objecting party never gave the trial
court an opportunity to address and correct any perceived errors.” State v. Johnson,
2011 MT 286, ¶ 14, 362 Mont. 473, 265 P.3d 638 (citation omitted). Because the Tiedjes
failed to object to questioning about Montana Hidden Treasures and chose to
cross-examine witnesses on this issue, they have not preserved a due process argument for
lack of notice. The record demonstrates that the Tiedjes had actual notice that the District
Court would consider the thrift store when deciding whether to issue an injunction; and
they participated fully at the preliminary injunction hearing, undermining any claim of
prejudice.
¶11 The Tiedjes next contend that the District Court erred in considering the impacts
from Montana Hidden Treasures because the last peaceable condition, or status quo, prior
to litigation included the thrift store. For reasons discussed below, however, we conclude
that evidence of the Tiedjes’ plans and preparations for the storage unit business justify the
preliminary injunction even without considering the impacts from Montana Hidden
6 ¶12 The Tiedjes argue that Neighbors failed to meet their burden of proof to obtain a
preliminary injunction. “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never
awarded as of right.” MAID, ¶ 10 (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S.
7, 24, 129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008)). The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain
the status quo, or “to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits
can be held.” Cross, ¶ 52 (quoting Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 346,
144 S. Ct. 1570, 1576 (2024)). “The status quo is the last actual, peaceable, noncontested
condition [that] preceded the pending controversy.” Stephenson v. Lone Peak Preserve,
LLC, 2025 MT 148, ¶ 14, 423 Mont. 46, ___ P.3d ___ (quoting Flying T Ranch, LLC v.
Catlin Ranch, LP, 2022 MT 162, ¶ 28, 409 Mont. 478, 515 P.3d 806).
¶13 Section 27-19-201(1), MCA, requires an applicant to establish four factors to obtain
a preliminary injunction:
(a) the applicant is likely to succeed on the merits;
(b) the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief;
(c) the balance of equities tips in the applicant’s favor; and
(d) the order is in the public interest.
An applicant for an injunction under § 27-19-201(1), MCA, bears the burden of
demonstrating the need for injunctive relief. Section 27-19-201(3), MCA. Because this
test is conjunctive, the applicant must establish each element. Stephenson, ¶ 13 (citation
omitted); Cross, ¶ 19 (citation omitted).
7 Likelihood of Success on the Merits
¶14 The District Court concluded that Neighbors had established a likelihood of success
on the merits “because they have shown the Defendants violated the Bylaws.” To show a
likelihood of success on the merits, a plaintiff “must present a prima facie case but need
not show a certainty of winning.” Cross, ¶ 33 (quoting 13A Charles Alan Wright,
Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948.3 (3d ed.
2008)). “Prima facie means literally at first sight or on first appearance but subject to
further evidence or information.” Cross, ¶ 33 (quoting Weems v. State, 2019 MT 98, ¶ 18,
395 Mont. 350, 440 P.3d 4). “In deciding whether an applicant has established a prima
facie case, a court should determine whether a sufficient case has been made out to warrant
the preservation of the property or rights in status quo until trial, without expressing a final
opinion as to such rights.” Sweet Grass Farms, Ltd. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Sweet
Grass Cnty., 2000 MT 147, ¶ 28, 300 Mont. 66, 2 P.3d 825 (citation omitted).
¶15 The Bylaws provide the following process for amendment: “These Bylaws may be
amended by the [HOA] in a duly constituted meeting for such purpose and no amendment
shall take effect unless approved by at least seventy-five percent (75%) of the unit owners.”
Additionally, “[a]ll present or future owners . . . or any other person that might use the
facilities of the development in any manner, are subject to the regulations set forth in the[]
By-laws.” Matthew testified that, in order to amend the Bylaws, he sent an e-mail to all
property owners in the Subdivision, then collected signatures from those who responded
favorably to his suggested amendment. He admitted that the HOA did not hold a meeting
8 to vote on his amendment. Despite making efforts to amend the Bylaws, Matthew also
testified that he was not bound by them.
¶16 The Tiedjes do not dispute that they own property in the Subdivision or use the
facilities of the development. On first appearance, as owners of real property in the
Subdivision, the Tiedjes are bound by the Bylaws. Matthew’s concession that there was
no meeting on his proposed amendment forms the basis for a prima facie case that the
Tiedjes did not follow the correct procedure to amend the Bylaws.
¶17 The Tiedjes respond that the Bylaws are unenforceable; they assert various
affirmative defenses, including waiver and estoppel. The application of their defenses, the
Tiedjes contend, shows that Neighbors are unlikely to succeed on the merits. We find it
unnecessary to consider the Tiedjes’ defenses prior to a merits determination at the trial
court. See Porter v. K & S P’ship, 192 Mont. 175, 177-78, 627 P.2d 836, 837 (1981)
(reasoning that it would be “premature” to consider defenses on preliminary injunction
appeal before a final determination from the trial court). The Tiedjes will have the
opportunity to develop a record on their affirmative defenses during the merits phase of the
case. But based on the preliminary injunction record, the District Court did not manifestly
abuse its discretion in finding that Neighbors were likely to succeed on the merits.
Irreparable Harm
¶18 An applicant for a preliminary injunction must show that irreparable injury is likely,
not merely speculative. Cross, ¶ 47 (citation omitted). “[H]arm is irreparable if legal
remedies, like an award for damages, are an inadequate remedy.” Cross, ¶ 47 (citation
9 omitted). The District Court found that Neighbors had demonstrated a likelihood of
irreparable harm through their testimony on the impacts of the development.
¶19 Geri Kirkpatrick—who lives across from the Tiedjes and their proposed storage unit
business—testified that there has been an increase in dust since the Tiedjes brought in
truckloads of gravel. After living in the Subdivision for forty years, Geri said that she
knows the dust is not coming from another road because it now has a different color and is
more frequently disruptive. Because of the dust, Geri rarely opens her front windows. Geri
testified that the excess gravel has caused drainage issues on a Subdivision road, making it
rutted and potholed. She anticipated that the storage unit business would require lighting
and fencing and would cause additional traffic, noise, and litter in the Subdivision.
¶20 Quoting MAID, ¶ 19 (“generalized fears and supposition” about potential injury
insufficient for finding of irreparable harm), the Tiedjes assert that the hearing testimony
established at best speculative injury. As the storage unit developers, the Tiedjes claim
that they “provided the only competent testimony regarding the likely impacts of that
operation,” including that their gravel has not caused any increase in dust or road drainage
issues and that the storage unit business will not lead to increased traffic. This case, the
Tiedjes maintain, is about breach of contract, which is not an irreparable injury.
¶21 First, it is not our role “to reweigh conflicting evidence or to question a district
court’s assessment of the strength of the evidence on a preliminary injunction appeal.”
Cross, ¶ 38 (citation omitted). We do not second-guess the District Court’s finding, based
on the affidavits and testimony, that “[t]he storage facility and retail thrift store will cause
10 an increase in traffic in the subdivision which will result in increased wear and tear of the
subdivision infrastructure and disruption to the residential nature of the subdivision.”
¶22 Neighbors do not allege a speculative or tenuous injury like the plaintiff in MAID.
There, the only evidence the plaintiff submitted in support of irreparable injury was an
affidavit “alluding to the possibility of finding a multi-unit building or a duplex, or an
accessory dwelling unit going up next door.” MAID, ¶ 19 (internal quotation marks omitted
and emphasis added). Unlike in MAID, ¶ 19, the Tiedjes have taken concrete steps towards
opening a storage unit business that likely would violate the residential Bylaws. Testimony
indicates that these preparations already have caused excessive dust and road damage. The
Tiedjes have had materials and gravel delivered and they even bought additional lots in the
Subdivision where they intend to place the storage units. Although increased lighting,
fencing, and traffic are future effects of the business, the evidence showed that they are
sufficiently likely to support the District Court’s finding of irreparable injury.
¶23 Second, we find no fault with the District Court’s apparent assessment that monetary
damages would not remedy the effects of a storage unit business in a subdivision that
prohibits commercial activities. In Sweet Grass Farms, ¶ 32, we held that the impacts from
introducing a subdivision into a primarily agricultural area, including increased traffic,
noise, dust, and “irreparable loss of the agricultural character of the area,” supported the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. Likewise, introducing a seventy-two-unit storage
business into an otherwise residential subdivision could permanently change the
Subdivision’s character before a ruling on the merits.
11 ¶24 This Court should vacate the injunction, the Tiedjes contend, and allow them to
continue developing the storage facility because the alleged harms to Neighbors are
temporary and capable of being redressed after the merits proceeding. The Tiedjes
maintain that if the court rules for Neighbors on the merits, the court could still restore the
parties to their original position. This argument is unpersuasive. If the Tiedjes continue to
develop the seventy-two unit storage facility, a merits ruling from the District Court in
Neighbors’ favor would then require them to reverse course, evict their tenants, and tear
the units down. Allowing the Tiedjes to continue construction while awaiting a merits
determination would be inconsistent with the purpose of a preliminary injunction—to
preserve the “last actual, peaceable, noncontested condition [that] preceded the pending
controversy.” Stephenson, ¶ 14 (quoting Flying T Ranch, ¶ 28). The District Court
therefore did not obviously, unmistakably, or evidently abuse its discretion when it ruled
that irreparable harm was likely in the absence of a preliminary injunction.
Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest
¶25 The third element of the preliminary injunction inquiry asks whether the equities tip
in the applicant’s favor. Section 27-19-201(1)(c), MCA. The District Court concluded
that the balance of the equities tips in Neighbors’ favor because “the potential impacts of
the development outweigh the risks of not developing the lots.” The Tiedjes argue that the
equities tips in their favor because if they cannot continue to develop the storage facility,
they will be unable to repay a loan and will be forced to file for bankruptcy. From the
preliminary record, however, the District Court found that the Tiedjes did not properly
12 amend the Bylaws but were taking steps to develop their property into a large storage
facility in violation of the Bylaws’ plain limitation that properties may be used only for
residential purposes. The equities do not favor a violation of restrictive covenants simply
because the party has made financial commitments to that violation.
¶26 The Tiedjes maintain, however, that the District Court contributed to the inequities
against them when it extended the temporary restraining order. The District Court, the
Tiedjes assert, “rescheduled and delayed the show cause hearing, often with no regard to
whether the Tiedjes consented or objected to the delays,” subjecting them to the temporary
restraining order for four months. The record reflects that the court extended the temporary
restraining order first after the Tiedjes consented, again due to a scheduling conflict, and
finally when the parties requested more time to explore settlement. Although the court did
not cite its rationale for one such extension, the Tiedjes did not object to the delays or give
the trial court an opportunity to rectify its error. Absent an objection, the Tiedjes did not
preserve this issue for appeal. See Johnson, ¶ 14 (citation omitted).
¶27 The Tiedjes also contend that the equities weigh in their favor because the District
Court did not provide an explanation when it waived the requirement that Neighbors post
a written undertaking. In waiving the undertaking requirement, the court did, however,
state that “[i]mmediate cessation of all development activities does not appear to threaten
any loss to the Defendant[s].” The court also found specific harms to Neighbors, including
to their ability to protect their properties from disruption and to enforce their rights under
the Bylaws.
13 ¶28 A district court has discretion to waive the undertaking requirement under
§ 27-19-306(b)(ii), MCA, when it finds waiver to be in the interests of justice. Shammel v.
Canyon Res. Corp., 2003 MT 372, ¶ 37, 319 Mont. 132, 82 P.3d 912 (citation omitted).
Section 27-19-306, MCA, does not require a court to make specific findings before waiving
an undertaking. Concluding that it was in the interest of justice, the District Court here
properly exercised its discretion to waive the undertaking requirement. Although the court
did not make detailed findings, its conclusion that development posed no immediate loss
to the Tiedjes, combined with its equitable findings, sufficiently supports the waiver. In
sum, the court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the equities tip in Neighbors’
favor.
¶29 An applicant also must establish that the injunction is in the public interest.
Section .27-19-201(1)(d), MCA. “The public interest factor ‘is another way of inquiring
whether there are policy considerations that bear on whether’ to grant an injunction.”
Cross, ¶ 53 (quoting Wright & Miller § 2948.4). The District Court found this factor
satisfied. Its preliminary injunction serves to maintain the status quo until the court can
make a merits determination whether the Tiedjes’ activities violate the Bylaws or whether
the Bylaws have been abandoned. Until then, the injunction serves the public interest by
minimizing the impacts to other property owners in the Subdivision and protecting their
rights under the contractual Subdivision Bylaws. Though the public interest includes
respect for private property rights, here those rights are contractually limited by the
covenants to which all lot owners agreed. Without “anticipat[ing] the ultimate
14 determination of the questions of right involved” here, public policy supports compliance
with restrictive covenants. Sweet Grass Farms, ¶ 38 (quoting Porter, 192 Mont. at 183,
627 P.2d at 840). The District Court did not err in concluding that maintaining the
residential nature of the Subdivision pending final determination of the merits is in the
public interest.
¶30 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of
applicable standards of review. The District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion
in finding that Neighbors established each required element for a preliminary injunction
under § 27-19-201(1), MCA. The preliminary injunction is affirmed.
/S/ BETH BAKER
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ KATHERINE M BIDEGARAY /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON