Byron v. Byron, No. Fa 94 538975 (Oct. 30, 2001)

2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 14128
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedOctober 30, 2001
DocketNo. FA 94 538975
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 14128 (Byron v. Byron, No. Fa 94 538975 (Oct. 30, 2001)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Byron v. Byron, No. Fa 94 538975 (Oct. 30, 2001), 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 14128 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTIONS FOR MODIFICATION AND CONTEMPT
On March 16, 2001, the plaintiff filed a motion to reopen and modify judgment in which she requested that the amount of her court ordered weekly child support payment be reduced.

On August 27, 2001, the defendant filed a contempt motion. In it, he alleged that the plaintiff had defied the court's order that she pay her portion of the premium for the minor child's medical insurance coverage.

The motions were heard coterminously by this court on October 12, 2001. Both parties proceeded pro se at the hearing. The plaintiff testified at hearing and introduced one exhibit into evidence. The defendant also testified and offered four exhibits. The parties federal income tax returns for the year 2000 were also admitted as court CT Page 14129 exhibits.

Both parties submitted sworn financial affidavits at the October 12, 2001 hearing. Neither party prepared a child support guideline worksheet.

The court has carefully considered all of the evidence adduced at hearing, as well as the parties' financial affidavits. The court has taken judicial notice of documents contained in the courts' file concerning the extensive procedural history of this matter. The court has also carefully considered the provisions of Connecticut General Statutes §§ 46b-86 and 46b-87, and has applied them to the facts of this case.

FACTUAL FINDINGS
The court (Levine, J.) dissolved the parties' marriage after an uncontested hearing on September 13, 1996. At that time, custody and financial orders were entered in accordance with an agreement reached by the parties.

Custody of the three children who were then minors1 was awarded to the plaintiff and defendant jointly. The children's primary place of residence was to be with the defendant, subject to the plaintiff's reasonable rights of access.

The dissolution decree provided that neither party would pay child support to the other for the first nine months following the date of judgment. Thereafter, the plaintiff was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $125.00 per week "for those weeks she is employed.' The judgment also provided that "[i]n the event neither party has . . . medical coverage then they shall share equally the cost of such coverage with reasonable benefit levels.'

Since the date of judgment, there has been extensive litigation in this matter which has been primarily related to contempt and modification motions filed by both of the parties. On October 8, 2000, the court (Barall, J.) granted a motion by the plaintiff for modification of child Support. Judge Barall ordered that the plaintiff pay the defendant $185.00 per week as child support for the two children who were still minors, plus $35.00 per week on an arrearage of $2,891.00 for past child support and medical expense reimbursement. On October 8, 2000, the plaintiff's financial affidavit reflected projected gross income of $900.00 per week2, and the defendant's financial affidavit indicated gross weekly wages of $1,434.97. In his ruling Judge Barall found that the plaintiff had not proven that she had a shared parenting arrangement which would justify a deviation from the State Child Support Guidelines. CT Page 14130

After David Byron attained the age of majority last March, the plaintiff filed the instant motion for modification. As a temporary order, pending the outcome of this hearing on that motion, the court (Caruso, J.) ordered that the plaintiff pay weekly child support for her sixteen year old daughter, Lauren, in the amount of $92.50 per week.

The plaintiff is self-employed as a computer software writer and consultant. She operates her business, which is established as a limited liability corporation (LLC), out of her home. The plaintiff holds a bachelor's degree in English, and a master's degree in Business Administration.

The plaintiff's business generates gross receipts of $8,600.00 per month, or $103,200.00 annually. However, the plaintiff indicated on her October 12, 2001 financial affidavit that she receives gross weekly wages of $900.00 and net weekly wages of $633.89, from her business. The plaintiff claimed that certain expenses marked with asterisks on her financial affidavit were legitimate business expenses which should be deducted from the gross receipts of her limited liability corporation. The court did not find this testimony, or the plaintiff's financial affidavit, to be credible.

From the $103,200.00 she receives in gross receipts from her self-employment as a computer consultant and writer, the plaintiff claims that she receives actual gross annual income (before taxes and deductions) of $46,800.00 annually, or $3,900.00 per month. The business-related expenses enumerated on the plaintiff's financial affidavit total $34,493.04 per annum, or $2,874.42 per month. When the claimed monthly income figure of $3,900.00 is added to the monthly expense number of $2,874.42 the total is $6,774.42. When that sum is subtracted from the limited liability corporation's gross monthly receipts of $8,600.00, there is a surplus of $1,825.58 per month. The plaintiff did not offer convincing testimony and evidence at hearing which explained this disparity, or clarified how she arrived at the net income figure listed on her affidavit.

Although the court cannot determine, based on the evidence presented, the precise amount of the plaintiff's weekly income, the court finds that it is greater than the amount listed on the financial affidavit which she submitted at this hearing.

The plaintiff claimed during hearing that Lauren is about to obtain her license and has recently been spending more time at the plaintiff's home. She indicated that Lauren has rooms at both parties' residences. Based on the evidence presented at hearing, however, the court finds that CT Page 14131 the plaintiff did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she and the defendant have shared physical custody of Lauren. The plaintiff also failed to prove at hearing that the present physical custody arrangement substantially increased her expenses.

The defendant holds a bachelor's of science degree in electrical engineering, a bachelor's of science degree in real estate appraisal, and a master's of business administration degree in finance. At the time of the hearing last year before Judge Barall, the defendant was employed as a computer consultant and earned gross weekly salary of $1,434.97.

At the hearing before this court, the defendant claimed to be unemployed. He submitted a financial affidavit that indicated he had no income whatsoever. The defendant claimed that he had suffered a stroke and could not work because he would not be available to an employer every day as a result of his medical condition. The defendant testified that he was not receiving social security disability payments, and he offered no medical records or other competent evidence concerning the nature of his medical problems, or how they impacted his ability to earn income. The defendant claimed that he was supporting himself with the equity that he received from the sale of the home. The court did not find this testimony, or the defendant's financial affidavit, to be credible.

The defendant admitted during his testimony that he spends two to five hours per day buying and selling securities by computer ("day trading").

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Bluebook (online)
2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 14128, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/byron-v-byron-no-fa-94-538975-oct-30-2001-connsuperct-2001.