Byron Shaw v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedAugust 1, 2024
DocketSF-0752-20-0498-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Byron Shaw v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Byron Shaw v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Byron Shaw v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

BYRON K. SHAW, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0752-20-0498-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: August 1, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Byron K. Shaw , San Jose, California, pro se.

Anna Jang , Esquire, San Francisco, California, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed his termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND The appellant was employed by the agency’s Veterans Health Administration (VHA) as an Advanced Medical Support Assistant in the competitive service until February 2020. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 5, 7. He received an excepted-service appointment to the position of Nurse, effective March 1, 2020, pursuant to the VHA authority set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 7401(1). IAF, Tab 1 at 5, 7, Tab 8 at 7. The agency terminated his employment effective May 1, 2020, for failure to maintain a current, unrestricted Registered Nurse (RN) license. IAF, Tab 1 at 12. The appellant appealed the termination to the Board and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. In an acknowledgment order, the administrative judge informed the appellant that the Board may lack jurisdiction over his termination because the appellant alleged that the VHA appointed him as a Nurse under 38 U.S.C. § 7401(1), and ordered him to file evidence and argument nonfrivolously alleging that his appeal was within the Board’s jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 2. In response, the appellant asserted that the Board’s jurisdiction to “hear 3

this case regarding a Title 38 employee is based on the evidence provided that the [Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)] knowingly and willingly appointed [him] from a competitive service (GS-6 position) to a Title 38 excepted appointment knowing [he] did not meet the criteria according to VA Handbook.” IAF, Tab 6 at 4. The agency replied that the Board lacks jurisdiction because the appellant was appointed under 38 U.S.C. § 7401(1). IAF, Tab 8 at 4-6. In an initial decision based on the written record, 2 the administrative judge found that the appellant was not entitled to appeal his termination to the Board because his appointment was pursuant to the authority under 38 U.S.C. § 7401(1). IAF, Tab 12, Initial Decision (ID) at 4. The administrative judge further found that the appellant could not rely on the appeal rights he held in his prior position in the competitive service. ID at 4-6. The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has not responded to the petition for review.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW On review, the appellant reasserts that the agency promoted him to the Nurse position, for which he was not qualified, in order to eliminate his appeal rights and then terminate him. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, 6-8. The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). An individual who meets the definition of “employee” at 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1) generally has the right to challenge his removal from the Federal service by filing an appeal with the Board under chapter 75. Maibaum v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 116 M.S.P.R. 234, ¶ 9 (2011); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512(1), 7513(d). However, as provided in 5 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(10), an individual does not have the right to appeal an adverse action under chapter 75 if he “holds a position within the [VHA] which has been excluded from the 2 The appellant withdrew his request for a hearing and elected to receive a decision on the written record. IAF, Tab 7 at 4. 4

competitive service by or under a provision of title 38, unless such employee was appointed to such position under section 7401(3) of such title.” Pichon v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 67 M.S.P.R. 325, 326-27 (1995). Here, it is undisputed that the appellant was appointed to his position as a Nurse under 38 U.S.C. § 7401(1). The statutory exception for section 7401(3) appointments is therefore inapplicable to the appellant. Thus, the administrative judge properly found that as a 38 U.S.C. § 7401(1) appointee, the appellant is not entitled to appeal his termination to the Board under chapter 75. ID at 4. The appellant does not dispute this finding on review, and we discern no basis to disturb it. 3 On review, the appellant argues that he had completed his probation in his prior position. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. The administrative judge properly determined that the appellant’s prior status as a tenured employee did not transfer to his new appointment. ID at 4-6. Only an individual who meets the definition of an employee under 5 U.S.C. § 7511

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Bluebook (online)
Byron Shaw v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/byron-shaw-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.