Byrne v. Byrne

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Byrne v. Byrne

228 A.D.2d 402, 643 N.Y.2d 659, 643 N.Y.S.2d 659, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6253

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 3, 1996

StatusPublished

This text of 228 A.D.2d 402 (Byrne v. Byrne) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Byrne v. Byrne, 228 A.D.2d 402, 643 N.Y.2d 659, 643 N.Y.S.2d 659, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6253 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

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Opinion

The defendant failed to present any proof estáblishing that the parties’ 1994 stipulation of settlement as to the distribution of marital property was unfair and constituted overreaching by the plaintiff (see, Ruxton v Ruxton, 181 AD2d 876). At the time the 1994 stipulation was entered into, which stipulation modified a 1990 stipulation, the defendant, represented by counsel, knew about a certain pension plan in favor of the plaintiff, but failed to seek any share of the plan. Rather, she [403]*403unequivocally agreed to the terms of the stipulation, which represented several concessions by the plaintiff with regard to his financial obligations. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s request to set aside the stipulation in order for the defendant to obtain an equitable share of the pension plan. Ritter, J. P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Krausman, JJ., concur.

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The defendant failed to present any proof estáblishing that the parties’ 1994 stipulation of settlement as to the distribution of marital property was unfair and constituted overreaching by the plaintiff (see, Ruxton v Ruxton, 181 AD2d 876). At the time the 1994 stipulation was entered into, which stipulation modified a 1990 stipulation, the defendant, represented by counsel, knew about a certain pension plan in favor of the plaintiff, but failed to seek any share of the plan. Rather, she [403]*403unequivocally agreed to the terms of the stipulation, which represented several concessions by the plaintiff with regard to his financial obligations. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s request to set aside the stipulation in order for the defendant to obtain an equitable share of the pension plan. Ritter, J. P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Krausman, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

228 A.D.2d 402, 643 N.Y.2d 659, 643 N.Y.S.2d 659, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6253, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/byrne-v-byrne-nyappdiv-1996.

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