Byrd v. Stringer

666 P.2d 1332, 295 Or. 311, 1983 Ore. LEXIS 1360
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 19, 1983
DocketCA A22578, SC 29107
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 666 P.2d 1332 (Byrd v. Stringer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Byrd v. Stringer, 666 P.2d 1332, 295 Or. 311, 1983 Ore. LEXIS 1360 (Or. 1983).

Opinion

*313 ROBERTS, J.

We granted review to consider the applicability of statewide land use planning goals, in this case Goal 3 for agricultural lands, to county land use decisions after Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) acknowledgment of a county’s comprehensive plan and implementing ordinances.

The Polk County Board of Commissioners granted respondents a building permit for a dwelling in conjunction with a farm use. The Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) reversed. LUBA declined to apply the standards set out in the county ordinance for new development on existing lots 1 in the farm/forest (F/F) zone. Instead, it assessed the county’s decision against its interpretation of the standards of Goal 3. 2 The Court of Appeals reversed LUBA, 60 Or App 1, 652 P2d 1276 (1982), finding that because LCDC, in its acknowledgment order, expressly approved the farm use standard, Goal 3 was inapplicable to the case. We affirm the Court of Appeals and go one step further. We hold that after acknowledgment, the county plan and implementing zoning regulations control land use decisions. This is so by virtue of ORS 197.605(5), the statute which regulates our review in post-acknowledgment cases. Our analysis applies to review of any post-acknowledgment land use decision, whether or not LCDC expressly addresses a particular ordinance in its acknowledgment order. The county’s decision in this case complied with its acknowledged plan and implementing ordinances.

*314 FACTS

The Byrds, respondents in this court, applied for a permit to build a dwelling on their 1.02 acre parcel in Polk County’s F/F zone. In order to erect a dwelling on agricultural land in that zone Polk County’s acknowledged ordinances require an applicant to demonstrate that the dwelling either (1) is permitted outright pursuant to county ordinance sections 138.030(a) and 136.020, that is, is a dwelling in conjunction with a farm use, or, (2) meets the criteria for a non-farm dwelling set forth in ordinance section 138.040(1), incorporating ORS 215.213(3). 3 Simply stated an applicant choosing the first route must show that the land to be built upon is a farm; otherwise he or she must prove that the land is unsuitable for farming, a non-farm parcel.

On October 5, 1981, the county granted the Byrds’ request for a dwelling permitted outright because it concluded that the Byrds could put their parcel to a farm use as that term is defined in ordinance section 110.223, set forth infra. The county determined that (1) the property could be farmed profitably as an intensive commercial farm for the raising of rabbits and raspberries, (2) the Byrds’ use of the land would increase the aggregate agricultural enterprise in the area, and (3) the parcel was sufficiently large to accommodate the intended farming activities.

*315 LUBA reversed the county, apparently finding it had “[improperly construed the applicable law.” ORS Section 5(4)(a)(E>), ch 772, Or Laws 1979, as amended by ch 748, Or Laws 1981. LUBA determined that the profitability criterion was an inadequate definition of commercial farm, because it had rejected such a standard in Sane Orderly Development v. Douglas County Bd of Comm’rs, 2 Or LUBA 196 (1981). Even though “farm use” is the only standard set forth in the acknowledged ordinance for construction of dwellings in the F/F zone, LUBA decided that “LCDC did not mean to imply [in its acknowledgment order] that the applicable standard for new dwellings in an F/F zone need only be a finding the dwelling is to be used in conjunction with ‘farm use.’ ” LUBA, therefore, relied exclusively on Goal 3 and interpreted a commercial farm to be, at a minimum, one which is of comparable size to others in the area. It ruled that dwellings in the F/F zone could be erected only on parcels sufficiently large to ensure “continuation of the existing commercial agricultural enterprise within the area,” language drawn from Goal 3. Unless thatprequisite is met, profitability, according to LUBA, is irrelevant. LUBA concluded that because the Byrds’ parcel was smaller than surrounding commercial agricultural tracts it was presumptively unsuitable for a commercial agricultural enterprise.

The Court of Appeals reversed LUBA. It reasoned that LCDC had expressly approved in its acknowledgment order the county’s “farm use” standard for new building on existing lots in the F/F zone. The court noted that the county’s standards for building on existing lots were challenged during the acknowledgment process for noncompliance with Goal 3. The attack was rejected by LCDC in its acknowledgment order:

“Fourth, 1000 Friends object that new farm dwellings in the [exclusive farm use] EFU and F/F zones are allowed on existing lots without a showing that such lots are appropriate for the continuation of commercial agricultural enterprises in the area. The EFU and F/F Zones require that new dwellings must be in conjunction with a farm use (Section 136.020). This issue was not previously objected to by 1000 Friends.”

The court was further persuaded that Goal 3 standards do not apply because the county had declined to set a *316 minimum lot size for the F/F zone. Ordinance section 138.010 set forth infra.

The court relied exclusively on the acknowledged plan and ordinances, sections 138.030(a) and 136.020, and determined that a commercial farm is one which meets the county’s definition of farm use:

“110.223. FARM USE. ‘Farm Use’ means the current employment of land including that portion of such lands under buildings supporting accepted farming practices for the [primary] purpose of obtaining a profit in money by raising, harvesting and selling crops or by the feeding, breeding, management and sale of, or the product of, livestock, poultry, furbearing animals or honeybees or for dairying and the sale of dairy products or any other agricultural or horticultural use or animal husbandry or any combination thereof. ‘Farm use’ includes the preparation and storage of the products raised on such land for man’s use and animal use and disposal by marketing or otherwise. * * *.” 4

Profitability, according to the Court of Appeals, is the only consideration in the county’s decision. Because the Byrds had adequately demonstrated that they could farm their parcel intensively at a profit, the county’s decision was affirmed.

We review pursuant to ORS Section 6a(8)(a), ch 772, Or Laws 1979, as amended by ch 748, Or Laws 1981, to examine whether LUBA’s order was unlawful in substance.

THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT PROCESS

LCDC is charged with authority to review county comprehensive plans and implementing ordinances for compliance with the statewide planning goals.

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Bluebook (online)
666 P.2d 1332, 295 Or. 311, 1983 Ore. LEXIS 1360, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/byrd-v-stringer-or-1983.