Byrd v. STATE THROUGH DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY

637 So. 2d 114
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedMay 23, 1994
Docket93-C-2765
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 637 So. 2d 114 (Byrd v. STATE THROUGH DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Byrd v. STATE THROUGH DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY, 637 So. 2d 114 (La. 1994).

Opinion

637 So.2d 114 (1994)

Eugene BYRD
v.
STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS and the State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Health and Human Resources.

No. 93-C-2765.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 23, 1994.
Rehearing Denied June 24, 1994.

Vincent R. Cicardo, Alexandria, for applicant.

Robert S. Leake, Robert W. Stratton, Baton Rouge, Richard P. Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., for respondents.

*115 MARVIN, Justice Ad Hoc.[1]

In this medical malpractice action this court granted a writ to review whether the court of appeal's reversal, on factual grounds, of the trial court judgment in plaintiff's favor was based on a misapplication of the clearly wrong standard of appellate review this court has mandated. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989); Stobart v. State Through DOTD, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993).

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the appellate court's reversal of the trial court judgment on the basis of clear factual error was correct for reasons which we hereafter assign.

POSTURE

Plaintiff Eugene Byrd suffered from chronic intermittent diarrhea, rectal bleeding and abdominal cramps from December 1985 until February 1987, when his inflamed and severely ulcerated colon was surgically removed. For most of this time, Byrd was in the custody of the State Department of Corrections, first in the parish jail in Alexandria and then at Hunt Correctional Center in St. Gabriel.

While incarcerated, Byrd received medical treatment for his condition at Hunt and at state hospitals in Pineville, Baton Rouge and New Orleans. Byrd's symptoms had subsided when he was released from custody on January 6, 1987, but recurred shortly thereafter, causing him to return to the state hospital in Pineville on January 13, 1987, where his colon was removed on February 19, 1987, after steroids failed to reduce the inflammation of his colon.

Byrd sued the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections and through the Department of Health and Human Resources, alleging generally that the state's doctors misdiagnosed and improperly treated his condition and specifically that malpractice was committed in these respects in his medical treatment before January 1987. Byrd later claimed that malpractice occurred during his January 1987 diagnosis and treatment, although he did not formally amend his pleadings to specifically include such allegations. At trial, the State objected to evidence of malpractice involving Byrd's medical care in January 1987, arguing that it was beyond the scope of Byrd's pleadings. The trial court overruled the objection. The court found that Byrd's medical treatment before January 1987 comported with the applicable standard of care, but found malpractice occurred in the January 1987 diagnosis and treatment and awarded Byrd $350,000 in damages.

Byrd did not seek appellate review of the trial court's ruling that no malpractice occurred before January 1987. The State appealed the judgment on both procedural and substantive grounds, arguing that the trial court should not have admitted evidence on Byrd's claim of malpractice in January 1987 because he did not formally plead that claim, and that the court was clearly wrong in finding the State negligent on the basis of that evidence, even if it was admissible.

Reversing on the substantive issue, the appellate court concluded the trial court was clearly wrong in finding that the evidence preponderately proved each of the three factual elements of a malpractice cause of action under LSA-R.S. 9:2794: the applicable standard of care, breach of that standard, and injury caused by the substandard conduct. The appellate court did not squarely rule on the procedural issue raised by the State. Byrd v. State, Through DPS, 625 So.2d 315 (La.App. 3d Cir.1993).

Pretermitting discussion of the procedural issue, we shall assume, for discussion purposes, that the evidence about Byrd's medical treatment in January 1987 was admissible. That evidence, which we shall discuss in detail below, however, and even when viewed most favorably toward upholding the trial court judgment, simply does not reasonably support the trial court's factual findings. The trial court's view of the evidence, on this record, is not a "permissible" view under Rosell and Stobart, cited supra.

*116 FACTS

The medical evidence explains that Byrd had one or more types of colitis, or inflammation of the colon, during the period 1985-1987. Colitis may be caused by bacterial or viral agents or may also occur without an identifiable cause. The inflammation may be limited to the lowest part of the colon, the rectum, in which case it is called proctitis, or it may extend to other parts of the colon, which form a rather lengthy inverted U-shape in the abdomen and include the sigmoid colon, the ascending colon, the transverse colon and the descending colon.

Symptoms such as Byrd experienced (diarrhea, cramps and rectal bleeding) are commonly associated with every type of colitis of whatever etiology. Diagnostic tests are performed to identify the cause of these symptoms. If the tests reveal the presence of a bacterial or viral agent in the colon or rectum, the colitis is named according to the cause of the inflammation (i.e., viral colitis, or, more specifically, herpetic colitis if the virus can be identified as the herpes simplex virus). If the cause of the colitis cannot be discovered by the diagnostic tests, the condition is simply called ulcerative colitis. Byrd's condition was diagnosed as herpetic proctitis in September 1986, as herpetic colitis in December 1986, and as ulcerative colitis in January 1987.

Ulcerative colitis may affect all or only part of the colon, while herpetic colitis generally does not affect the entire colon unless the patient's immune system is compromised, as, for instance, by a condition such as AIDS. Byrd was not an immunocompromised patient. Areas of internal inflammation of the colon may be seen by the use of lighted tubes or "scopes" which are inserted through the anus and into the colon to allow the doctor to view all or part of the colon. When the inflammation is mild or moderate, the appearance of the colon is much different in a case of herpetic colitis than in ulcerative colitis. If the inflammation is severe, however, the appearance of the colon is similar for both herpetic and ulcerative colitis. The appropriate medical treatment of these two conditions differs in the respects discussed below.

The inflammation Byrd experienced was initially limited to his rectum, being revealed by a visual examination of his lower colon (rectum and sigmoid colon) with a sigmoidoscope. The sigmoidoscopy was performed at Charity Hospital in New Orleans in August 1986. Doctors there diagnosed his condition as herpetic proctitis in September 1986 after learning that a tissue sample taken from his rectum tested positive for the presence of the herpes simplex virus.

Herpetic colitis is not curable medically but goes through periods of spontaneous exacerbation and remission, or waxing and waning. The antiviral medication Acyclovir, also marketed as Zovirax, may reduce the duration and severity of the herpetic episode during periods of exacerbation, but is not always prescribed, even when the herpes virus is known to be the cause of the patient's inflammation, because the symptoms generally resolve on their own, without medical intervention.

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