Byrd v. State

228 So. 2d 874
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 24, 1969
Docket45559
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 228 So. 2d 874 (Byrd v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mississippi Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Byrd v. State, 228 So. 2d 874 (Mich. 1969).

Opinion

228 So.2d 874 (1969)

Lawrence BYRD
v.
STATE of Mississippi.

No. 45559.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

November 24, 1969.

*875 Sullivan & Sullivan, Hattiesburg, for appellant.

A.F. Summer, Atty. Gen., by Guy N. Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

JONES, Justice:

Section 2006, Mississippi Code of 1942 Annotated (1956) defines the crime of arson first degree as follows:

Any person who wilfully and maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any dwelling house, whether occupied, unoccupied or vacant, or any kitchen, shop, barn, stable or other outhouse that is parcel thereof, or belonging to or adjoining thereto, whether the property of himself or of another, shall be guilty of arson in the first degree, and upon conviction thereof, be sentenced to the penitentiary for not less than two nor more than twenty years.

Appellant was indicted under this section following the words of the section by using "or". In other words, the crime was charged in the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive. A demurrer was filed to the indictment, and the district attorney, with permission of the court, then amended by striking out the word "or" and writing in the place of it "and" so as to charge the various acts in the conjunctive.

A demurrer and a motion to quash was filed to the amended indictment on the ground that the original indictment was not amendable.

Section 2449 of the Mississippi Code of 1942 Annotated (1956) provides for the amendment of indictments in cases of formal defects. It will be noted that the amended indictment did not change the crime charged and did not add any new elements thereto. As stated in 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 240, page 1250 (1944):

The test of whether an accused is prejudiced by the amendment of an indictment *876 or information has been said to be whether or not a defense under the indictment or information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made and whether or not any evidence accused might have would be equally applicable to the indictment or information in the one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance, * * *

This is the rule that has been adopted by our Court. Kelly v. State, 239 Miss. 683, 124 So.2d 840, 85 A.L.R.2d 1199 (1960); Gillespie v. State, 221 Miss. 116, 72 So.2d 245 (1954); Hearn v. State, 219 Miss. 412, 69 So.2d 223 (1954); Perciful v. Holley, 217 Miss. 203, 63 So.2d 817 (1953); Mays v. State, 216 Miss. 631, 63 So.2d 110 (1953); Osser v. State, 165 Miss. 680, 145 So. 754 (1932); Sauer v. State, 166 Miss. 507, 144 So. 225 (1932).

The case of Lenoir v. State, 237 Miss. 620, 115 So.2d 731 (1959) involved child desertion where the statute provided for various acts constituting desertion and non-support, the said various acts being connected by the disjunctive "or". The indictment charged a violation of Section 2087 by the use of the conjunctive word "and". A question was raised as to the indictment in that case, and the Court said:

It is a general rule that where a statute denounces as an offense two or more distinctive acts, things, or transactions enumerated therein in the disjunctive, the whole may be charged conjunctively and the defendant found guilty of either one. Section 1798, Vol. 4, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure; 27 Am. Jur., Indictment and Information, Sec. 104. This Court seems to have followed this general rule in cases involving other statutes. Cf. State v. Sam, 154 Miss. 14, 122 So. 101; Sauer v. State, 166 Miss. 507, 144 So. 225; Turner v. State, 177 Miss. 272, 171 So. 21; Brady v. State, 128 Miss. 575, 91 So. 277; State v. Clarke, 97 Miss. 806, 52 So. 691; Coleman v. State, 94 Miss. 860, 48 So. 181, and West v. State, Miss., 49 So.2d 271. 237 Miss. at 623-624, 115 So.2d at 732.

The court did not err on this ground.

The appellant moved that the State be required to elect the offense on which appellant would be tried, and also demurred to the amended indictment, both of which were overruled. A motion was made to quash the indictment. It was alleged that appellant was summoned before the grand jury and that he should be granted immunity under the constitutional clause providing against self-incrimination.

It was stipulated, however, that while the appellant was summoned before the grand jury, he answered in response to the first question propounded to him that he claimed his rights under the Fifth Amendment, and he was thereupon immediately excused. He did not testify to one fact. Consequently there is no error in refusing to quash the indictment because of his appearance before the grand jury.

It is argued that partiality was evident in the trial as a whole. This argument is without any substantial basis. The trial covered three full days and approximately one thousand pages of transcript. Complaints that the judge urged dispatch and gave his reasons sometimes for his ruling on objections and insisted on proceeding does not manifest any partiality. Such things occur in every case of any length, and we have found no evidence in this record that would justify our holding that impartiality was lacking. The above questions are raised by the appellant and are discussed here because, as to them, it is unnecessary to discuss the actual facts shown on the trial.

This is a companion case to that of Smith v. State, 223 So.2d 657 (Miss. 1969) and involved the burning of the residence of one Vernon Dahmer in which he and his family were sleeping; the burning being *877 done at midnight on January 10, 1966, near Hattiesburg, Mississippi. The Smith case, supra, will give an "overall picture" of the situation and the question here is whether the evidence was sufficient to connect appellant Byrd with the said offense. He was not actually present at the burning.

Two witnesses in this case testified that the appellant was present at two meetings of the Ku Klux Klan near Laurel, Mississippi. It was stated that one of these meetings was held on property belonging to Byrd, but there was a conflict as to this. At the first meeting, it was testified that Sam H. Bowers, the Imperial Wizard, spoke and was vehement in his condemnation of Vernon Dahmer and said that something had to be done about him. He wanted to burn him out or kill him, such acts being designated by Numbers 3 and 4. It was suggested that a "dry run" first be made by the property for reconnaissance purposes. Byrd said that he could not go because of back trouble he was having. The "dry run" was gone through and there was another meeting in another part of the county where the matter was further discussed, and Byrd was present. Although no one could testify as to what he said, witnesses did state that he made some remarks, but they could not understand them except for the statement about the condition of his back.

It is shown from one of the meetings that Byrd drove one of those who was to go on the run to that party's filling station in the filling station operator's car and then carried the car home with him where it was left with the keys in it, available to the owner who secured it the next morning before Byrd arose.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation obtained a statement from Byrd as to his connection with the matter, which statement consists of twenty-two typewritten pages.

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Bluebook (online)
228 So. 2d 874, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/byrd-v-state-miss-1969.