Byrd v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Byrd v. State

867 So. 2d 1260, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 3495, 2004 WL 524892

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMarch 18, 2004

DocketNo. 1D03-1450

StatusPublished

This text of 867 So. 2d 1260 (Byrd v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Byrd v. State, 867 So. 2d 1260, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 3495, 2004 WL 524892 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004).

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WEBSTER, J.

Appellant seeks review of a conviction, following a non-jury trial, for stopping payment on a check with intent to defraud in violation of section 832.041(1), Florida Statutes (2002). Her only argument is that the evidence presented was legally insufficient to support the trial court’s determination of guilt. We disagree, and affirm.

The testimony of the state’s witnesses was irreconcilable with that of appellant. Appellant claimed that she did not form the intent to stop payment on the check until after she had presented it as payment for automotive repairs. However, if believed, testimony from the state’s witnesses was legally sufficient to contradict appellant’s account, and to support a finding that appellant did intend to stop payment (and thereby defraud the auto repair shop) at the time she presented the check. The trial court chose to believe the state’s witnesses rather than appellant. Because the trial court’s determination is supported by legally sufficient evidence, we may not reweigh that evidence and arrive at a different conclusion. See State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120, 133 (Fla.2003) (noting that “[cjompetent, substantial evidence is tantamount to legally sufficient evidence, and a reviewing court must assess the record evidence for its sufficiency only, not its weight”). Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

ALLEN, J., concurs; BENTON, J., dissents with written opinion.

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WEBSTER, J.

Appellant seeks review of a conviction, following a non-jury trial, for stopping payment on a check with intent to defraud in violation of section 832.041(1), Florida Statutes (2002). Her only argument is that the evidence presented was legally insufficient to support the trial court’s determination of guilt. We disagree, and affirm.

The testimony of the state’s witnesses was irreconcilable with that of appellant. Appellant claimed that she did not form the intent to stop payment on the check until after she had presented it as payment for automotive repairs. However, if believed, testimony from the state’s witnesses was legally sufficient to contradict appellant’s account, and to support a finding that appellant did intend to stop payment (and thereby defraud the auto repair shop) at the time she presented the check. The trial court chose to believe the state’s witnesses rather than appellant. Because the trial court’s determination is supported by legally sufficient evidence, we may not reweigh that evidence and arrive at a different conclusion. See State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120, 133 (Fla.2003) (noting that “[cjompetent, substantial evidence is tantamount to legally sufficient evidence, and a reviewing court must assess the record evidence for its sufficiency only, not its weight”). Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

ALLEN, J., concurs; BENTON, J., dissents with written opinion.

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867 So. 2d 1260, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 3495, 2004 WL 524892, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/byrd-v-state-fladistctapp-2004.

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