Byrd v. Brush Wellman, Inc.

753 F. Supp. 1403, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16387, 1990 WL 198080
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Tennessee
DecidedJanuary 19, 1990
DocketCIV-1-87-134
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 753 F. Supp. 1403 (Byrd v. Brush Wellman, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Byrd v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1403, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16387, 1990 WL 198080 (E.D. Tenn. 1990).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

EDGAR, District Judge.

This products liability case is presently before the Court upon the second motion of defendant Brush-Wellman Corporation for summary judgment. (Court File No. 84). The defendant’s original motion for summary judgment (Court File No. 41) was denied by the Court (Court File No. 73). However, because of a recent development in Tennessee law which has now been raised by Brush-Wellman, the defendant’s motion will be GRANTED.

I. Background,

Plaintiffs contend the defendant manufactured, sold and delivered its beryllium-containing product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to its intended users in that the defendant failed to provide an adequate warning of the risks associated with the use of beryllium-containing products and, further, failed to properly instruct foreseeable users of its products in the proper manner to safely handle beryllium-containing products.

Plaintiff Fred L. Byrd worked in Chattanooga for the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (“3M”) and its successor, the General Electric Corporation (“GE”), from 1965 until 1986. During his employment, Mr. Byrd was exposed to beryllium oxide produced by Brush-Wellman. As a result of this exposure, he has developed berylliosis, a debilitating lung disease, which may result in death.

II. Discussion

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if, based on the record as a whole, there is no genuine issue of any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party “bears the burden of clearly and convincingly establishing the non-existence of any genuine issue of mate *1404 rial fact, and the evidence as well as the inferences drawn therefrom must be read in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir.1986).

However, “[o]nce the moving party presents sufficient evidence to support the motion under Rule 56(c), ... [t]he nonmov-ing party is not entitled to a trial merely on the basis of allegations; significant probative evidence must be presented to support the complaint.” Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 861 (6th Cir.1986) (emphasis supplied). Only factual disputes whose resolution “might affect the outcome of the suit” are “material” and preclude the entry of summary judgment. 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir.1987). If, after reviewing the evidence, it appears that no such genuine issue of fact exists, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In considering the prior motion for summary judgment, this Court found genuine issues of material fact to exist as to the adequacy of Brush-Wellman’s warning to 3M and 3M employees and as to the issue of causation. However, it is now necessary to take another look at this case in light of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Whitehead v. Dycho, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn.1989).

In Whitehead, the plaintiff and her husband brought a products liability action for plaintiffs personal injuries resulting from an explosion caused by the chemical naphtha. Defendants were manufacturers and distributors of the naphtha sold to the plaintiffs employer, Magnavox. The plaintiff had access to the naphtha at work. She brought some of the chemical home with her to clean glue off her work apron, but, instead, the chemical caused a violent explosion, resulting in serious injury to the plaintiff.

In affirming the trial court, the court stated: “We are of the opinion that the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment for the Defendants, but for different reasons.” Id. at 598. The reasons set forth by the trial court were:

1. Defendants owed no duty to warn the Plaintiff with respect to the dangers of naptha because Magnavox was “a skilled, sophisticated, industrial purchaser in bulk from the defendants,”
2. Magnavox was a learned intermediary, who the defendants could reasonably rely upon to warn its employees of the dangers of naptha and to instruct them in its use, and
3. Magnavox’s “use of the product was unforeseeable as a matter of law.”

Id. at 596.

In affirming summary judgment, the Tennessee Supreme Court is unclear as to whether or not it adopts comment n to section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1985), which states: '

Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
Comment:
n. Giving to the third person through whom the chattel is supplied all the information necessary to its safe use is not in all cases sufficient to relieve the supplier from liability. It is merely a means by which this information is to be conveyed to those who are to use the chattel. The *1405 question remains whether this method gives a reasonable assurance that the information will reach those whose safety depends upon their having it....

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Bluebook (online)
753 F. Supp. 1403, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16387, 1990 WL 198080, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/byrd-v-brush-wellman-inc-tned-1990.