Byler v. City of Kodiak

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 19, 2026
• Docket: 24-6991
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 19 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DARREN K. BYLER, Preferred Marine No. 24-6991 Mortgage Lien Holder M/V Wild Alaskan, D.C. No. 3:23-cv-00067-SLG-MMS Plaintiff - Appellant, MEMORANDUM* and

OIL SPILL RESPONSE VESSELS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF KODIAK; PAT BRANSON; MIKE TVENGE; JOSIE BAHNKE; MICHAEL SARNOWSKI; CHARLES DAVIDSON; TERRY J. HAINES; RICHARD WALKER; JOHN WHIDDON; LAURA ARBOLEDA; COOPER G. CURTIS; HIGHMARK MARINE FABRICATION, LLC,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska Sharon L. Gleason, District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Submitted February 18, 2026**

Before: CALLAHAN, FRIEDLAND, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Darren K. Byler appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations arising from the

impoundment and scuttling of the maritime vessel Wild Alaskan. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis of the applicable statute of

limitations. Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004).

We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d

1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.

The district court properly determined that the local ordinances related to the

harbor were not preempted by federal maritime law and properly dismissed as

time-barred Byler’s claims arising from the 2017 impoundment of the Wild

Alaskan. See Alaska Stat. § 09.10.070 (providing two-year statute of limitations for

personal property claims); Cholla Ready Mix, 382 F.3d at 974 (stating that courts

borrow the most appropriate state statute of limitations for § 1983 claims); Barber

v. State of Hawai’i, 42 F.3d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting “the Supreme

Court’s longstanding recognition that anchorage and mooring rules are best left to

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 24-6991 the states in the absence of compelling government interests to the contrary”).

Dismissal of Byler’s procedural due process claim arising from the sinking

of the Wild Alaskan in 2021 was proper because the local ordinance notice

provision did not create a constitutional right to receive such notification. See

James v. Rowlands, 606 F.3d 646, 657 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the

violation of a statute requiring notice did not give rise to a procedural due process

claim because it did not create a protected right).

The district court properly dismissed Byler’s claims against the Highmark

defendants because Byler failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the

Highmark defendants acted under color of state law. See Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d

423, 445-46 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth tests for determining whether a private

entity acted under color of state law and whether a private entity was the proximate

cause of the alleged violation).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Byler’s motion for

default against the Highmark defendants because they responded timely to the

complaint after the district court’s extension of time. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d

1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth standard of review and factors to

consider before entering default judgment).

Contrary to Byler’s contention, the district court properly disregarded

Byler’s proposed amended complaint because, despite being granted leave to

3 24-6991 amend, Byler elected to stand on his initial complaint.

We reject as unsupported by the record Byler’s contentions that the district

judge was required to recuse herself under 28 U.S.C. § 455 and that the district

court erred in not addressing his defamation claim.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

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