Bykova v. McBrayer

2013 Ohio 5745

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 26, 2013
• Docket: 100172
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Bykova v. McBrayer, 2013-Ohio-5745.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 100172

IRINA BYKOVA PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

vs.

DENISE MCBRAYER DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

JUDGMENT: DISMISSED

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-791833

BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, J., Boyle, P.J., and McCormack, J.

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 26, 2013 FOR APPELLANT

Irina Bykova, pro se 3056 West 44th Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113

FOR APPELLEE

Denise McBrayer, pro se 3060 West 44th Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Irina Bykova (“Bykova”), appeals the trial court’s

judgment adopting defendant-appellee’s, Denise McBrayer’s (“McBrayer”), proposed

settlement terms in its final judgment. Having determined that the court’s final judgment

is not a final, appealable order, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

{¶2} Bykova and McBrayer have had an antagonistic relationship since Bykova

and her family moved in next door to McBrayer’s house. Although the parties’

relationship was hostile from the start, Bykova eventually sought a civil protection order,

alleging that McBrayer’s behavior had become increasingly aggressive. Following a

hearing on the motion, the court ordered the parties to submit proposed terms that the

court could adopt in its final decision. The trial court subsequently rendered the

following judgment:

Parties submitted agreed upon terms both of which are hereby incorporated

into a court order. The court reserves jurisdiction to enforce the parties’

agreed upon terms for coexistence. With any perceived violation of these

terms, parties are hereby directed to contact the court at which time a

contempt hearing may be scheduled. This matter is hereby deemed

resolved.

{¶3} The main purpose of a final order or judgment is to terminate the case or

controversy the parties presented to the trial court for resolution. Stumph Rd. Properties

v. Vargo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89811, 2008-Ohio-1830, ¶ 13. To terminate the matter, the court’s order must contain a statement of the relief granted to the parties.

Harkai v. Scherba Industries, Inc., 136 Ohio App.3d 211, 216, 736 N.E.2d 101 (9th

Dist.2000). A judgment that does not specify the relief granted does not terminate the

action and does not constitute a final, appealable order. Id. at 221. Furthermore, a

judgment that requires the parties to refer to other documents does not constitute a final,

appealable order. Golden Goose Properties v. Daniel Leizman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

99937, 2013- Ohio-5438, ¶ 7, citing Stumph Rd. Properties at ¶ 13.

{¶4} In this case, the trial court’s judgment expressly requires the parties to refer to

their proposed lists to determine their respective rights and obligations. The relief

purported to be granted is not evident from the face of the judgment entry. Therefore,

the court’s final judgment is not a final, appealable order.

{¶5} Appeal dismissed.

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and TIM McCORMACK, J., CONCUR