NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0631-24
B.Y.F.,1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
K.D.,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted January 12, 2026 – Decided February 24, 2026
Before Judges Walcott-Henderson and Bergman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FD-14-0224-24.
K.D., self-represented appellant.
Weiner Law Group, LLC, attorneys for respondent (William G. Johnson, Special County Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
1 We use initials and pseudonyms for the parties and child to protect the minor's privacy. See R. 1:38-3(d). Defendant K.D. appeals from the Family Part's September 17, 2024 order
denying his motion contesting the establishment of paternity and related child
support obligations concerning the parties' child, K.D. ("Kelly"). Having
reviewed the arguments in light of the record and applicable legal principles, we
affirm for the reasons expressed by Judge James M. DeMarzo in his thorough
oral decision.
I.
We limit our factual recitation to those relevant in this appeal. On July
12, 2017, the court established a child support order in the amount of $114 per
week payable by defendant to plaintiff for the benefit of their child, Kelly,
presumably based on defendant's signature on the certificate of parentage in
2008. Thereafter, in August 2018, the court entered an order suspending child
support based on defendant's application for paternity testing and plaintiff's
nonappearance and failure to provide a genetic sample for herself and the child.
The record exhibits defendant had previously submitted a DNA sample at
the Essex County Courthouse on June 11, 2018, but plaintiff and the child did
not submit their samples at the time. Eventually, after relocating to
Pennsylvania, plaintiff provided genetic samples on February 1, 2019 at a
A-0631-24 2 LabCorp facility in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. The test results indicated a
"99.99[percent]" probability of paternity for defendant.
In 2023, after plaintiff moved to Morris County and applied for
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, the Morris County Office of
Temporary Assistance ("MCOTA") made application to reinstate child support.
On August 8, 2023, a Family Part judge in Essex County ordered plaintiff and
the child to comply with genetic test but the prior 2019 test results were
eventually located and presented to the court.
At a hearing on October 13, 2023, where plaintiff, defendant, and MCOTA
appeared, the court referenced the LabCorp test from February 2019 and asked
defendant if he was Kelly's father. Defendant replied "Yes." On that same date
the judge entered an order for paternity "by consent and DNA testing dated
2/1/2019," and established child support payable by defendant in the amount of
$149 per week.
Subsequently, venue was transferred to Morris County where defendant
moved for a new round of DNA testing, challenging the validity and chain of
custody of the 2019 results and arguing procedural irregularities and possible
fraud. The motion judge denied the application. The judge found the evidence
of paternity was overwhelming, noting consistent paperwork, thumbprints, and
A-0631-24 3 account numbers in the LabCorp documentation; defendant's sample in Essex
County; plaintiff's sample in Pennsylvania; and a certificate of parentage signed
by both parties from 2008 when the child was born.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial judge failed to address
fundamental procedural defects and testing irregularities and violated his due
process rights constituting reversible error. Specifically, defendant contends the
judge: (1) accepted compromised unauthenticated testing evidence constituting
an abuse of discretion; (2) relied on an allegedly fraudulent certificate of
parentage despite evidence of misrepresentation; (3) erred by failing to find the
procedures surrounding the paternity testing constituted extrinsic fraud; and (4)
demonstrated prejudicial bias, undermining his right to a fair hearing.
Plaintiff opposed, arguing defendant provided no evidence of mistake,
fraud, or newly discovered facts sufficient to vacate the paternity and child
support orders under Rule 4:50-1. Plaintiff contends all procedures, including
chain of custody, were followed, and that defendant's admission under oath, his
prior conduct, and the genetic testing results support affirmance.
II.
"Our review of a Family Part judge's findings is limited[,] . . . 'afford[ing]
substantial deference to the Family Part's findings of fact because of that court's
A-0631-24 4 special expertise in family matters.'" Voynick v. Voynick, 481 N.J. Super. 207,
220-21 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting W.M. v. D.G., 467 N.J. Super. 216, 229 (App.
Div. 2021)). Pursuant to this standard, "we are bound to uphold a finding that
is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." Moynihan v. Lynch,
250 N.J. 60, 90 (2022) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). "We
will reverse only if we find the [court] clearly abused [its] discretion." Voynick,
481 N.J. Super. at 221 (alterations in original) (quoting Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J.
Super. 61, 72 (App. Div. 2012)).
"We apply that deference to a Family Part judge's decision regarding a
child support obligation." Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App.
Div. 2012). However, the "[court's] legal conclusions, and the application of
those conclusions to the facts, are subject to [a reviewing court 's] plenary
review." Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 535 (App. Div.
2015) (quoting Reese, 430 N.J. Super. at 568). We review questions of law and
statutory interpretation decisions de novo. Cardali v. Cardali, 255 N.J. 85, 107
(2023).
"The decision [as to] whether to vacate a judgment . . . is a determination
left to the sound discretion of the trial court, guided by principles of equity. "
F.B. v. A.L.G., 176 N.J. 201, 207 (2003). "The trial court's determination under
A-0631-24 5 [Rule 4:50-1] warrants substantial deference and should not be reversed unless
it results in a clear abuse of discretion." US Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209
N.J. 449, 467 (2012).
When a court has entered a [final order], the party seeking to vacate the
[the order] must meet the standard of Rule 4:50-1, which in pertinent part states:
On motion, with briefs and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a[n] . . . order for the following reasons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (c) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; . . . or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.
A party seeking relief from a paternity judgment faces an elevated
standard where prior admissions, certifications of parentage, and DNA test
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0631-24
B.Y.F.,1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
K.D.,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted January 12, 2026 – Decided February 24, 2026
Before Judges Walcott-Henderson and Bergman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, Docket No. FD-14-0224-24.
K.D., self-represented appellant.
Weiner Law Group, LLC, attorneys for respondent (William G. Johnson, Special County Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
1 We use initials and pseudonyms for the parties and child to protect the minor's privacy. See R. 1:38-3(d). Defendant K.D. appeals from the Family Part's September 17, 2024 order
denying his motion contesting the establishment of paternity and related child
support obligations concerning the parties' child, K.D. ("Kelly"). Having
reviewed the arguments in light of the record and applicable legal principles, we
affirm for the reasons expressed by Judge James M. DeMarzo in his thorough
oral decision.
I.
We limit our factual recitation to those relevant in this appeal. On July
12, 2017, the court established a child support order in the amount of $114 per
week payable by defendant to plaintiff for the benefit of their child, Kelly,
presumably based on defendant's signature on the certificate of parentage in
2008. Thereafter, in August 2018, the court entered an order suspending child
support based on defendant's application for paternity testing and plaintiff's
nonappearance and failure to provide a genetic sample for herself and the child.
The record exhibits defendant had previously submitted a DNA sample at
the Essex County Courthouse on June 11, 2018, but plaintiff and the child did
not submit their samples at the time. Eventually, after relocating to
Pennsylvania, plaintiff provided genetic samples on February 1, 2019 at a
A-0631-24 2 LabCorp facility in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. The test results indicated a
"99.99[percent]" probability of paternity for defendant.
In 2023, after plaintiff moved to Morris County and applied for
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, the Morris County Office of
Temporary Assistance ("MCOTA") made application to reinstate child support.
On August 8, 2023, a Family Part judge in Essex County ordered plaintiff and
the child to comply with genetic test but the prior 2019 test results were
eventually located and presented to the court.
At a hearing on October 13, 2023, where plaintiff, defendant, and MCOTA
appeared, the court referenced the LabCorp test from February 2019 and asked
defendant if he was Kelly's father. Defendant replied "Yes." On that same date
the judge entered an order for paternity "by consent and DNA testing dated
2/1/2019," and established child support payable by defendant in the amount of
$149 per week.
Subsequently, venue was transferred to Morris County where defendant
moved for a new round of DNA testing, challenging the validity and chain of
custody of the 2019 results and arguing procedural irregularities and possible
fraud. The motion judge denied the application. The judge found the evidence
of paternity was overwhelming, noting consistent paperwork, thumbprints, and
A-0631-24 3 account numbers in the LabCorp documentation; defendant's sample in Essex
County; plaintiff's sample in Pennsylvania; and a certificate of parentage signed
by both parties from 2008 when the child was born.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial judge failed to address
fundamental procedural defects and testing irregularities and violated his due
process rights constituting reversible error. Specifically, defendant contends the
judge: (1) accepted compromised unauthenticated testing evidence constituting
an abuse of discretion; (2) relied on an allegedly fraudulent certificate of
parentage despite evidence of misrepresentation; (3) erred by failing to find the
procedures surrounding the paternity testing constituted extrinsic fraud; and (4)
demonstrated prejudicial bias, undermining his right to a fair hearing.
Plaintiff opposed, arguing defendant provided no evidence of mistake,
fraud, or newly discovered facts sufficient to vacate the paternity and child
support orders under Rule 4:50-1. Plaintiff contends all procedures, including
chain of custody, were followed, and that defendant's admission under oath, his
prior conduct, and the genetic testing results support affirmance.
II.
"Our review of a Family Part judge's findings is limited[,] . . . 'afford[ing]
substantial deference to the Family Part's findings of fact because of that court's
A-0631-24 4 special expertise in family matters.'" Voynick v. Voynick, 481 N.J. Super. 207,
220-21 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting W.M. v. D.G., 467 N.J. Super. 216, 229 (App.
Div. 2021)). Pursuant to this standard, "we are bound to uphold a finding that
is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." Moynihan v. Lynch,
250 N.J. 60, 90 (2022) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). "We
will reverse only if we find the [court] clearly abused [its] discretion." Voynick,
481 N.J. Super. at 221 (alterations in original) (quoting Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J.
Super. 61, 72 (App. Div. 2012)).
"We apply that deference to a Family Part judge's decision regarding a
child support obligation." Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J. Super. 109, 116 (App.
Div. 2012). However, the "[court's] legal conclusions, and the application of
those conclusions to the facts, are subject to [a reviewing court 's] plenary
review." Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 535 (App. Div.
2015) (quoting Reese, 430 N.J. Super. at 568). We review questions of law and
statutory interpretation decisions de novo. Cardali v. Cardali, 255 N.J. 85, 107
(2023).
"The decision [as to] whether to vacate a judgment . . . is a determination
left to the sound discretion of the trial court, guided by principles of equity. "
F.B. v. A.L.G., 176 N.J. 201, 207 (2003). "The trial court's determination under
A-0631-24 5 [Rule 4:50-1] warrants substantial deference and should not be reversed unless
it results in a clear abuse of discretion." US Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209
N.J. 449, 467 (2012).
When a court has entered a [final order], the party seeking to vacate the
[the order] must meet the standard of Rule 4:50-1, which in pertinent part states:
On motion, with briefs and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a[n] . . . order for the following reasons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (c) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; . . . or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.
A party seeking relief from a paternity judgment faces an elevated
standard where prior admissions, certifications of parentage, and DNA test
results are in the record. See F.B. v. A.L.G., 176 N.J. 201 (2003).
Authentication of scientific evidence for purposes of admission requires the
proponent to present sufficient evidence to support a finding the item is what it
purports to be. N.J.R.E. 901. The chain of custody, documentation,
thumbprints, and identification are all relevant to this inquiry.
As found by the trial judge, defendant submitted a genetic sample on June
11, 2018 at the Essex County Courthouse, with a signature, thumbprint, and
A-0631-24 6 photograph. Plaintiff and the minor child provided samples on February 1, 2019
at LabCorp's Bethlehem, Pennsylvania facility. LabCorp, an accredited facility,
processed the samples and reported a 99.99 percent probability of paternity.
Notification letters dated February 8, 2019 were sent to both parties stating the
result. From this record, we conclude defendant presented no credible evidence
to the judge to suggest the results were unreliable as a result of tampering,
mislabeling, or substitution. Defendant provided no expert testimony,
contradictory documentation, or any credible basis to disturb the court's
findings. Moreover, defendant's bare assertions that Essex County "declared the
results fraudulent" are belied by the record.
While defendant contends procedural irregularities occurred, particularly
in the time gap between the collection of the samples and the
publication/issuance of the LabCorp results, these delays were caused by
plaintiff's relocation to Pennsylvania, where she subsequently complied with the
testing requirement and provided samples for herself and Kelly to LabCorp. We
concur with Judge DeMarzo's findings that there is no evidence that the integrity
of the testing process or chain of custody was compromised.
In addition, at the October 13, 2023 hearing, defendant confirmed under
oath he was Kelly's father after the court referenced the genetic testing results.
A-0631-24 7 Even if defendant is correct that he never signed the certificates, he did not
challenge the 2019 genetic testing result until 2023, despite notification of the
results in February 2019. Nevertheless, the trial court reviewed all of the
evidence on the merits, including the genetic testing and found defendant was
the father based on substantial, credible evidence in the record, thus, the court's
finding is entitled to deference. Voynick, 481 N.J. at 220-21.
We now turn to defendant's assertion of extrinsic fraud related to the court
procedures to obtain the genetic testing of the parties and child. Extrinsic fraud
that would justify equitable relief is such that the party asserting it has been
deprived of a fair process. See Zelek v. Brosseau, 47 N.J. Super. 521 (App. Div.
1957). Here, the record exhibits the defendant was properly notified and was
given an opportunity to contest paternity, including access to the genetic testing
and results. Defendant's assertion that he did not receive the 2019 results until
years later does not establish a fraudulent withholding or unreliability in the
testing procedures, but instead reflects his own failure to follow up with a
request to review the results in a timely manner.
We further determine the record does not support defendant's claims of
bias by the judge. We note "judges must avoid acting in a biased way or in a
manner that may be perceived as partial." DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 514
A-0631-24 8 (2008) (emphasis omitted). However, "bias is not established by the fact that a
litigant is disappointed in a court's ruling on an issue," and the litigant's "belief
that the proceedings were unfair must be objectively reasonable." State v.
Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 186, 279 (1997). The record here does not exhibit
objective proof of conduct by the judge manifesting prejudice or partiality that
affected the fairness of the hearing. Although defendant objects to certain
comments made by the court, we conclude the remarks did not show judicial
bias affecting the outcome. Nor can we conclude any comments of the judge
would override the evidence supporting the judge's denial of defendant's motion,
including the certificate of parentage signed by defendant, his admissions of
paternity and, most importantly, conclusive documentary and scientific proof of
his paternity presented through genetic testing. The record shows the court
permitted defendant and his attorney to fully present his case, make inquiries,
and respond to questions, which we conclude resulted in a fair hearing.
To the extent we have not addressed any of defendant's remaining
arguments, we conclude those arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-0631-24 9