Bydatel Corp. v. Clarke

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Bydatel Corp. v. Clarke

156 A.D.2d 956

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 20, 1989

DocketAppeal No. 2

StatusPublished

This text of 156 A.D.2d 956 (Bydatel Corp. v. Clarke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bydatel Corp. v. Clarke, 156 A.D.2d 956 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989).

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Opinion

Judgment unanimously affirmed with costs. Memorandum: Generally, it is the responsibility of the courts to interpret written instruments (see, Hartford Ace. & Indent. Co. v Wesolowski, 33 NY2d 169; Mallad Constr. Corp. v County Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 32 NY2d 285). We conclude that Special Term, in interpreting the parties’ document, correctly found that it constituted a valid contract between Bydatel and Nipacan. Further, the failure of Nipacan’s agent, Richard Clarke, to use the standard representative signature form to bind a principal does not alter this result because the instrument clearly establishes the parties’ intent that Clarke was signing on behalf of Nipacan (see, 2 NY Jur 2d, Agency, §§ 181, 182). Since respondent Clarke did not cross-appeal from Special Term’s order staying his demand for arbitration, this issue has not been preserved for appellate review. (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Forma, J. — arbitration.) Present —Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Denman, Green and Lawton, JJ.

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Judgment unanimously affirmed with costs. Memorandum: Generally, it is the responsibility of the courts to interpret written instruments (see, Hartford Ace. & Indent. Co. v Wesolowski, 33 NY2d 169; Mallad Constr. Corp. v County Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 32 NY2d 285). We conclude that Special Term, in interpreting the parties’ document, correctly found that it constituted a valid contract between Bydatel and Nipacan. Further, the failure of Nipacan’s agent, Richard Clarke, to use the standard representative signature form to bind a principal does not alter this result because the instrument clearly establishes the parties’ intent that Clarke was signing on behalf of Nipacan (see, 2 NY Jur 2d, Agency, §§ 181, 182). Since respondent Clarke did not cross-appeal from Special Term’s order staying his demand for arbitration, this issue has not been preserved for appellate review. (Appeal from judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Forma, J. — arbitration.) Present —Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Denman, Green and Lawton, JJ.

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156 A.D.2d 956, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bydatel-corp-v-clarke-nyappdiv-1989.

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