Buzianis v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 12, 2024
• Docket: 2:22-cv-02106
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 WO 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

11 Zachary Buzianis, No. 2:22-CV-02106-PHX-SMB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER

13 v.

14 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 15 Defendant. 16 17 At issue is the denial of Zachary Buzianis’ Application for disabled adult child’s 18 insurance benefits benefits by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) under the Social 19 Security Act (the “Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) and an Opening Brief (Doc. 20 14) seeking judicial review of that denial. Defendant SSA filed an Answering Brief (Doc. 21 17), to which Plaintiff replied (Doc. 18). After reviewing the parties’ briefs, the 22 Administrative Record (Doc. 12), and the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) decision, 23 (Doc. 12-3 at 15–24), the Court will affirm the ALJ’s decision for the reasons addressed 24 herein. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 On November 5, 2018, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for disabled adult 27 child’s insurance benefits, alleging a disability beginning on January 1, 2007. (Doc. 12-3 28 at 18.) Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied, and he filed a request for reconsideration in 1 February 2019. (See Doc. 12-7.) Upon reconsideration, Plaintiff’s claim was again denied 2 in March 2019. (Doc. 12-3 at 18.) Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an ALJ. (Id.) 3 On July 29, 2021, ALJ Tom Duann conducted an online video hearing. (Id.) After 4 the hearing and consideration of the medical evidence and opinions, the ALJ issued a 5 written decision in which he denied Plaintiff’s application for child insurance benefits and 6 concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled prior to February 2008. (Doc. 12-3 at 18–24.) 7 Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s Request for Review of the ALJ’s 8 decision—making it the SSA Commissioner’s (the “Commissioner”) final decision—and 9 this appeal followed. (Id. at 2–5.) 10 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 11 An ALJ’s factual findings “shall be conclusive if supported by substantial 12 evidence.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2019). The Court may set aside 13 the Commissioner’s disability determination only if it is not supported by substantial 14 evidence or based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). 15 Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 16 to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. Generally, “[w]here the 17 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the 18 ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 47, 19 954 (9th Cir. 2002). In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court 20 reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 21 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 The issue here is whether Plaintiff was disabled under Section 223(d) of the Act 24 prior to reaching the age of twenty-two. (Doc. 12-3 at 18.) Under Section 202(d) of the 25 Act, for Plaintiff to be entitled to disabled adult child’s insurance benefits, he must have a 26 disability that began before he reached the age of twenty-two. 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a). 27 The ALJ determined that Plaintiff turned twenty-two in February 2008 and therefore had 28 to prove that he was disabled by that time. (Doc. 12-3 at 22–23.) After reviewing the 1 medical evidence, the ALJ concluded that the earliest records indicating Plaintiff’s mental 2 impairments were from September 2008, and therefore found that Plaintiff was not disabled 3 for disabled adult child’s insurance benefits purposes. (Id.) 4 Plaintiff argues that by requiring medical treatments to establish an onset date, the 5 ALJ committed harmful error in evaluating Plaintiff’s case. (Doc. 14 at 3.) The 6 Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was not disabled by age twenty- 7 two is supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 17 at 4.) The Court has reviewed the 8 medical and administrative records and agrees with the Commissioner. 9 A. ALJ’s Interpretation of Medical Evidence 10 Under the Act, “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, 11 if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In the 12 context of evidentiary sufficiency, this threshold is not high. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. 13 Substantial evidence “means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable 14 mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co. 15 of New York v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 16 Here, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly believed that Plaintiff was required 17 to have medical records to document the existence of his mental impairments at the time 18 that the disability began. (Doc. 14 at 3–4.) The Commissioner argues that substantial 19 evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning 20 of the Act. (Doc. 17 at 4.) The earliest medical record indicating Plaintiff’s mental 21 impairments are from September 2008. (Doc. 12-3 at 22.) Dr. Jorge Salas, who treated 22 Plaintiff at that time, indicated that “the symptoms began approximately three months 23 ago[.]” (Doc. 12-8 at 3.) After being under the care of Dr. Salas, Plaintiff went on to be 24 under the care of Dr. Wendy Wells in November 2008. (Id. at 299.) Dr. Wells asserted 25 that Plaintiff’s symptoms “began in January 2007 and possibly earlier.” (Id.) 26 In finding Dr. Well’s opinion unpersuasive, the ALJ pointed out that Dr. Wells’ 27 assessment was based on reports by Plaintiff’s mother about his symptoms, and that those 28 reports were not corroborated by any other medical records. (Doc. 12-3 at 22.) The ALJ 1 || concluded that Dr. Wells opinion is “without a valid basis and these notes from Dr. Wells || are unpersuasive regarding the onset date of [Plaintiff's] mental impairments.” (/d.) || Furthermore, the ALJ considered the reports provided by psychological consultants U. 4|| Jacobs, Ph.D. and H. Patterson, Ph.D. which both noted insufficient evidence of mental 5 || impairments in the relevant time frame prior to the Plaintiff reaching the age of twenty- || two. Cd.) 7 In summary, the ALJ’s analysis considered Dr. Wells’ conclusion that □□□□□□□□□□□ 8 || symptoms existed prior to his attainment of age twenty-two but found it unpersuasive in 9|| light of the lack of medical records to support such a conclusion. (/d.) Instead, the ALJ 10 || examined other medical opinions that indicated Plaintiff began suffering symptoms after |} age twenty-two. (/d. at 22—23.) Accordingly, the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was || not disabled within the meaning of the Act was supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the ALJ did not commit error. 14] DI. CONCLUSION 15 For the reasons discussed above, 16 IT IS ORDERED affirming the August 30, 2021 decision of the ALJ, as upheld by 17 || the Appeals Council. 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgement 19 || consistent with this Order and close this case. 20 Dated this 11th day of March, 2024. 21 —— 22 ose 23 Afonorable Susan M. Brnovich 74 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28

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