Buxton v. Traver

130 U.S. 232, 9 S. Ct. 509, 32 L. Ed. 920, 1889 U.S. LEXIS 1743
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedApril 1, 1889
Docket211
StatusPublished
Cited by43 cases

This text of 130 U.S. 232 (Buxton v. Traver) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Buxton v. Traver, 130 U.S. 232, 9 S. Ct. 509, 32 L. Ed. 920, 1889 U.S. LEXIS 1743 (1889).

Opinion

Mr. . Justice Field

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a suit .-to charge the defendant Hattie L. Traver as trustee for the plaintiffs, of an undivided half interest in certain lands in San' Bernardino County, California, and was commenced in one of. the . Superior Courts of the State. To thé complaint the defendants demurred; the derimrrer was sustained arid judgment entered that the suit be dismissed. On appeal.to the Supreme Court of the State the judgment was affirmed; and the case is brought to this court oh writ of error.

The complaint alleges that, on the 2d of February, 1870, one Oscar Traver settled upon a quarter section of land in township two in San Bernardino County, California, and that until his death he lived upon, iriiproved and cultivated the land; that, at the time of' his settlement and continuously until the 1st day of. July, 1879, it wás public property of the United States, arid was unoccupied and unsurveyed and subject to the right of preemption; that no approved plat of the township was received'at the United'States District Land Office at Los Angeles, which .embraced the land in controversy, until July 1st, 1879; that at the time oh his settlement, and there? after until his déath,- which occurred January 2d; 1877, he was a citizen- of. the United States, and entitled to the benefit of the preemption and homestead laws; that he settléd upon,' improved the land, and erected' a building thereon, intending to acquire a title thereto from the.United States as soon as he possibly could; that at the time of his • settlement he was a. single person and remained so until .the-13th of December, 1870, when he. intermarried with the defendant Hattie L. Traver; that on his .death he left surviving him his widow and . two daughters, Lizzie and Annie, and the three were his only *234 heirs at law; that the daughters have since married and are the plaintiffs in this suit; that the deceased died intestate; and that no administrator of his estate has been appointed.

The complaint further alleges that on the 16th of July, 1878, the defendant Hattie L. Traver filed in the United States District Land Office at Los Angeles, a preemption declaratory statement describing the land, alleging settlement on the 2d of February, 1870, and stating her intention to claim the same under the preemption laws of the United States; that soon after the death of Oscar Traver she wrote to the plaintiffs at San Francisco, informing them of the death of their father, and representing that he had not left any property; that this representation was made with intent to deceive them and prevent them from filing the necessary papers to complete his preemption and homestead rights; that in December, 1882, they discovered .for the first time that- she had completed those rights and obtained the patent; that she had lived upon the land and received to her own use its rents and profits since, his death, which are-stated upon information and belief to be $2500; that the land is of the value of one thousand dollars per acre; that the other defendants named claim to have some interest in the land by purchase from her; that such purchase was made with notice of the plaintiffs’ rights; and that she denies that they have an'y rights in the lands, or in the rents, issues and profits thereof. The prayer of the complaint is that the defendant Hattie L. Traver may be charged, as trustee for plaintiffs of an undivided half interest in the lands, and in -the rents, issues and profits thereof, and account for and pay over to them such- interest in the rents, .issues and profits; that the other defendants be adjudged to have no interest in the land or in any part thereof; and that the plaintiffs . may have such other and further relief as to the court may appear to be just.

The entire claim and contention of the plaintiffs rest upon two grounds: 1st, that the deceased acquired by his occupation of unsurveyed lands of the United States a right" of preemption to them- under the laws of the United States; and, 2d, that the plaintiffs, as heirs at law of the deceased, were equally *235 entitled, with his widow, under'§ 2269 of the Revised Statutes, to the benefit of the patent obtained by her. That section is as follows:

“ Where a party entitled to claim the benefits of the preemption laws dies before consummating his claim, by filing in due time all the papers essential to the establishment of, the same, it shall be competent for the executor or administrator of the¡ estate of such party, or one. of the heirs, to file the necessary papers to complete the same; but the entry in such cases shall be made in favor of the heirs' of the deceased preemptor, and a patent thereon shall cause the title to inure to such heirs, as if their names had been specially mentioned.”

Neither of these grounds is well; taken. No portion of the public domain, unless it be in special cases not affecting the general rule, is open to sale until it has been surveyed and an approved plat of the township embracing the land has been returned'to the local land office. A settlement upon the public lands in advance of the public surveys is allowed to parties who in good faith intend, when the surveys are made and returned to the local land office, to' apply for their purchase. If, within a specified time after the surveys,’ and the return of the township plat, the settler takes certain steps, that is, files a declaratory statement, such as is required when the surveys, have preceded settlement, arid performs certain other acts prescribed by law, he acquires for the first time a right of preemption to the land, that is, a right to purchase it in preference to others. Until then he has no estate in the land which he. can devise by will, or which, in case of his death, will pass to his heirs at law: He has been permitted by the government to occupy a certain portion of the public, lands and therefore is not a trespasser, on his statement that when the property is open to sale he intends to take the steps prescribed by láw to purchase it; in which case he is to have the preference over others in purchasirig, that is, the right to preempt it. The United States make no promise to sell him the land, nor do they enter into any contract with him upon the subject. They simply say to him-— if you- wish to settle upon a portion of the public lands, and purchase the title, you- can oceupv any *236 unsurvéyed lands which are vacant and have not been reserved .from sale; and, when the public surveys are made and returned, the land not having been in the meantime withdrawn from-sale, you can acquire, by pursuing certain steps, the right to purchase them. If those steps are from any cause not taken, the proffer of the government has not been accepted, and a. title in the occupant is not even- initiated. The title to the land remains unaffected, and subject to the control and disposition of the government, as before his occupancy. This doctrine has been long established in this court. Thus in Frisbie v. Whitney, 9 Wall. 187, 193, where the subject was fully considered, it was held that occupation and improvement on the public lands, with a view to preemption, did not confer a vested right in the land so occupied. ' Speaking of the settle.ment in. that case, the court, by Mr. Justice Miller, said: “ So far as anything done by him is to be considered, his claim résts solely upon his going upon the land and building and residing on it.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
130 U.S. 232, 9 S. Ct. 509, 32 L. Ed. 920, 1889 U.S. LEXIS 1743, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/buxton-v-traver-scotus-1889.