Buttrick v. City of Lowell

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Buttrick v. City of Lowell

83 Mass. 172

CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

DecidedJanuary 15, 1861

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 83 Mass. 172 (Buttrick v. City of Lowell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Buttrick v. City of Lowell, 83 Mass. 172 (Mass. 1861).

Pincite

Opinion

Bigelow, C. J.

This case must be governed by the decisions in Hafford v. City of New Bedford, 16 Gray,, and Walcott v. Swampscott, ante, 101. Police officers can in no sense be regarded as agents or servants of the city. Then- duties are of a public nature. Their appointment is devolved on cities and towns by the legislature as a convenient mode of exercising a function of government; but this does not render them liable for their unlawful or negligent acts. The detection and arrest [174]*174of offenders, the preservation of the public peace, the enforcement of the laws, and other similar powers and duties with which police officers and constables are intrusted, are derived from the law, and not from the city or town under which they hold their appointment. For the mode in which they exercise their powers and duties the city or town cannot be held liable.

Nor does it make any difference that the acts complained of were done in an attempt to enforce an ordinance or by-law of the city. The authority to enact by-laws is delegated to the city by the sovereign power, and the exercise of the authority gives to such enactments the same force and effect as if they had been passed directly by the legislature. They are public laws of a local and limited operation, designed to secure good order and to provide for the welfare and comfort of the inhabitants. In their enforcement, therefore, police officers act in their public capacity, and not as the agents or servants of the city.

The facts relied on in this case to show a ratification or adoption by the city of the acts of the police officers cannot have that effect. They are entirely consistent with a belief on the part of the mayor and other agents of the city that the police officers had committed no unlawful invasion of the plaintiff’s rights. Perley v. Georgetown, 7 Gray, 464.

It may be added that, if the plaintiff could maintain his position that police officers are so far agents or servants of the city that the maxim respondeat superior would be applicable to their acts, it is clear that the facts agreed would not render the city liable in this action; because it plainly appears that, in committing the acts complained of, the officers exceeded the authority vested in them by the by-law of the city.

Judgment for the defendants.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Bigelow, C. J.

This case must be governed by the decisions in Hafford v. City of New Bedford, 16 Gray,, and Walcott v. Swampscott, ante, 101. Police officers can in no sense be regarded as agents or servants of the city. Then- duties are of a public nature. Their appointment is devolved on cities and towns by the legislature as a convenient mode of exercising a function of government; but this does not render them liable for their unlawful or negligent acts. The detection and arrest [174]*174of offenders, the preservation of the public peace, the enforcement of the laws, and other similar powers and duties with which police officers and constables are intrusted, are derived from the law, and not from the city or town under which they hold their appointment. For the mode in which they exercise their powers and duties the city or town cannot be held liable.

Nor does it make any difference that the acts complained of were done in an attempt to enforce an ordinance or by-law of the city. The authority to enact by-laws is delegated to the city by the sovereign power, and the exercise of the authority gives to such enactments the same force and effect as if they had been passed directly by the legislature. They are public laws of a local and limited operation, designed to secure good order and to provide for the welfare and comfort of the inhabitants. In their enforcement, therefore, police officers act in their public capacity, and not as the agents or servants of the city.

The facts relied on in this case to show a ratification or adoption by the city of the acts of the police officers cannot have that effect. They are entirely consistent with a belief on the part of the mayor and other agents of the city that the police officers had committed no unlawful invasion of the plaintiff’s rights. Perley v. Georgetown, 7 Gray, 464.

It may be added that, if the plaintiff could maintain his position that police officers are so far agents or servants of the city that the maxim respondeat superior would be applicable to their acts, it is clear that the facts agreed would not render the city liable in this action; because it plainly appears that, in committing the acts complained of, the officers exceeded the authority vested in them by the by-law of the city.

Judgment for the defendants.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

83 Mass. 172, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/buttrick-v-city-of-lowell-mass-1861.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack