F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 13 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
ANNA Z. BUTLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-6144 (D.C. No. 98-CV-1164) WAL-MART STORES, INC., a (W.D. Okla.) foreign corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , BARRETT , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Plaintiff Anna Z. Butler appeals from an order of the district court granting
defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this case brought pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. We affirm.
Ms. Butler was employed by defendant from 1993 until 1997 when she was
terminated. In 1995, Ms. Butler suffered an on-the-job injury to her knee and
back which required three surgeries. Although defendant has no permanent light
duty positions, it provided Ms. Butler with temporary light duty positions after
each surgery, as she was medically restricted from prolonged standing. In
October 1997, Ms. Butler was assigned to the position of people greeter, a
position requiring prolonged standing. Ms. Butler informed defendant that she
needed a stool to sit on for relief from the constant standing. Defendant then
requested a statement from Ms. Butler’s physician detailing her current physical
restrictions. Ms. Butler presented a two-year old note stating that her restrictions
were permanent and that she needed to avoid prolonged standing. At that point,
defendant realized that her permanent restrictions would prevent her from
carrying out the essential job duties of all the permanent positions in the store and
terminated her.
Ms. Butler commenced this action. The district court granted defendant’s
motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Ms. Butler had
presented no evidence that she was “in fact a disabled person within the meaning
-2- of the ADA.” Plaintiff’s App. at 10. The court noted that, in her deposition,
Ms. Butler had testified that she believed she had no condition that restricted her
from performing any life activity and she could meet the physical requirements of
the position of people greeter. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over
Ms. Butler’s pendent state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.
On appeal, Ms. Butler argues she is a qualified individual with a disability,
that defendant perceived her as disabled, and that she should not have been
required to produce a letter from her doctor detailing her restrictions. Ms. Butler
concludes the court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
“We review the entry of summary judgment de novo, drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovants.” Hulsey v. Kmart, Inc., 43
F.3d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 1994). The moving party must show there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
id. The nonmovant must establish, at a minimum, an inference of the presence of
each element essential to the case. See id. Although we must resolve doubts in
favor of the non-moving party, “conclusory allegations standing alone will not
defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” White v. York Int’l
Corp. , 45 F.3d 357, 363 (10th Cir. 1995). We may affirm the district court’s
judgment for any reason for which there is support in the record. See Perry v.
Woodward , 188 F.3d 1220, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999).
-3- The ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability” in stated employment actions, including
employee discharge. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A “qualified individual with a
disability” is “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires.” Id. § 12111(8). “Disability” means “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual [or] a record of such an impairment . . . .” Id.
§ 12102(2). The ADA also covers situations in which the employee may not
actually be disabled, but is perceived to be disabled by the employer. See id.
§ 12102(2)(C); Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. , 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149-50 (1999).
Accordingly, to qualify for relief under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that he is qualified, that is, with or without reasonable accommodation (which he must describe), he is able to perform the essential functions of the job; and (3) that the employer terminated him because of his disability.
White, 45 F.3d at 360-61.
If the plaintiff can make a facial showing that accommodation is possible,
the employer must then show that it is unable to provide accommodation. See id.
at 361. If the employer makes that showing, the plaintiff must present evidence
of her individual capabilities and provide suggestions for accommodations which
-4- will rebut the employer’s evidence. See i d. The question of whether a person has
a disability under the ADA is individualized. See Sutton , 119 S. Ct. at 2142.
Although Ms. Butler concluded, after her termination, that she was not
disabled, we look at her situation at the time of her firing. At that time, whether
or not Ms. Butler was actually disabled, her employer perceived her as being
disabled. 1 Further, at the time she was terminated, Ms. Butler also felt that she
was disabled.
Ms. Butler alleged she was disabled because she could not perform the
major life activity of working. 2 She asserted that, with the accommodation of a
stool to provide breaks from standing, she could work. Ms. Butler asserted that
her request for a stool was a reasonable accommodation and that defendant
terminated her because it would not accommodate her. Ms. Butler, thus,
established a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA.
Defendant, in response, stated that it could not provide Ms. Butler her
requested accommodation. Defendant set forth evidence that all positions in the
1 Defendant contends that we should not address Ms. Butler’s argument that she had a record of impairment or was perceived to be impaired by her employer, as she did not make these arguments to the district court.
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 13 1999 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
ANNA Z. BUTLER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-6144 (D.C. No. 98-CV-1164) WAL-MART STORES, INC., a (W.D. Okla.) foreign corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , BARRETT , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Plaintiff Anna Z. Butler appeals from an order of the district court granting
defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this case brought pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. We affirm.
Ms. Butler was employed by defendant from 1993 until 1997 when she was
terminated. In 1995, Ms. Butler suffered an on-the-job injury to her knee and
back which required three surgeries. Although defendant has no permanent light
duty positions, it provided Ms. Butler with temporary light duty positions after
each surgery, as she was medically restricted from prolonged standing. In
October 1997, Ms. Butler was assigned to the position of people greeter, a
position requiring prolonged standing. Ms. Butler informed defendant that she
needed a stool to sit on for relief from the constant standing. Defendant then
requested a statement from Ms. Butler’s physician detailing her current physical
restrictions. Ms. Butler presented a two-year old note stating that her restrictions
were permanent and that she needed to avoid prolonged standing. At that point,
defendant realized that her permanent restrictions would prevent her from
carrying out the essential job duties of all the permanent positions in the store and
terminated her.
Ms. Butler commenced this action. The district court granted defendant’s
motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Ms. Butler had
presented no evidence that she was “in fact a disabled person within the meaning
-2- of the ADA.” Plaintiff’s App. at 10. The court noted that, in her deposition,
Ms. Butler had testified that she believed she had no condition that restricted her
from performing any life activity and she could meet the physical requirements of
the position of people greeter. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over
Ms. Butler’s pendent state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.
On appeal, Ms. Butler argues she is a qualified individual with a disability,
that defendant perceived her as disabled, and that she should not have been
required to produce a letter from her doctor detailing her restrictions. Ms. Butler
concludes the court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
“We review the entry of summary judgment de novo, drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovants.” Hulsey v. Kmart, Inc., 43
F.3d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 1994). The moving party must show there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
id. The nonmovant must establish, at a minimum, an inference of the presence of
each element essential to the case. See id. Although we must resolve doubts in
favor of the non-moving party, “conclusory allegations standing alone will not
defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” White v. York Int’l
Corp. , 45 F.3d 357, 363 (10th Cir. 1995). We may affirm the district court’s
judgment for any reason for which there is support in the record. See Perry v.
Woodward , 188 F.3d 1220, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999).
-3- The ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability” in stated employment actions, including
employee discharge. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A “qualified individual with a
disability” is “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires.” Id. § 12111(8). “Disability” means “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual [or] a record of such an impairment . . . .” Id.
§ 12102(2). The ADA also covers situations in which the employee may not
actually be disabled, but is perceived to be disabled by the employer. See id.
§ 12102(2)(C); Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. , 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149-50 (1999).
Accordingly, to qualify for relief under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that he is qualified, that is, with or without reasonable accommodation (which he must describe), he is able to perform the essential functions of the job; and (3) that the employer terminated him because of his disability.
White, 45 F.3d at 360-61.
If the plaintiff can make a facial showing that accommodation is possible,
the employer must then show that it is unable to provide accommodation. See id.
at 361. If the employer makes that showing, the plaintiff must present evidence
of her individual capabilities and provide suggestions for accommodations which
-4- will rebut the employer’s evidence. See i d. The question of whether a person has
a disability under the ADA is individualized. See Sutton , 119 S. Ct. at 2142.
Although Ms. Butler concluded, after her termination, that she was not
disabled, we look at her situation at the time of her firing. At that time, whether
or not Ms. Butler was actually disabled, her employer perceived her as being
disabled. 1 Further, at the time she was terminated, Ms. Butler also felt that she
was disabled.
Ms. Butler alleged she was disabled because she could not perform the
major life activity of working. 2 She asserted that, with the accommodation of a
stool to provide breaks from standing, she could work. Ms. Butler asserted that
her request for a stool was a reasonable accommodation and that defendant
terminated her because it would not accommodate her. Ms. Butler, thus,
established a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA.
Defendant, in response, stated that it could not provide Ms. Butler her
requested accommodation. Defendant set forth evidence that all positions in the
1 Defendant contends that we should not address Ms. Butler’s argument that she had a record of impairment or was perceived to be impaired by her employer, as she did not make these arguments to the district court. However, the analysis of whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case remains the same whether the employee actually is disabled or is perceived as disabled. Therefore, we proceed with our analysis. 2 We have held that “[w]orking is a major life activity” under the ADA. Siemon v. AT&T Corp. , 117 F.3d 1173,1176 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted).
-5- store required prolonged standing and that it had no permanent light duty
positions.
Ms. Butler attempted to refute that evidence with conclusory statements.
She asserted, without support, that other stores did provide stools for people
greeters to use. Conclusory statements are unavailing.
Therefore, we conclude that providing Ms. Butler her requested
accommodation
is not reasonable because it is tantamount to asking [defendant] to provide a permanent light duty post. No such permanent assignments exist . . . and the ADA does not require an employer to create a new position or even modify an essential function of an existing position in order to accommodate a disabled worker.
Martin v. Kansas , 190 F.3d 1120, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Milton v.
Scrivner, Inc. , 53 F.3d 1118, 1124 (10th Cir. 19 95) (ADA does not limit
employer’s ability to establish functions of job).
Ms. Butler contends she should not have been required to produce a current
letter from her physician detailing her restrictions. Section 12112(d)(4) explicitly
authorizes an employer to “make inquiries into the ability of an employee to
perform job-related functions” including seeking medical information when that
inquiry is “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” Logically, an
employer cannot attempt to make reasonable accommodation without current
knowledge of the employee’s medical restrictions.
-6- The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe Circuit Judge
-7-