Butler v. Shoemake

173 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 26 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2089, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8283, 2001 WL 1400307
CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedJune 12, 2001
Docket00CV561
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 173 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (Butler v. Shoemake) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Butler v. Shoemake, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 26 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2089, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8283, 2001 WL 1400307 (D. Or. 2001).

Opinion

OPINION and ORDER

BROWN, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant Standard Insurance Company (StandardX# 43) and Defendant Standard’s Cross-Motion for Summary *1071 Judgment (# 61). After a thorough review of the record and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Standard’s Cross-Motion and DENIES Plaintiffs Motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was injured and alleges she became disabled as the result of a car accident that occurred on April 1, 1998, when she was 24 years old. At that time, Plaintiff was employed by Nike, Inc., as a customer service representative and was covered by a group long-term disability (LTD) insurance policy issued by Standard. After the car accident, Plaintiff suffered neck pain, back pain, and headaches and received a variety of treatments from several different physicians. She returned to work part-time in June, 1998, but stopped working in September, 1998, on the advice of one of her physicians, Eric Long, M.D. Standard paid short-term disability benefits to Plaintiff through September 27, 1998. By letter dated October 20, 1998, Standard informed Plaintiff it would review her claim to determine her eligibility for LTD disability benefits. On December 3, 1998, Plaintiff was examined by Lawrence Zivin, M.D., a neurologist, at Standard’s request. Dr. Zivin concluded Plaintiff was able to work without restrictions.

On April 12, 1999, Standard awarded Plaintiff disability benefits for the period September 28, 1998, through December 3, 1998, but found Plaintiff was not disabled after that date. Plaintiff asked Standard to reconsider its claim denial for the period after December 3, 1998. After reconsideration, including review of additional medical records supplied by Plaintiff, Standard affirmed its decision on October 28, 1999. Standard then referred Plaintiffs claim for an “independent review” by its Quality Assurance Unit. On January 11, 2000, Standard’s Quality Assurance Unit affirmed Standard’s decision to close Plaintiffs claim as of December 3,1998.

Plaintiff brings her Third Claim 1 pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) and alleges Standard violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by breaching its obligations under the LTD policy and by breaching its fiduciary duty to Plaintiff by refusing to pay long-term disability benefits.

I. Standard of Review Under ERISA

When an ERISA plan provides the plan administrator with discretionary authority to determine benefit eligibility, the district court ordinarily reviews the plan administrator’s decision to grant or to deny benefits for an abuse of discretion. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989). When the plan does not confer such authority unambiguously, review is de novo. Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1095 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 964, 120 S.Ct. 398 (1999). The Court’s first inquiry, therefore, is whether Standard’s LTD plan grants the requisite discretion to the plan administrator. The Standard policy provides:

Except for those functions which the Group Policy specifically reserves to the Policy-owner, we have full and exclusive authority to control and manage the Group Policy, to administer claims, and to interpret the Group Policy and resolve all questions arising in the administration, interpretation, and application of the Group Policy.
Our authority includes, but is not limited to:
*1072 1. The right to resolve all matters when a review has been requested;.
2. The right to establish and enforce rules and procedures for the administration of the Group Policy and any claim under it;
3. The right to determine:
a. Eligibility for insurance;
b. Entitlement to benefits;
c. Amount of benefits payable;
d. Sufficiency and the amount of information we may reasonably require to determine a., b., or c. above.
Subject to the review procedures of the Group Policy, any decision we make in the exercise of our authority is conclusive and binding.

The Ninth Circuit has examined identical policy language and held it grants discretion unambiguously. See Bendixen v. Standard Ins. Co., 185 F.3d 939, 943 n. 1 (9th Cir.1999). Plaintiff concedes the policy language here is identical to that interpreted by the Ninth Circuit in Bendixen, but argues, nonetheless, the Court must review Standard’s decision de novo because of Standard’s alleged errors in its review of her claim. The standard of review, however, is not determined by the administrator’s actions in processing a claim, but by the language of the policy. Based on Bendixen, Standard’s policy unambiguously vests the plan administrator with discretion to determine whether Plaintiff is disabled and, therefore, this Court reviews Standard’s decision for abuse of discretion.

Even when the plan provides an unambiguous grant of discretion to the administrator, however, a heightened standard of review may be required by the presence of a conflict of interest. Bendixen, 185 F.3d at 943. The Supreme Court has held that a conflict of interest is “one factor that must be weighed in determining whether there was an abuse of discretion.” Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115, 109 S.Ct. 948. The Ninth Circuit has held that an apparent conflict is present whenever a plan administrator is responsible for both funding and paying claims. See Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote Tech., Inc., 125 F.3d 794, 798 (9th Cir.1997). See also Bendixen, 185 F.3d at 943-44. Only a serious conflict, however, will require heightened scrutiny. Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 1317, 1322-23 (9th Cir.1995). Atwood sets forth a two-tiered test:

The ‘less deferential’ standard under which we review apparently conflicted fiduciaries has two steps. First, we must determine whether the affected beneficiary has provided material, probative evidence, beyond the mere fact of the apparent conflict, tending to show that the fiduciary’s self-interest caused a breach of the administrator’s fiduciary obligations to the beneficiary. If not, we apply our traditional abuse of discretion review.

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173 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 26 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 2089, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8283, 2001 WL 1400307, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/butler-v-shoemake-ord-2001.