Butler v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.

528 F.2d 1390
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedDecember 22, 1975
DocketNo. 74-2377
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 528 F.2d 1390 (Butler v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Butler v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 528 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1975).

Opinion

OPINION

Before KOELSCH, BROWNING and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff appeals from a $5,000 judgment entered against defendant after the district judge ruled that the case had been settled for that sum. The plaintiff contends that he had not authorized his then attorney to make such a settlement, and that the judgment therefore must be set aside.

The district judge made a finding of fact to the effect that plaintiff had authorized the settlement, but changed his mind when a release form was presented to him for his signature. Although based upon affidavits rather than upon live testimony, the finding is supported by evidence and is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the finding of fact is binding upon this court.

Given this factual situation, plaintiff contends that the settlement is void as a matter of state law, citing R.C.W. 2.44.010.1

Plaintiff argues that, because there is diversity of citizenship, local law controls settlement, and that under local law the settlement agreement never came into being because it was not made in compliance with R.C.W. 2.44.010.

It is true that plaintiff’s attorney did not appear in open court and dictate the terms of the settlement into the record, or “in the presence of the clerk.” It is also true that the memorial of the settlement was not signed by the party (plaintiff). However, the plaintiff’s attorney, in his affidavit filed in the proceedings to enforce the settlement, admitted the making of the settlement, and signed his name to the affidavit. If R.C.W. 2.44.-010 does apply to federal court proceedings by way of limiting the authority of an attorney operating within the geographic boundaries of the state of Washington, then the statute was satisfied when the attorney signed the affidavit, even if the statute had not been satisfied prior to that time.

Affirmed.

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Related

Klever v. City of Stow
13 Ohio App. 3d 17 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1983)
Klever v. Stow
468 N.E.2d 58 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1983)
Stottlemyre v. Reed
665 P.2d 1383 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 1983)
Lewelling v. First California Co.
564 F.2d 1277 (Ninth Circuit, 1977)
Asa L. Lewelling v. First California Company
564 F.2d 1277 (First Circuit, 1977)
Butler v. Merrill Lynch
528 F.2d 1390 (Ninth Circuit, 1976)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
528 F.2d 1390, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/butler-v-merrill-lynch-pierce-fenner-smith-inc-ca9-1975.