Butler Manufacturing Company v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texa

Eighth Circuit

Butler Manufacturing Company v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texa

282 F. App'x 486

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedJuly 3, 2008

Docket07-1816

StatusUnpublished

This text of 282 F. App'x 486 (Butler Manufacturing Company v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texa) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Butler Manufacturing Company v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texa, 282 F. App'x 486 (8th Cir. 2008).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Butler Manufacturing Company appeals the district court’s 1 grant of summary judgment in favor of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas. We affirm.

*487 Michael Richardson and Julie Ann Richardson were divorced in 1993. Michael was employed by Butler Manufacturing Company and participated in its self-funded healthcare plan, and Julie was employed by R & R Marine Fabrication and Drydock and participated in its healthcare plan. This action arises out of a dispute over which of the two healthcare plans is responsible for medical expenses incurred on behalf of the Richardsons’ minor son, Kyle, prior to his death in 2003.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., Inc., 173 F.3d 1076, 1085 (8th Cir.1999). Summary judgment is proper if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 962-63 (8th Cir.1997). However, a “nonmovant must present more than a scintilla of evidence and must advance specific facts to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” F.D.I.C. v. Bell, 106 F.3d 258, 263 (8th Cir.1997).

The district court concluded the healthcare plan of the custodial parent had primary responsibility for payment of healthcare related costs. The court further concluded the parties’ divorce decree designated Michael as Kyle’s custodial parent. Therefime, Butler’s healthcare plan bore financial responsibility for Kyle’s medical expenses. We agree. Because an extended discussion would add nothing to the well-reasoned order of the district court, we affirm under 8th Cir. R. 47B.

1

. The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

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PER CURIAM.

Butler Manufacturing Company appeals the district court’s 1 grant of summary judgment in favor of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas. We affirm.

*487 Michael Richardson and Julie Ann Richardson were divorced in 1993. Michael was employed by Butler Manufacturing Company and participated in its self-funded healthcare plan, and Julie was employed by R & R Marine Fabrication and Drydock and participated in its healthcare plan. This action arises out of a dispute over which of the two healthcare plans is responsible for medical expenses incurred on behalf of the Richardsons’ minor son, Kyle, prior to his death in 2003.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Jaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., Inc., 173 F.3d 1076, 1085 (8th Cir.1999). Summary judgment is proper if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 962-63 (8th Cir.1997). However, a “nonmovant must present more than a scintilla of evidence and must advance specific facts to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” F.D.I.C. v. Bell, 106 F.3d 258, 263 (8th Cir.1997).

The district court concluded the healthcare plan of the custodial parent had primary responsibility for payment of healthcare related costs. The court further concluded the parties’ divorce decree designated Michael as Kyle’s custodial parent. Therefime, Butler’s healthcare plan bore financial responsibility for Kyle’s medical expenses. We agree. Because an extended discussion would add nothing to the well-reasoned order of the district court, we affirm under 8th Cir. R. 47B.

1

. The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

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