Butler Coal & Grain Co. v. Roy

13 Mass. App. Div. 143
CourtMassachusetts District Court, Appellate Division
DecidedNovember 16, 1948
StatusPublished

This text of 13 Mass. App. Div. 143 (Butler Coal & Grain Co. v. Roy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts District Court, Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Butler Coal & Grain Co. v. Roy, 13 Mass. App. Div. 143 (Mass. Ct. App. 1948).

Opinion

Riley, P. J.

This case was submitted to the trial judge upon what is styled an agreed statement of facts. It is an action of contract in which the plaintiff seeks to recover for goods sold by it to the defendant. The defendant’s answer was a general denial and a special answer setting up the fact that the defendant was a minor at the time the [144]*144contract or contracts were made with the plaintiff and that he desires to avoid his voidable contract or contracts made with the plaintiff during said minority. The defendant admits having received merchandise from the plaintiff in the sum stated in its declaration but denies that he is liable therefor because of his disaffirmance of the contract or contracts during his infancy; he admits being a veteran of World War II and applying and securing a loan from the Greylock National Bank of Adams, Massachusetts, under the provisions of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, as amended, and that said loan was guaranteed by the Veterans Administration of the Federal Government under the provisions of said act. He further admits that the funds secured from the aforesaid loan were utilized in establishing and operating a grocery business in North Adams, Massachusetts. The plaintiff admits selling groceries to the defendant during his minority although at the time he sold the goods he had no knowledge that the defendant was a minor and also admits that the merchandise purchased from it was purchased-in the course of the • defendant’s grocery business. The Judge upon the agreed facts found for the defendant. He denied the following requests for rulings of law duly filed by the plaintiff:

1. Upon the law and all the evidence, the Court should find for the plaintiff, based upon the following specified grounds: (a) Defendant admits owing the plaintiff $136.85. (b) Defendant was a minor veteran of World War II at the time of entering into said contract or contracts with the plaintiff and entitled to the benefits provided by the federal law known as the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, and also called the G. I. Bill of Rights, and any amendment thereof or addition thereto, (c) Defendant participated in the benefits of said Act by applying for and securing a business loan from the Greylock National Bank of Adams, Massachusetts, for the purpose of conducting a grocery store at the [145]*145córner of Cliff Street and Glen Avenue, North Adams, Massachusetts, (d) Defendant gave said bank a promissory note secured by a chattel mortgage on the stock and fixtures of the grocery store in the sum of $2,000.00, which mortgage was executed by the defendant August 5,1947 and recorded on August 18, 1947 with the records of Chattel Mortgages in the City Clerk’s Office, North Adams, Massachusetts, in Book 22, Page 510. (e) Defendant’s loan from said bank was guaranteed by the Veterans Administration under the provisions of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 as witnessed by a Guarantee Certificate held by said bank, (f) The purchase of merchandise for said grocery store of the defendant is contemplated by the provisions of Chapter 259 of the Acts of 1947.
4. The contract or contracts made by the minor veteran defendant with the plaintiff is not or are not voidable under the provisions of Chapter 259 of the Acts of 1947.
5. Chapter 259 of the Acts of 1947 was intended by the Legislature as an exception to the general rule of avoidance by minors of their express contracts when said minors are veterans of World War II and participate in the benefits of the G. I. Bill of Rights.
6. Chapter 259 of the Acts of 1947 enlarges the obligations of minor veterans who participate in the benefits provided by the G. I. Bill of Rights, by clothing said minor veterans with full legal capacity to act in their own behalf in the matter of contracts, conveyances, mortgages and other transactions.
7. Chapter 259 of the Acts of 1947 deems a minor veteran competent to act in the matter of contracts, conveyances, mortgages and other transactions when made by said minor veteran for the purpose of enjoying the benefits provided by the G. I. Bill of Rights.
8. The privilege of disaffirmance of a contract or contracts made by a minor in a business venture does not inure to a minor veteran who has participated in the benefits provided by the G. I. Bill of Rights, under the provisions of Chapter 259 of the Acts of 1947.
[146]*1469. Chapter 259 of the Acts of 1947 deprives a minor veteran of the privilege of disaffirmance of his contracts when he accepts the benefits provided by the G. I. Bill of Bights.
10. By accepting the benefits provided by the G. I. Bill of Bights, the minor veteran defendant waived the privilege of disaffirming his express contract or contracts made with the plaintiff.
11. The defendant, a minor veteran, by participating in the benefits provided by the G. I. Bill of Bights, became subject to the obligations of persons of full age.
12. Chapter 259 of the Acts of 1947 is an exception to the General Buie of Avoidance by minors of their express contracts.

At the request of the defendant he made by following ruling: “On all the pleadings and all the evidence, the Plaintiff cannot recover, for the following reasons: (a) The contract or contracts, express or implied, having been made with a minor, the Defendant, who is still such minor, have been disaffirmed by the Defendant, (b) The contract or contracts, express or implied, having been made with a minor, the Defendant, who is still such minor, are unenforceable, (c) The contract or contracts, express or implied, having been made with a minor, the Defendant, who is still such minor, does not involve necessaries for which said minor would be liable, (d) The provisions of Chapter 259 of the Acts of 1947, have no application whatsoever to this case.”

The decision of the case depends upon the construction to be given Chapter 259 of the Acts of 1947 which reads as follows:

SECTION 1.
“Besidents of this commonwealth who are veterans of World War II and are entitled to the benefits provided by the federal law known as the Servicemen’s Be-[147]*147adjustment Act of 1944, and also called the G. I. Bill of Bights, and any amendment thereof or addition thereto, may participate in said benefits notwithstanding that they, or their spouses, are under twenty-one years of age, and for said purpose such minor veterans or spouses shall have full legal capacity to act in their own behalf in the matter of contracts, conveyances, mortgages and other transactions, and with respect to such acts done by them they shall have all of the rights, powers and privileges and be subject to the obligations of persons of full age. SECTION 2. Such acts of minors as are referred to in section one of this act, if done prior to its effective date, shall have the same force and effect as if this act had been in effect at the time of such acts.”
This act is entitled: “An Act Enabling War Veterans Who Are Minors, or Whose Spouses Are Minors, to Participate in the Benefits Provided by the Federal Law Known as the Servicemen’s Beadjustment Act of 1944 or the G. I. Bill of Bights, as Amended.”

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Bluebook (online)
13 Mass. App. Div. 143, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/butler-coal-grain-co-v-roy-massdistctapp-1948.