Butcher v. Smith

Court of Appeals of Texas

Butcher v. Smith

195 S.W. 1180, 1917 Tex. App. LEXIS 625

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

DecidedMay 16, 1917

DocketNo. 1799.

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 195 S.W. 1180 (Butcher v. Smith) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Butcher v. Smith, 195 S.W. 1180, 1917 Tex. App. LEXIS 625 (Tex. Ct. App. 1917).

Pincite

Opinion

LEVY, J.

(after stating the facts aS above). The witnesses John F. Butcher and Miss ■Wheeler, who were present when the contract in suit was made, would have testified, if the court had not sustained the appellee’s objection thereto, that the parties to the contract, during the negotiation, discussed and agreed that “saw timber” meant and described only growing timber 14 inches or over at the small end and at least 12 feet in length. The words “saw timber,” as used in the contract, are words of description of the subject-matter of sale, and have no legal signification, and it was proper to hear evidence to enable the jury to know in what sense the parties to the contract used the words. Kelly & Roberts v. Robb, 58 Tex. 377. And proof of the local meaning Of terms having no well-defined signification may be made to show the true meaning of the parties. 1 Greenleaf, § 292; 10 R. O. L. § 268. The evidence in the case was confined to a local understanding of the term “saw timber,” and which understanding did not show a uniform and commonly accepted meaning of the words. The witness Laforee testified:

“Anything at all that I considered would measure 10 inches at the stump was merchantable saw stuff for our plant, though now I would say that I could not go to work and saw that would be a standard merchantable rule. * * * When I go out to estimate a bunch of pine, timber I look for 10 inches and better, but as to whether that would be every man’s practice, or not I could not say. * * * We consider timber that will scale 8 inches saw timber.”

And the evidence of other witnesses goes to shoiw respectively that timber scaling at the stump 6 inches, 8 to 10 inches, and 12 inches constitutes “saw timber” was 14 inches and above that at the stump. In this state of the evidence there was no certain and established local usage of the term “saw timber,” and the evidence as to size of timber that the parties themselves had in mind *1181 and understood at tlie time of tlie contract was to be cut as “saw timber” was, it is concluded, admissible to explain the meaning the parties attached to the words “saw timber.” In view of the record there was reversible error, it is believed, in not admitting and allowing the jury to consider the- evidence complained of.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for another trial.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

LEVY, J.

(after stating the facts aS above). The witnesses John F. Butcher and Miss ■Wheeler, who were present when the contract in suit was made, would have testified, if the court had not sustained the appellee’s objection thereto, that the parties to the contract, during the negotiation, discussed and agreed that “saw timber” meant and described only growing timber 14 inches or over at the small end and at least 12 feet in length. The words “saw timber,” as used in the contract, are words of description of the subject-matter of sale, and have no legal signification, and it was proper to hear evidence to enable the jury to know in what sense the parties to the contract used the words. Kelly & Roberts v. Robb, 58 Tex. 377. And proof of the local meaning Of terms having no well-defined signification may be made to show the true meaning of the parties. 1 Greenleaf, § 292; 10 R. O. L. § 268. The evidence in the case was confined to a local understanding of the term “saw timber,” and which understanding did not show a uniform and commonly accepted meaning of the words. The witness Laforee testified:

“Anything at all that I considered would measure 10 inches at the stump was merchantable saw stuff for our plant, though now I would say that I could not go to work and saw that would be a standard merchantable rule. * * * When I go out to estimate a bunch of pine, timber I look for 10 inches and better, but as to whether that would be every man’s practice, or not I could not say. * * * We consider timber that will scale 8 inches saw timber.”

And the evidence of other witnesses goes to shoiw respectively that timber scaling at the stump 6 inches, 8 to 10 inches, and 12 inches constitutes “saw timber” was 14 inches and above that at the stump. In this state of the evidence there was no certain and established local usage of the term “saw timber,” and the evidence as to size of timber that the parties themselves had in mind *1181 and understood at tlie time of tlie contract was to be cut as “saw timber” was, it is concluded, admissible to explain the meaning the parties attached to the words “saw timber.” In view of the record there was reversible error, it is believed, in not admitting and allowing the jury to consider the- evidence complained of.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for another trial.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

195 S.W. 1180, 1917 Tex. App. LEXIS 625, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/butcher-v-smith-texapp-1917.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack