Bustos v. Rome General Lumber and Hardware

6 Misc. 3d 546
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 26, 2004
StatusPublished

This text of 6 Misc. 3d 546 (Bustos v. Rome General Lumber and Hardware) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bustos v. Rome General Lumber and Hardware, 6 Misc. 3d 546 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2004).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Robert F. Julian, J.

Relief Requested: Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment [547]*547determining liability against the defendant pursuant to Labor Law § 240.

Holding: Partial summary judgment granted. Plaintiffs fall was caused by a violation of Labor Law § 240.

Discussion: Citing Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, Inc. (1 NY3d 280 [2003]), the defendant argues that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any violation of Labor Law § 240, that the ladder in question was sound and sufficient, that the plaintiffs negligence was the sole cause of his injury, and that plaintiff is therefore not entitled to summary judgment. The defendant argues that “the Plaintiff was the only professional on the site who was experienced in doing roofing work. Plaintiff has testified that he placed the ladder in its location; that he chose not to tie it off; and that this decision was based on his opinion that tying off the ladder was not necessary.”

Assuming arguendo the absolute truth of defendant’s statement of the facts, the rulings in Blake (supra) do not defeat this plaintiffs entitlement to summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 240.

Factual Analysis

The facts in Blake (supra) are very different from those in the case at bar. Indeed one could argue that the facts in Blake are rare, if not unique. In Blake the plaintiff supplied his own extension ladder and was standing on the extension portion of the ladder when it telescoped and collapsed, resulting in the plaintiffs foot being trapped between rungs of the ladder. The ladder did not fall to the ground. The plaintiff, in his unsuccessful motion for summary judgment and at trial, did not put forward a theory as to why the ladder telescoped or connect that theory with a violation of section 240 (1) of the Labor Law. Blake simply asserted that the ladder collapsed, causing his injury. Indeed, Blake testified that the ladder was in good working order prior to and subsequent to his injury, that it had no defective condition, that he believed he fastened the hooks that supported the extension portion of the ladder on the base portion, that the ladder had appropriate feet and that in his opinion there was no need to secure the ladder to the building or to have someone hold the ladder.1 The ladder did not fall to the ground until after Blake sustained an injury to his foot, which [548]*548had become trapped between rungs. 2 There was no indication or demonstration in Blake of any required safety device which was not present, was not properly placed or secured, or which failed. There was only proof of a ladder which had adequate and appropriate safety devices. Blake stands for the proposition that a Labor Law § 240 plaintiff is required to show a statutory violation which caused the injury complained of. The statute requires that proper and adequate safety equipment be provided and properly placed and operated. Blake also recognizes that the collapse of a safety device (a ladder, a scaffold) raises a presumption that the device was inadequate and that the statute was violated, but only a rebuttable presumption. In Blake the defendant was able to establish — through the plaintiff’s own testimony — that there was nothing defective or inappropriate or inadequate about the safety device in question, its placement, or its operation. The defendant established, through Blake’s own testimony, that there was no statutory violation. Blake, himself, rebutted the presumption, and offered no evidence, factual or expert,3 of a statutory violation.

[549]*549The facts in the case at bar are markedly different in that this ladder was not properly secured against side slip by any other or different or additional or included safety device, and side slip caused the fall. When a ladder slips from its position because it is unsecured against slipping, liability will attach pursuant to section 240. (See Evans v Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 277 AD2d 874 [4th Dept 2000]; Petit v Board of Educ., 307 AD2d 749 [4th Dept 2003]; Burke v APV Crepaco, Inc., 2 AD3d 1279 [4th Dept 2003].) Plaintiff here has asserted violations of Labor Law § 240 (1), in that the ladder was not provided with proper protection against slipping and was not secured or steadied by either mechanical or human means while plaintiff climbed it. The defendant has provided no fact or opinion constituting evidence that the ladder was properly secured and hence provided proper protection. It has thus not shown a triable issue of fact regarding the cited violations. This is exactly contrary to the situation in Blake, in which the plaintiff himself provided the evidence that there was no statutory violation.

Plaintiff Bustos was working as a carpenter, building an addition to the defendant’s business structure. On the day in question, he was working alone on a roof, but the defendant had sent an employee, who had just been lifted to the roof by a forklift, to assist him. It is undisputed that the ladder upon which Bustos was climbing slid sideways and fell as he was carrying an A-frame stepladder to the roof to assist him in his work. The plaintiff fell to the ground with the falling ladder, and sustained fractures. Although the proof in the depositions is confusing, the court concludes that the roof was at a 20-foot elevation based on the testimony of defendant’s employee Hazelton (exhibit 6 of plaintiffs motion at 17). The plaintiff was using a 20-foot extension ladder to access the roof area; however, the ladder was not tied or otherwise secured to the building and no one was holding it. Included in the plaintiffs’ assertion that no safety equipment was provided, they allege that a scaffold was required. The defendant responds that the ladder in ques[550]*550tion was in good working order and the sole cause of the fall was the plaintiff’s misuse of the ladder by hand carrying a stepladder up the extension ladder. The absence of a scaffold is not addressed.4

Legal Analysis

The defendant mistakes the import of Blake and fails to refute plaintiffs prima facie showing of statutory violations. The Court of Appeals decision in Blake simply clarified that Labor Law § 240 (1) provides absolute liability only when the injured plaintiff proves a violation of the Labor Law that is a contributing cause of his or her injury. Judge Rosenblatt explains very succinctly the cornerstone of Blake, “Here, plaintiff has shown no violation of Labor Law § 240 (1).” (Blake at 289.)

The defendant asserts that plaintiff Bustos located the ladder, chose not to tie it off, and that this decision was based on plaintiffs opinion that tying off the ladder was not necessary. Therefore the defendant argues, the ladder slipped and fell with Bustos on it solely because of Bustos’ failure to secure the ladder or erect a scaffold. The defendant ignores that it had a statutory duty to provide the equipment to tie off the ladder and make certain the ladder was tied off pursuant to Labor Law § 240 (1) — unlike Blake where there was no evidence of a missing or defective or defectively placed ladder or other safety device. Blake testified that the ladder in question had the proper safety equipment and there was no allegation that any safety equipment was not provided.

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Related

Blake v. Neighborhood Housing Services of New York City, Inc.
803 N.E.2d 757 (New York Court of Appeals, 2003)
Weininger v. Hagedorn & Co.
695 N.E.2d 709 (New York Court of Appeals, 1998)
Panek v. County of Albany
788 N.E.2d 616 (New York Court of Appeals, 2003)
Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, Inc.
482 N.E.2d 898 (New York Court of Appeals, 1985)
Haimes v. New York Telephone Co.
385 N.E.2d 601 (New York Court of Appeals, 1978)
Bland v. Manocherian
488 N.E.2d 810 (New York Court of Appeals, 1985)
Burke v. APV Crepaco, Inc.
2 A.D.3d 1279 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2003)
Evans v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
277 A.D.2d 874 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2000)
Meade v. Rock-Mcgraw, Inc.
307 A.D.2d 156 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2003)
Petit v. Board of Education
307 A.D.2d 749 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
6 Misc. 3d 546, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bustos-v-rome-general-lumber-and-hardware-nysupct-2004.