AFFiRM; Opinion Filed i)cceniber 5. 2012.
In The nitrt tif Apii.a1i Fifth t1itrirt uf xzu ztt 1a11a No. 05-1 1-00504-CR
MIChAEL JOSHUA BUSCHARDT, Appellant
V.
TIlE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal L)istrict Court No. 6 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F09-72104-X
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Moseley, Fillmore, and iyers Opinion By justice Moseley
Appellant Michael Joshua Busehardt pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to deliver
gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB). Before entering his plea, i3usehardt filed a motion to suppress,
which the trial court denied. In a single issue on appeal, Buschardt asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they
entered a hotel room he was in without a warrant. The background and facts of the case are
well-known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues
t A ppellant filed a supplemental brief, which, along with the paies’ original briefs, was considered as pa of the Cou’s analysis. are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. T€x. R. App. P.47.2(a). 47A. We affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
The only evidence presented at the hearing on Buschardt’s motion to suppress was the
testimony of Officer Fabian Hernandez of the Dallas Police Department. He testified to the
following facts. On March 20, 2009, at approximately 3:27 a.m., Hernandez received a call from
the police dispatch “regarding a person calling in saying a friend was being held against their wilt
by a few dope dealers” at the Crowne Plaza Hotel. 2 The Crowne Plaza Hotel is located in an area
“known for drug dealing and prostitution,” a “high crime area.”
Hcrnandez and another police officer went to the howl, knocked on the hotel room door
several times, and announced “police.” When no one answered, the hotel clerk retrieved a key to
the room. Heniandez was asked: “What did this [the failure ofanyone to answer the door] do to your
belief someone might be in danger or in need of - - you might need to protect their lifr or avoid
serious bodily injury? Did that increase it or decrease it?” He responded: “It increases.”
When the hotel clerk returned with the room key, the officers knocked on the door again and,
when no one answered, the howl clerk gave the key to the officers who attempted to open the door.
The door opened slightly because it also was locked from the inside; the clerk retrieved a second key.
After unlocking the second lock, the officers entered the room.
When the officers entered the room, they announced themselves again. Appellant “came out
from the room, from the back of the room.” The officers saw a “green leafy substance in bags,
2 parties state in their brieth the call was anoeymous. No evidence was presented at the hearing about the identity ofthe caller.
—2— scales. He had cloves on his hands, so I proceeded to tell him to sit on the chair.” Later a search
warrant was executed,
Hernandez answered affirmatively when asked whether he believed “that you had to act to
protect or preserve lifi or avoid serious bodily injury” of a person being held against his will and
when asked if he was “acting immediately in response to this situation.
On appeal, appellant only argues the “anonymous tip was insufficient to support a reasonable
belief that Officer llernandez needed to act immediately to protect or preserve life or avoid serious
bodily injury.”
When, as here, the trial court does not make findings of fact, we review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. See Carniouche v. State. 10 S.W.3d 323. 327—28 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000). We “assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact supported in the
record that buttress its conclusion.” Id. at 328. However, we review de novo the trial court’s
application of the law to the facts. See id.
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.
C0NsT. amend. JV; Liinon v. State, 340 S.W.3d 753, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 179 (1990)). The Fourth Amendment’s protections extend to occupants
of a hotel room, see Stoner i’. Ca/i/din/a, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964), and entry into a hotel room is
a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, see Valtieura v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 448 (Tex.
Crirn. App. 2010). When the police conduct a warrantless search subject to the Fourth Amendment,
the search is presumed unreasonable unless it falls within an exception to the warrant requirement.
Linion, 340 S.W.3d at 756.
Although no evidence was presented at the motion to suppress hearing about when the police found the GFIB, the 3 parties’ briefs both state the GHB was found during the search made pursuant to the search warrant.
—j — The emergency doctrine is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, Lanevv. State,
117 S.W.3d 854,860 (Tex. Crim App. 2003) (citing Mincev v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,392(1978)),
and it is the exception thc Statc argues in this case. The emergency doctrine allows a police officer
to make a warrantless entry and search when the officer has an immediate, reasonable belief that a
person within is in need ofimmediate aid and the officer must act to protect or preserve life or avoid
serious injury. id. at 861 (quoting Mincev, 437 U.S. at 392).
We have used an objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether a warrantless search is justified under the Emergency Doctrine. This objective standard looks at the police officer’s conduct and “takes into account the facts and circumstances known to the police at the time ofthe search.” Furthermore, we look to ensure that the warrantless search is “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.”
Id. at 862 (internal citations omitted). The emergency doctrine is limited. It applies when police are
acting in their community caretaking role, not their crime fighting role; the officer’s bactions [must
be] totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the
violation of a criminal statute.” Id.
The evidence presented at the hearing established the police responded to an emergency
phone call reporting a person was being held against his will by drug dealers early in the morning
in a hotel room located in a high-crime area. When the officers arrived at the hotel room, their
repeated knocks on the door and “police” announcements were unanswered. Additionally, the latch
on the inside of the door was secured, indicating the room was occupied. Even after the officers
unlocked the first lock on the door, no one came to the door. These circumstances reasonably raised
Hernandez’ suspicion of foul play.
Viewing the uncontested evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, a
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
AFFiRM; Opinion Filed i)cceniber 5. 2012.
In The nitrt tif Apii.a1i Fifth t1itrirt uf xzu ztt 1a11a No. 05-1 1-00504-CR
MIChAEL JOSHUA BUSCHARDT, Appellant
V.
TIlE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal L)istrict Court No. 6 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F09-72104-X
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Moseley, Fillmore, and iyers Opinion By justice Moseley
Appellant Michael Joshua Busehardt pleaded guilty to possession with the intent to deliver
gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB). Before entering his plea, i3usehardt filed a motion to suppress,
which the trial court denied. In a single issue on appeal, Buschardt asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they
entered a hotel room he was in without a warrant. The background and facts of the case are
well-known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues
t A ppellant filed a supplemental brief, which, along with the paies’ original briefs, was considered as pa of the Cou’s analysis. are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. T€x. R. App. P.47.2(a). 47A. We affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
The only evidence presented at the hearing on Buschardt’s motion to suppress was the
testimony of Officer Fabian Hernandez of the Dallas Police Department. He testified to the
following facts. On March 20, 2009, at approximately 3:27 a.m., Hernandez received a call from
the police dispatch “regarding a person calling in saying a friend was being held against their wilt
by a few dope dealers” at the Crowne Plaza Hotel. 2 The Crowne Plaza Hotel is located in an area
“known for drug dealing and prostitution,” a “high crime area.”
Hcrnandez and another police officer went to the howl, knocked on the hotel room door
several times, and announced “police.” When no one answered, the hotel clerk retrieved a key to
the room. Heniandez was asked: “What did this [the failure ofanyone to answer the door] do to your
belief someone might be in danger or in need of - - you might need to protect their lifr or avoid
serious bodily injury? Did that increase it or decrease it?” He responded: “It increases.”
When the hotel clerk returned with the room key, the officers knocked on the door again and,
when no one answered, the howl clerk gave the key to the officers who attempted to open the door.
The door opened slightly because it also was locked from the inside; the clerk retrieved a second key.
After unlocking the second lock, the officers entered the room.
When the officers entered the room, they announced themselves again. Appellant “came out
from the room, from the back of the room.” The officers saw a “green leafy substance in bags,
2 parties state in their brieth the call was anoeymous. No evidence was presented at the hearing about the identity ofthe caller.
—2— scales. He had cloves on his hands, so I proceeded to tell him to sit on the chair.” Later a search
warrant was executed,
Hernandez answered affirmatively when asked whether he believed “that you had to act to
protect or preserve lifi or avoid serious bodily injury” of a person being held against his will and
when asked if he was “acting immediately in response to this situation.
On appeal, appellant only argues the “anonymous tip was insufficient to support a reasonable
belief that Officer llernandez needed to act immediately to protect or preserve life or avoid serious
bodily injury.”
When, as here, the trial court does not make findings of fact, we review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. See Carniouche v. State. 10 S.W.3d 323. 327—28 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000). We “assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact supported in the
record that buttress its conclusion.” Id. at 328. However, we review de novo the trial court’s
application of the law to the facts. See id.
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.
C0NsT. amend. JV; Liinon v. State, 340 S.W.3d 753, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 179 (1990)). The Fourth Amendment’s protections extend to occupants
of a hotel room, see Stoner i’. Ca/i/din/a, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964), and entry into a hotel room is
a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, see Valtieura v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 448 (Tex.
Crirn. App. 2010). When the police conduct a warrantless search subject to the Fourth Amendment,
the search is presumed unreasonable unless it falls within an exception to the warrant requirement.
Linion, 340 S.W.3d at 756.
Although no evidence was presented at the motion to suppress hearing about when the police found the GFIB, the 3 parties’ briefs both state the GHB was found during the search made pursuant to the search warrant.
—j — The emergency doctrine is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, Lanevv. State,
117 S.W.3d 854,860 (Tex. Crim App. 2003) (citing Mincev v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,392(1978)),
and it is the exception thc Statc argues in this case. The emergency doctrine allows a police officer
to make a warrantless entry and search when the officer has an immediate, reasonable belief that a
person within is in need ofimmediate aid and the officer must act to protect or preserve life or avoid
serious injury. id. at 861 (quoting Mincev, 437 U.S. at 392).
We have used an objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether a warrantless search is justified under the Emergency Doctrine. This objective standard looks at the police officer’s conduct and “takes into account the facts and circumstances known to the police at the time ofthe search.” Furthermore, we look to ensure that the warrantless search is “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.”
Id. at 862 (internal citations omitted). The emergency doctrine is limited. It applies when police are
acting in their community caretaking role, not their crime fighting role; the officer’s bactions [must
be] totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the
violation of a criminal statute.” Id.
The evidence presented at the hearing established the police responded to an emergency
phone call reporting a person was being held against his will by drug dealers early in the morning
in a hotel room located in a high-crime area. When the officers arrived at the hotel room, their
repeated knocks on the door and “police” announcements were unanswered. Additionally, the latch
on the inside of the door was secured, indicating the room was occupied. Even after the officers
unlocked the first lock on the door, no one came to the door. These circumstances reasonably raised
Hernandez’ suspicion of foul play.
Viewing the uncontested evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, a
reasonable officer could have believed that person was being held involuntarily and he immediately a
-4- needed to enter the hotel room to protect or preserve that person’s life, or to avoid serious injury to
that person .See id. at $6 The officers’ intrusion was limited to acting as community caretakers,
not crime fighters’, they took flO actions beyond determining whether a person in the room needed
immediate aid, The officers did not search the room after entering until after they obtained a search
warrant.
Looking at the officers’ conduct and taking into account the facts and circumstances known
to the officers, we cannot conclude the trial court erred by determining the officers were justified in
making a warrantless entry into the hotel room. Thus, the trial court did not err by denying
appellant’s motion to suppress.
We ovcnule ippellant s sok. issue and ilfiim the tiial comt s iudgment / 4 .1
fMMOSELEY JUSTlCE
Do Not Publish TEx. R. App. p. 47 I 10504F.U05 Qi”urt tif ipcak FiftIi Dhürirt øf rxa at lattwi
JUDGMENT MICHAEL J( SHUA BUSCHARDT, Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. Appellant 6 of Dallas County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. Cause No. F09-72 1 04-X). No. 05-Il —00504-CR Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley, Justices Fillmore and Myers participating. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Courts opinion of this date. the judgment of the trial court is AFHRNIED.
Judgment entered I)ccemher 5, 20 1 2. /
/
JIM MOSELEY JiST ICE