Burwash v. Ballou

132 Ill. App. 71, 1907 Ill. App. LEXIS 108
Appellate Court of Illinois·Decided April 4, 1907·No. Gen. No. 12,913·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Mr. Presiding Justice Brown

delivered the opinion of the court.

In this cause the appellant (complainant below) is f) seeking to rescind a contract into which he has en-[j tered, to pay for a large number of shares in a mining^ company, and to recover back certain money and notes which he has paid for it. He alleges that he was induced to make the investment by false representations as to the character and prospects of the mines by the persons named as defendants, who were the promoters of the company and the beneficiaries of this sale of stock. The defendants deny making any such false representations, and declare that the company was and is an enterprise honestly conducted, and that the actions of the defendants in representations and reports of its prospects and in the sale of its stock were all designed for the good of all the stockholders, and that the purpose of the complainant is to set aside a speculative contract made with his eyes open, because it did not turn out as satisfactorily as he hoped. On these lines mainly the cause was tried below for several days before the chancellor on oral testimony heard in open court. This oral testimony was conflicting in material parts.

Under these circumstances it may be well to preface our opinion with two quotations which contain propositions necessary to keep constantly in mind in the de-‘ termination of the merits of this appeal. The first contains an often repeated statement of the force of the decision of a chancellor on conflicting testimony heard in open court:

“The testimony was conflicting and the conclusions to be drawn from it depended largely upon the credit which should be accorded to the different witnesses and to the weight and value of their testimony. The chancellor had, therefore, superior opportunities for forming an opinion of the relative merit and weight. of the testimony given by the several witnesses, whom he saw and heard testify. When a chancery cause is so heard and the evidence is conflicting, the findings of the chancellor will not be reversed, unless it is clear and palpable that he fell into error.” Arnold v. The Northwestern Telephone Co., 199 Ill. 201.

The second is the utterance of the Supreme Court upon representations of mining company promoters: “Courts of equity do not aid parties who will not use their own sense and discretion upon matters of this sort. Appellant was dealing with his own property and had a right to puff it in the most extravagant terms, the other party being at full liberty to exercise his own judgment about it. * * * It is in proof that in buying and selling mines people buy and pay or agree to pay for them influenced by the prospect. No man, however scientific he may be, could certainly state how a mine with a most flattering outcrop or blow-out will finally turn out. * * * Mines are not purchased and sold on a warranty, but on the prospect. ‘The sight’ determines the purchase. If very flattering, a party is willing to pay largely for the chance. There is no other sensible or known mode of" selling this kind of property. It is, in the nature of the thing, utterly speculative, and every one knows the business is of the most fluctuating and hazardous character. How many mines have noit sustained the hopes created by their outcrop! * '* * ' In purchasing an oil well they would buy from the prospect, and no court would hold the extravagant assertions of the seller as anything more than gassing. The court would not hold them as statements of fact, but as opinions which the fact, as it appeared, justified, or at least presented grounds on which to base the statement. So in the sale of a mine. These exaggerated statements are always made, and a man’s own natural judgment must be his counselor and guide. The great Comstock mine of Nevada, which has poured into the country its millions of silver, was bought and sold on the prospect and for a few dollars. The discoverer could not pry into futurity; he took his chances for a few dollars, whilst those purchasing have a bonanza of scarcely appreciable value.” Tuck v. Downing, 76 Ill. 71.

Applying to the case at bar the doctrines contained in these general statements, we must, in the first place, in support of the decree of the chancellor below, not only assume that he found as to all conflicting evidence on representations that the version of the matter put forward by the defendants was the correct one, but we must also assume that it was in fact correct; and, secondly, we must be careful not to impute a fraudulent and wilfully misleading character to any matter, written or oral, which was merely exaggeration, puffing or “gassing,” not made with intent to deceive, but as the exuberant and enthusiastic expression of an optimistic confidence in the future.

Under these rules, the. complaints of the appellant fail to impress our minds, as they failed to impress the chancellor’s below, as so' substantial or well founded as to demand relief at the hands of ja, court of equity.

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Burwash v. Ballou, 132 Ill. App. 71, 1907 Ill. App. LEXIS 108 (Ill. Ct. App. 1907).

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