Burton v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: September 7, 2023
• Docket: 244, 2023
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

MARVIN BURTON, § § Defendant Below, § No. 244, 2023 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 0410003743 (S) § Appellee. §

Submitted: August 4, 2023 Decided: September 7, 2023

ORDER

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to

affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The appellant, Marvin Burton, filed this appeal from the Superior

Court’s denial of his motion for correction of illegal sentence. The State of Delaware

has filed a motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on

the face of Burton’s opening brief that his appeal is without merit. We agree and

affirm.

(2) In August 2005, a Superior Court jury found Burton guilty of first-

degree rape, second-degree rape, and second-degree unlawful sexual contact. After

granting the State’s motion to declare Burton a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214, the Superior Court sentenced Burton to two sentences of life imprisonment

plus two years. We affirmed Burton’s convictions on direct appeal.1 After remands

and evidentiary hearings, we affirmed the denial of Burton’s first and second

motions for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.2

(3) On June 5, 2023, Burton filed a motion for correction of illegal

sentence. He argued that his habitual offender sentence was illegal because the

State’s submission of two habitual offender motions violated Double Jeopardy and

there was no signed and dated order declaring him a habitual offender. The Superior

Court denied the motion, finding that Burton was appropriately declared a habitual

offender and that the sentence imposed was reasonable in light of the serious nature

of the offenses. This appeal followed.

(4) We review the denial of a motion for sentence correction for abuse of

discretion.3 We review questions of law de novo.4 A sentence is illegal if it exceeds

statutory limits, violates Double Jeopardy, is ambiguous with respect to the time and

manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required

1 Burton v. State, 2006 WL 2434914 (Del. Aug. 21, 2007). 2 Burton v. State, 2016 WL 3568189, at *4 (Del. June 22, 2016) (affirming the Superior Court’s denial of Burton’s second motion for postconviction relief); Burton v. State, 2011 WL 4342636, at *2-3 (Del. Sept. 15, 2011) (affirming the Superior Court’s denial of Burton’s first motion for postconviction relief). 3 Fountain v. State, 2014 WL 4102069, at *1 (Del. Aug. 19, 2014). 4 Id.

2 to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to its substance, or is a sentence that the

judgment of conviction did not authorize.5

(5) In his opening brief, Burton argues that the Superior Court erred in

failing to address his arguments and denying his motion for correction of illegal

sentence. The Superior Court did not err in denying his motion. As the State points

out in its motion to affirm, Burton is challenging the manner in which his sentence

was imposed.6 A motion for correction of a sentence imposed in an illegal manner

must be filed “within 90 days after the sentence is imposed.”7 Burton did not file

his motion until more than fifteen years after his sentence was imposed.

(6) In any event, the record refutes Burton’s claims. On March 10, 2005,

the State sent a letter to Burton’s counsel enclosing a draft motion to declare Burton

a habitual offender under Sections 4214(a) and (b).8 The State copied the

5 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 6 See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 2022 WL 121315, at *1 (Del. Jan. 12, 2022) (describing motion that alleged sentencing court failed to give the defendant an opportunity to challenge the habitual offender petition until the sentencing hearing as a motion for correction of a sentence imposed in an illegal manner). 7 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(a), (b). 8 At the time of Burton’s crimes, Section 4214(a) provided that “[a]ny person who has been 3 times convicted of a felony, other than those which are specifically mentioned in subsection (b) of this section, under the laws of this State…and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony of this State is declared to be an habitual criminal, and the court in which such 4th or subsequent conviction is had, in imposing sentence, may in its discretion, impose a sentence of up to life imprisonment upon the person so convicted.” Section 4214(b) provided that “[a]ny person who has been 2 times convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony hereinafter specifically named, under the laws of this State…and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony hereinafter specifically named, or an attempt to commit such specific felony, is declared to be an habitual criminal, and the court in which such third or subsequent conviction is had, in imposing sentence, shall impose a life sentence upon the person so convicted unless the

3 Prothonotary’s Office. The Superior Court took no action on the letter or draft

motion.

(7) On September 2, 2005, after the jury had convicted Burton, the State

filed a motion to declare Burton a habitual offender under Sections 4214(a) and (b).

At the sentencing hearing on October 28, 2005, Burton’s counsel stated that he had

no basis for objecting to the motion because Burton had the requisite felony

convictions.9 The Superior Court granted the State’s motion to declare Burton a

habitual offender. The Superior Court then sentenced Burton as a habitual offender

to life imprisonment for each of the rape convictions under Section 4214(b) and two

years of Level V incarceration for second-degree unlawful sexual contact under

Section 4214(a). The sentencing order approved by the judge includes language

declaring Burton a habitual offender and sentencing him as a habitual offender.

(8) Contrary to Burton’s contentions, there was no violation of Section

4215(b), which required the State to file a motion to declare Burton a habitual

offender before sentencing and the Superior Court to grant the order before imposing

a habitual offender sentence. Nor was there any Double Jeopardy violation in the

State’s filing of a draft habitual offender petition that the Superior Court did not act

subsequent felony conviction requires or allows and results in the imposition of capital punishment.” The felonies identified by Section 4214(b) included first-degree rape and second- degree rape. 9 The habitual offender motion listed the predicate convictions as third-degree burglary in 1987, third-degree unlawful sexual intercourse in 1995, and third degree-unlawful sexual intercourse in 1998.

4 upon and the State’s filing of a final habitual offender petition that the Superior Court

granted before sentencing Burton. Burton’s sentence is not illegal.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is

GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice