Burton v. Rogovin

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Burton v. Rogovin

262 A.D.2d 72, 692 N.Y.S.2d 37, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6463

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 10, 1999

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 262 A.D.2d 72 (Burton v. Rogovin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Burton v. Rogovin, 262 A.D.2d 72, 692 N.Y.S.2d 37, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6463 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

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Opinion

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Beatrice Shainswit, J.), entered on or about January 9, 1998, which granted defendants’ consolidated motions to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff pro se seeks to recover from former co-counsel legal fees he asserts he would have received if his former client had not discharged him and if her claims had been more diligently pursued by co-counsel. We agree with the IAS Court that plaintiffs claims, some of which are denominated as breach of contract claims, sound in legal malpractice and tortious interference with contract. Plaintiff has no standing to assert the malpractice claims since there was no attorney-client relationship between him and co-counsel (see, Lavanant v General Acc. Ins. Co., 164 AD2d 73, 81, lv dismissed 77 NY2d 939), and, in any event, both the malpractice and tortious interference claims are time-barred (CPLR 214 [4], [6]). Dismissal of the action was additionally warranted since, under the Bankruptcy Code, the claims plaintiff would assert in his individual capacity are the property of plaintiff’s bankruptcy estate (11 USC § 541 [a]). Concur — Ellerin, P. J., Nardelli, Mazzarelli, Rubin and Saxe, JJ.

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—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Beatrice Shainswit, J.), entered on or about January 9, 1998, which granted defendants’ consolidated motions to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff pro se seeks to recover from former co-counsel legal fees he asserts he would have received if his former client had not discharged him and if her claims had been more diligently pursued by co-counsel. We agree with the IAS Court that plaintiffs claims, some of which are denominated as breach of contract claims, sound in legal malpractice and tortious interference with contract. Plaintiff has no standing to assert the malpractice claims since there was no attorney-client relationship between him and co-counsel (see, Lavanant v General Acc. Ins. Co., 164 AD2d 73, 81, lv dismissed 77 NY2d 939), and, in any event, both the malpractice and tortious interference claims are time-barred (CPLR 214 [4], [6]). Dismissal of the action was additionally warranted since, under the Bankruptcy Code, the claims plaintiff would assert in his individual capacity are the property of plaintiff’s bankruptcy estate (11 USC § 541 [a]). Concur — Ellerin, P. J., Nardelli, Mazzarelli, Rubin and Saxe, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

262 A.D.2d 72, 692 N.Y.S.2d 37, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6463, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burton-v-rogovin-nyappdiv-1999.

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