Burton v. Pyramid Life Insurance

130 S.W.2d 706, 198 Ark. 688, 1939 Ark. LEXIS 107
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedJuly 3, 1939
Docket4-5546
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 130 S.W.2d 706 (Burton v. Pyramid Life Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Burton v. Pyramid Life Insurance, 130 S.W.2d 706, 198 Ark. 688, 1939 Ark. LEXIS 107 (Ark. 1939).

Opinion

Grxfrtn Smith,- C. J.

November 15, 1926, Pyramid Life Insurance Company issued policies numbered 960 and 961 on the life of Finis E. Burton, agreeing to pay appellant the principal sums in the event of the insured’s death.

Premiums on each policy, if paid annually in advance, were $112.78; if paid semi-annually in advance, $58.65; if paid quarterly in advance, $29.88. There were provisions for cash surrender or loan values.

Annual premiums were paid -to November 15, 1931, but the premiums then due Avere not paid by the insured, nor did he thereafter make any payments. He died June 18, 1937.

The cash surrender or loan values 1 were from time to time applied in payment of premiums under authority of automatic loan provisions of the contracts. Each policy ivas issued in the principal sum of $2,500; and because each (in all respects material to this opinion) is similar, discussions are confined to a single policy.

After hearing all of the testimony, the trial court •concluded that questions of law only ■ were presented, and judgment was given for the defendant.

It is urged by appellant that the testimony of her accountant-witness was in conflict with that of appellee’s assistant secretary and treasurer, who was also an expert accountant; that the conflicts went to substantial questions of values and to the accuracy of computations, and that only through witnesses skilled in respect of such matters can the alleged fallacious methods of accountancy employed by appellee be shown.

We agree with the court below that conclusions to be drawn from the evidence involve questions of law.. All factual bases having- been admitted, the result must be determined from a construction of the policies, essentials of which are copied in the margin. 2

Attention is first directed to the. provision that “. . . After three full annual premiums shall have been paid on the policy, any premium thereon, or other indebtedness, which shall not be paid when due, or within the period of grace, shall be charged as an automatic policy loan, with interest at six per cent, per annum, payable annually in advance, as long as the then loan values, in accordance with the table of guarantees hereinafter set forth, are sufficient to cover such loan and all other indebtedness to the company.”

The fifth policy anniversary was attained Novem ber 15,1931. No premium was then paid by the insured, nor was it paid within the grace period of 31 days. The company invoked the automatic loan provision by charging a premium against the accumulated values. No independent funds having been remitted by the insured to pay interest in advance on the loan, an additional charge of $7.22 was extended to cover this service. Annually thereafter similar loans were made until November 15,1935. At that time the company’s records showed an insufficient balance in the loan account to pay a full year’s premium. Accordingly, a letter was directed to-Finis E. Burton informing him of the claimed status of the policy; 3 that the full cash value was $577.50, against which automatic loans' aggregating $527.87 had been made; that dividends had accumulated to the amount of $56.28; that a semi-annual premium of $58.65 had been paid by an equal loan; that interest to November 15,1936, amounted to $33.83, and that the credit difference in his favor was $13.43. 4

There was no reply to the company’s letter of May 11, 1936, but April 21, 1937, 'Burton’s attorney wrote, mentioning the two policies, and stating: “I will appreciate your writing me the status of [these contracts] ; that is, as to loan values and extended insurance, or term insurance. ... In other words, please give me detailed information as to the exact status.” Reply to this letter is shown in the footnote. 5 A second letter (April 26,1937) was written by the company, explaining certain dividends, but they are not to be considered here.

Evidence on behalf of appellee (consisting of records and personal testimony), and matters under attack of appellant, show that the controversy revolves around methods of bookkeeping and accountancy employed by appellee subsequent to November 15, 1931, when the first policy loan was extended.

Accrual of dividends (as distinguished from cash or loan values) constituted a policy credit of $56.28. Since the difference between the cash or loan value (hereafter referred to as the loan value), when supplemented by the dividends, was not sufficient to pay a full year’s premium, such dividends were deducted from a semi-annual premium, the difference being $2.37;—that is, the accu. mulated dividends were $2.37 less than the semi-annual, premium of $58.65, which was at that time loaned.

The $2.37 differential was added to the debt of $527.87 existing as of November 15, 1935, making a total of $530.24. A year’s interest on $530.24 at 6% was charged, and a credit extended to November 15,1936. This interest, according to the company’s method of calculating, was $33.83, making a total indebtedness of $564.07. While the semi-annual premium only carried the policy to May 15,1936, interest on the loan was charged “annually in advance,” and such interest, therefore, was paid to November 15, 1936. The loan value ¿s of November 15, 1935, being $577.50, difference between it and the indebtedness was $13.43..

These results, as arrived at by the company, are based upon a system of computation which assumes the right, in lending the insured an annual, a semi-annual, or a quarterly premium, to also advance an amount sufficient to pay interest on the loan.

For example, $112.78 at six per cent, for one year would call for interest of $6.77. If the insured had paid such amount from his own funds,'$6.77 would have been the payment required to carry $112.78 a year. By the method applied in the instant case the company charged interest on the! item of $6.77, amounting to 41 cents, and it also charged interest on 41 cents, amounting to 2 emits. The total amount chargeable under this plan would be $7.20. However, the company made this item $7.22.

An illustration of the method of calculation, found in appellant’s brief, assumes a loan of $100 at six per cent, on -which interest for a year is $6. Interest on $6 is 36 cents, and interest on 36 cents.is 2 cents. It is assumed (and this is true) that the company loaned not only the full amount of the premium (in the hypothetical case $100), but that it also advanced $6 to pay the interest on the interest on the interest. • Hence, it is stated, 6.00 plus .36 plus .02 gives 6.38.

Applying this system to the case at bar, the company, in arriving at the sum chargeable to the borrower, multiplied $112.78 by 6.38. The result would seem to be $7.1953, and not $7.22, as the entries show.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Home Life Insurance Company v. Swaim
142 S.W.2d 209 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1940)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
130 S.W.2d 706, 198 Ark. 688, 1939 Ark. LEXIS 107, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burton-v-pyramid-life-insurance-ark-1939.