Burris v. Lexington/Richland School District 5

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Decided: March 5, 2014
• Docket: 2014-UP-090
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

Linda Burris, Appellant,

v.

Lexington/Richland School District 5, Employer, and South Carolina School Board Insurance Trust, Carrier, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2012-213482

Appeal From Richland County L. Casey Manning, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-090 Submitted January 1, 2014 – Filed March 5, 2014

AFFIRMED

E. Ros Huff, Jr., and Shelby Hapeshis Kellahan, both of Huff Law Firm, LLC, of Irmo, for Appellant.

Ernest G. Lawhorne, of Adams and Reese, LLP, of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Pierre v. Seaside Farms, Inc., 386 S.C. 534, 540, 689 S.E.2d 615, 618 (2010) ("The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) provides the standard for judicial review of decisions by the [Appellate Panel]. An appellate court can reverse or modify the [Appellate Panel]'s decision if it is affected by an error of law or is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole record." (internal citations omitted)); id. ("Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, but evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the agency reached." (quoting Tennant v. Beaufort Cnty. Sch. Dist., 381 S.C. 617, 620, 674 S.E.2d 488, 490 (2009)); Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co., 360 S.C. 276, 289, 599 S.E.2d 604, 611 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The final determination of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded evidence is reserved to the Appellate Panel."); id. at 295, 599 S.E.2d at 613-14 ("A work-related accident which aggravates or accelerates a pre-existing condition, infirmity, or disease . . . is compensable unless it is due solely to the natural progression of a pre-existing condition." (internal citations omitted)); id. at 295, 599 S.E.2d at 614 ("The right of a claimant to compensation for aggravation of a pre-existing condition arises only where there is a dormant condition which has produced no disability but which becomes disabling by reason of the aggravating injury." ); id. ("A determination of whether a claimant's condition was accelerated or aggravated by an accidental injury is a factual matter for the Appellate Panel."); id. ("Where there is a conflict in the evidence from the same or different witnesses, the [Appellate] Panel's findings of fact may not be set aside.").

AFFIRMED.1

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

1 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.