Burress-El v. Duke Energy, Inc.

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 7, 2023
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-2967
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANTUAN BURRESS-EL, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-02967 (UNA) v. ) ) DUKE ENERGY, INC, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se complaint, ECF

No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The Court will

grant the IFP application, and, for the reasons explained below, dismiss this matter without

prejudice.

The complaint is not a model in clarity, but, at root, Plaintiff takes issue with an “[e]minent

[d]omain[] [p]ipeline [e]xcavation that [d]amaged [his] [p]roperty.” Compl. at 7. Plaintiff, a

resident of Cincinnati, Ohio, sues seventeen defendants, all of whom are also located in Ohio. Id.

at 1-6. It appears that Plaintiff is attempting to sue anyone or anything that bears a connection,

however tenuous, to the excavation. He alleges that (1) a defendant contractor and the Public

Utilities Commission of Ohio (“PUCO”) “violated [f]ederal [p]ipeline and [p]ublic [s]afety laws”

and created a toxic environment, (2) PUCO “violated [the] USA and Ohio Constitution[s], [and]

[f]ederal and [s]tate laws,” (3) the Ohio Attorney General “violated his [o]ath to [p]rotect the USA

and Ohio Constitution[s] and the people of Ohio,” and (4) the Ohio Supreme Court and its justices

violated their oaths of office by overseeing related litigation despite an existing conflict of interest.

Id. at 7. Plaintiff demands equitable relief, $274,500,120 in damages, and “accountability” from

the defendants. Id. at 6-7. Even after construing the complaint liberally because of Plaintiff’s pro se status, see e.g., Theus v. Ally Fin., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 3d 41, 45 (D.D.C. 2015), the Court concludes

that it must dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for several reasons.

First, Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to establish the Court’s jurisdiction over his claims.

See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (explaining that

“the burden of establishing [a federal court’s jurisdiction] rests upon the party asserting

jurisdiction”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring that a complaint set forth “the grounds for

the court’s jurisdiction”). “Congress [has] granted federal courts jurisdiction over two general

types of cases: cases that ‘aris[e] under’ federal law, [28 U.S.C.] § 1331, and cases in which the

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is diversity of citizenship among the parties,

[id.] § 1332(a).” Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1746 (2019). Plaintiff’s

case does not fall into either category, and no other basis for jurisdiction is apparent from the

complaint, and so the Court “must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

The complaint’s allegations establish that the Court cannot exercise diversity jurisdiction

under § 1332. “For jurisdiction to exist under [that statute], there must be complete diversity

between the parties, which is to say that the plaintiff may not be a citizen of the same state as any

defendant.” Bush v. Butler, 521 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Owen Equip. & Erection

Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373–74 (1978)); see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff alleges that both

he and at least one of the defendants, Duke Energy Inc., are citizens of Ohio for jurisdictional

purposes. 1 Compl. at 6. The other defendants all appear to also reside in Ohio. Id. at 2–5. Since

there is not complete diversity, the Court cannot exercise diversity jurisdiction.

1 Specifically, the complaint alleges that Duke Energy is a corporation incorporated and with its principal place of business in Ohio, making it a citizen of Ohio for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (“For the purposes of [§ 1332,] . . . a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State . . . by which it has been incorporated and of the State . . . where it has its principal place of business . . . .); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010). The complaint also offers no basis on which the Court can exercise federal question

jurisdiction under § 1331. Although Plaintiff cites, broadly and in passing, to assorted federal

authority, he does not cite any specific statute, treaty, or constitutional provision that grants him a

federal cause of action, or identify which, if any, of his federal rights the defendants purportedly

violated. His vague allegations “cannot establish this Court’s jurisdiction.” Amiri v. Gelman

Mgmt. Co., 734 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2–4 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing complaint for lack of jurisdiction);

see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 682 (2009) (explaining that “bare assertions” of a

constitutional violation are “not entitled to be assumed true”).

Second, independent of those jurisdictional defects, the Court would also dismiss—or, at

minimum, transfer—the case for improper venue. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. EPA, 45 F.4th 380,

384–85 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (explaining that “venue . . . is a threshold, non-merits issue that a court

can address without first establishing its jurisdiction”). Venue in a civil action is proper only in

(1) the district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state in which the

district is located; (2) a district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to

the claim occurred (or in which a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is

situated); or (3) a district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction, if

there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b); see also

id. § 1406(a) (providing for dismissal or transfer for improper venue). None of those criteria make

venue in this District proper in this case; indeed, this matter bears no apparent connection to the

District of Columbia whatsoever. All of the parties are located in Ohio, and all of the alleged

wrongdoing giving rise to this case occurred there as well.

Third, federal district courts generally lack jurisdiction to review judicial decisions by state

courts, which is what Plaintiff asks this Court to do, at least in part. See Richardson v. D.C. Ct. of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923)). And fourth, the actions of

the defendant judges, to the extent they can be discerned, are protected by judicial immunity from

any damages claim. See Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam); see

also Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991) (per curiam).

For all of these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate order

accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date: November 7, 2023 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge