Burns v. Moorland Farm

CourtSuperior Court of Rhode Island
DecidedAugust 27, 2010
DocketC.A. No. NC-2007-0610
StatusPublished

This text of Burns v. Moorland Farm (Burns v. Moorland Farm) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Burns v. Moorland Farm, (R.I. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

DECISION
This matter came before the Court for a jury-waived trial held July 12 through July 14, 2010. This case centers around four special assessments issued by the Defendant Moorland Farm Condominium Association (hereinafter the "Association" or "Defendant") to pay for deck replacements for Phase I condominiums at the Moorland Farm Condominium (hereinafter, "Moorland Farm"). The Plaintiffs' Declaratory Judgment Claim (Count I) on whether these decks are a "common area," a "limited common area," or a part of the individual condominium units under both the Moorland Farm Condominium Declaration (hereinafter the "Declaration") and the Moorland Farm Condominium By-laws (hereinafter the "By-laws") and Defendant's corresponding counterclaim for any unpaid special assessment fees are the only remaining claims for this Court to decide, the others having been dismissed by stipulation. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-30-1 et. seq. *Page 2

I
Rule 52 Standard
Rule 52(a) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "in all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . the court shall find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions of law thereon. . . ." As a non-jury trial, resolution of the instant dispute requires the trial justice to sit "as trier of fact as well as law," to weigh and consider the evidence, to determine the credibility of witnesses, and to draw inferences from the evidence presented. Hood v. Hawkins,478 A.2d 181, 184 (R.I. 1984). See also Rodriques v.Santos, 466 A.2d 306, 312 (R.I. 1983) (holding that the question of who is to be believed is one for the trier of fact). Rule 52(a) does not necessitate "extensive analysis and discussion of all the evidence"; rather, "brief findings and conclusions are sufficient if they address and resolve the controlling and essential factual issues in the case." Donnelly v. Cowsill,716 A.2d 742, 747 (R.I. 1998) (quoting Anderson v. Town of E.Greenwich, 460 A.2d 420, 423 (R.I. 1983)).

II
Findings of Fact
In considering all of the credible testimony and other evidence presented, the Court finds as follows:

1. Moorland Farm is a condominium, located in Newport, Rhode Island, established by a "Declaration of Condominium" dated September 15, 1980 (hereinafter, the "Declaration"). (Joint Ex. 31 ¶ 1 2; Joint Ex. 1.)

2. On September 13, 1980, the Declaration was recorded in the Condominium Land Evidence Records of the City of Newport. (Joint Ex. 31 ¶ 3; Joint Ex. 1.)

*Page 3

3. The plans for Phase I were recorded in 1979 in the Condominium Land Evidence Records of the City of Newport and approved by the Association. (Joint Ex. 31 ¶ 11; Joint Ex. 1; Joint Ex. 35.)

4. On or about December 29, 1983, the First Amendment to the Declaration was recorded with the City of Newport adding Phases II and III (Units 13 through 33) to Moorland Farm. (Joint Ex. 31 ¶ 4; Joint Ex. 2.)

5. Moorland Farm is comprised of thirty-three (33) Units and ten (10) Resident Buildings, plus a Pool Building and a Garage Building. (Joint Ex. 31 ¶ 9).

6. The Declaration provides for two basic condominium units in Phase I: a two-story unit of approximately 2,478 square feet, designated as an "A Unit," and a three-story unit of approximately 3,876 square feet designated as a "B Unit." (Joint Ex. 1 § 3.)

7. Section 3 of the Declaration identifies three phases of construction at Moorland Farms. (Joint Ex. 31 ¶ 10; Joint Ex. 1 § 3.)

8. Phase I consists of the Units in three buildings known as Cardinal House, Pheasant House, and Robin House. (Joint Ex. 31 ¶ 11.)

9. Phase I Units were constructed before the construction of the Phase II and Phase III Units. (Joint Ex. 31 ¶ 13.)

10. Phase II consists of the Units in three buildings known as Gull House, Quail House, and Blue Jay House. (Joint Ex. 31 ¶ 14.)

11. Phase III consists of the Units in four buildings known as Heron House, Warbler House, Sparrow House, and Finch House. (Joint Ex. 31 ¶ 15.)

12. Plaintiffs Charles Burns (Unit 23, Blue Jay House), Peter D'Amario (Unit 21, Blue Jay House), Patricia Ganek (Unit 14, Gull House), Richard H. Koziara (Unit 28, Warbler *Page 4 House), Anne Liddell (Unit 26, Heron House), Charles and Selena Mangan (Unit 19, Quail House), Jane McCool (Unit 32, Finch House), Paul Miller (Unit 23, Blue Jay House), Leslie Parks (Unit 29, Warbler House), Michael and Elyse Spalding (Unit 22, Blue Jay House), and Bernard and Barbara Ward (Unit 33, Finch House) own units, or serve as trustees of trusts that own units, in Phases II and III at Moorland Farm. (Joint Ex. 31 ¶ 19.)

13. Each Phase I unit has at least one or two rear decks. (Joint Ex. 31 ¶ 16; Joint Ex. 33; Joint Ex. 35.)

14. Each Phase I unit also has two pocket decks. (Pls.' Ex. 33; Pls.' Ex. 35.)

15. The decks of a unit (including pocket decks), if any, are for the private, exclusive benefit and use of the unit to which they are connected. Use and enjoyment of such decks is restricted to the individual unit owner(s) and their invited guests. (Pls.' Ex. 32, Pls.' Ex. 33.)

16. Except for a few certain lower rear decks that have steps leading to the ground, access to all decks of a unit is only through the unit itself. Id.

17. Each Phase I unit has an "entry court area." Each entry court area leads to a particular Unit. The entryways — i.e. the steps leading into the unit and consisting of decking material — of each Phase I unit are within the entry court areas. (Pls.' Ex. 33; Pls.' 35.)

18. The entry court area of a unit, if any, is for the private, exclusive use of the unit to which it is appurtenant. Use and enjoyment of such entry court area is restricted to the individual unit owner(s) and their invited guests. (Joint Ex. 31 ¶ 18.)

19. The Declaration and the By-laws of Moorland Farm Condominium Association (Pls.' Ex. 1 Ex. D, hereinafter "By-laws") govern the Association and are binding on the *Page 5 Management Committee, its members, and all unit owners. (Joint Ex. 31 ¶ 33, 42, 45, 50 51; Pls.' Ex. 1 §§ 14 18; By-laws Art. I III.)

20. The Declaration and By-laws provide that the provisions of the Rhode Island Condominium Act, Title 34, Chapter 36, govern Moorland Farm. (Joint Ex. 31 ¶ 33, 42, 45, 50 51; Pls.' Ex. 1 §§ 3, 14 18; By-laws Art. I § 1.)

21.

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Bluebook (online)
Burns v. Moorland Farm, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burns-v-moorland-farm-risuperct-2010.