Burns v. Humboldt Recovery Center, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMarch 1, 2022
Docket4:22-cv-00880
StatusUnknown

This text of Burns v. Humboldt Recovery Center, Inc. (Burns v. Humboldt Recovery Center, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Burns v. Humboldt Recovery Center, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DWAYNE BRIAN BURNS, Case No. 22-cv-00880-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL 9 v.

10 HUMBOLDT RECOVERY CENTER, INC., et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 Plaintiff, an inmate at Kern Valley State Prison, has filed a pro se action against Humboldt 14 County Recovery Center, Inc (“HRC”)., and certain employees of HRC, alleging violations of the 15 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq., and state law. His complaint (Dkt. 16 No. 1) is now before the Court for review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff has been granted 17 leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. 18 DISCUSSION 19 A. Standard of Review 20 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 21 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 23 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 24 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 25 (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 26 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 1 necessary; the statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 2 grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). 3 While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands more than an unadorned, 4 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). 5 A pleading that offers only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 6 cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement does not suffice. Id. 7 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 8 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 9 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 10 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 11 B. Complaint 12 Plaintiff names as defendants the Humboldt County Recovery Center, Inc., HRC director 13 Arlette Large, HRC lead counselor John Remen, and Does 1-10. The complaint makes the 14 following allegations. Plaintiff is a member of one of the protected classes under the ADA. He 15 does not specify what his disability is. On July 7, 2021, Plaintiff began treatment for substance 16 abuse at the Humboldt Recovery Center. On or about August 16, 2021, defendant Remen 17 informed Plaintiff that energy drinks were not allowed at HRC under any circumstances, even if 18 Plaintiff got a note from his doctor. On August 30, 2021, defendant Large advised Plaintiff to 19 leave HRC and treatment immediately, stating that one of the reasons he was being asked to leave 20 was because he was unhappy with the energy drink policy. Plaintiff had to leave the treatment 21 program thirty-five days early. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated the ADA by forcing 22 him to leave the treatment program, and that in violating the ADA, have also violated California 23 law. Plaintiff requests statutory damages of $4,000 per violation, counting each day he was 24 refused entry into the program as a separate violation, for a total of $140,000 in statutory damages. 25 He also seeks unspecified declaratory and injunctive relief, and exemplary damages. See 26 generally Dkt. No. 1. 27 The Court DISMISSES this action with prejudice for failure to state a claim for the 1 Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the ADA. The elements of a cause of action 2 under Title II are that: (1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; 3 (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities; 4 (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated 5 against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s 6 disability. 7 Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). As an initial matter, Plaintiff has not 8 sufficiently pled that he has a disability covered by the ADA. In the context of the ADA, the term 9 “disability” means: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 10 the major life activities of the person; (B) having a record of such an impairment; or (C) being 11 regarded as having such an impairment.” Id. § 12102(1). His conclusory statement that he has a 12 disability within the meaning of the ADA is insufficient to state a claim for relief. More 13 importantly, according to the complaint, he was not denied access to the treatment program 14 because of his disability, but because he wanted to bring in energy drinks while participating in 15 treatment at HRC. Plaintiff has also failed to state a state law claim. It is also unclear what state 16 law, if any, provides that a violation of the ADA violates state law. 17 The dismissal of the ADA claim and the related state law claim is with prejudice because 18 these claims could not possibly be cured by allegations of other facts. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 19 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (district court should grant leave to amend unless pleading could 20 not possibly be cured by allegation of other facts). 21 C. Pending Motions 22 Plaintiff has requested appointment of counsel. Dkt. No. 7. As discussed above, the 23 deficiencies identified in Plaintiff’s claims cannot be cured by allegations of other facts. 24 Accordingly, the request for appointment of counsel (Dkt. No. 7) is DENIED as moot. 25 CONCLUSION 26 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES the complaint with prejudice for failure 27 to state a claim; DENIES the request for appointment of counsel (Dkt. No. 7); and DENIES all 1 in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff, and close the case. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 Dated: 3/1/2022 4 7 Matpurerd 3 Mh, □□□ □ HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 5 United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 ll a 12

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Related

Maryland Insurance v. Woods
10 U.S. 29 (Supreme Court, 1810)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
United States v. Harvey James Duranseau
19 F.3d 1117 (Sixth Circuit, 1994)
Thompson v. Davis
295 F.3d 890 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)

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Bluebook (online)
Burns v. Humboldt Recovery Center, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burns-v-humboldt-recovery-center-inc-cand-2022.