Burns v. Fugate

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedMay 6, 2020
Docket3:20-cv-00419
StatusUnknown

This text of Burns v. Fugate (Burns v. Fugate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Burns v. Fugate, (M.D. Fla. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JOHN SAMUEL BURNS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:20-cv-419-J-39MCR

SGT. FUGATE, et al.,

Defendants. _______________________________

ORDER

Plaintiff, John Samuel Burns, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § l983 (Doc. 1; Compl.) with an exhibit (Doc. 1-1; Pl. Ex.). Plaintiff moves to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) (Doc. 2). He names as Defendants four corrections officers at Union Correctional Institution, Sergeant Fugate, Sergeant Sodek, Captain Korey, and Lieutenant Roberts, for alleged sexual assault and retaliation. See Compl. at 2-4; Pl. Ex. at 1. Plaintiff asserts violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; articles three and five of the Declaration of Human Rights; the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA); and the Gender Motivated Violence Act (GMVA). Compl. at 3. As relief, he seeks monetary damages and for Defendants to be fired or reprimanded. Id. at 5. Upon review of the Complaint, the Court opines that Plaintiff has failed to set forth his claims sufficiently. Many of Plaintiff’s purported claims are not cognizable in a civil rights action. A viable claim under § 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish two essential elements: the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and this

conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). First, the Supreme Court has held that the GMVA is unconstitutional insofar as it extended to victims of gender motivated violence a right to civil relief against the offending individual. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Congress’ effort [under the GMVA] to provide a federal civil remedy can be sustained neither under the Commerce Clause nor under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Second, the PREA does not create a private right of action for civil damages. See, e.g.,

Jacoby v. PREA Coordinator, No. 517CV00053MHHTMP, 2017 WL 2962858, at *7 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 4, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 517CV00053MHHTMP, 2017 WL 2957825 (N.D. Ala. July 11, 2017) (“[The] PREA does not confer a private right of action on individuals.”). Finally, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the rights conferred under the Declaration of Human Rights “are not federal rights.” Moore v. McLaughlin, 569 F. App’x 656, 660 (11th Cir. 2014). In the absence of a federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action under § 1983. Plaintiff also alleges violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. However, those claims are not sufficiently pled under the federal pleading standards and applicable

precedent. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a pleading to include a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 10(b) requires all averments of the claim be made “in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” To survive dismissal, a complaint must allege facts, accepted as true, that state a claim “that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The standard asks for less than a probability but “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Though detailed factual allegations are not required, Rule 8(a) demands “more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. As such, a plaintiff may not rely on “[t]hreadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. As to the purported First Amendment claim, Plaintiff alleges Defendants retaliated against him, though he does not explain how. See Pl. Ex. at 3. To state an actionable claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must allege: (1) his speech was constitutionally protected; (2) the inmate suffered adverse action such that the [official’s] allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in such speech; and (3) there is a causal relationship between the retaliatory action . . . and the protected speech.

O’Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir. 2011) (first alteration in original). Plaintiff alleges he wrote grievances and attempted to initiate legal proceedings, both of which constitute protected speech. Plaintiff also alleges he suffered adverse action: he was placed on property restriction, threatened, and harassed. See Pl. Ex. at 2, 3. However, Plaintiff does not connect the purported acts of retaliation to the named Defendants or to his protected speech. In other words, he fails to demonstrate a causal connection between the alleged retaliatory conduct and his protected speech. Plaintiff’s allegations are merely conclusory, amounting to an “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants Sodek and Fugate “rubb[ed] and pinch[ed] [his] buttocks” implicates the Eighth Amendment. See Pl. Ex. at 1. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “severe or repetitive sexual abuse of a prisoner by a prison official can violate the Eighth Amendment.” Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1267 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff does not allege Defendants severely or repetitively sexually abused him. While the alleged conduct certainly is inappropriate and crude, Plaintiff is advised it may not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. Finally, as to the purported Fourteenth Amendment violation, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support such a claim. To the extent Plaintiff premises his claim on the handling of his

grievances, he should know that “a prison grievance procedure does not provide an inmate with a constitutionally protected interest.” Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1177. To the extent Plaintiff’s claim is premised on his placement on property restriction, his claim fails. See Woodson v. Whitehead, 673 F. App’x 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2016) (“The Due Process Clause does not create an enforceable liberty interest in freedom from restrictive confinement while a prisoner is incarcerated.”). Plaintiff asserts no facts indicating he was subjected to conditions so severe that they imposed upon him a significant hardship in comparison to the ordinary incidents of prison life.

To the extent Plaintiff premises a Fourteenth Amendment violation on the alleged sexual assault, he is advised that the Eighth Amendment “serves as the primary source of substantive protection” for such conduct. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). When a constitutional amendment “provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection,” that amendment guides the analysis, “not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).

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Related

Whitley v. Albers
475 U.S. 312 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Graham v. Connor
490 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court, 1989)
United States v. Morrison
529 U.S. 598 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Al-Amin v. Warden Hugh Smith
637 F.3d 1192 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
O'BRYANT v. Finch
637 F.3d 1207 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
Bingham v. Thomas
654 F.3d 1171 (Eleventh Circuit, 2011)
Chastin Betron Moore v. Gregory McLaughlin
569 F. App'x 656 (Eleventh Circuit, 2014)
Fred Dalton Brooks v. Warden
800 F.3d 1295 (Eleventh Circuit, 2015)
Antonio DaMarcus Woodson v. Brad Whitehead
673 F. App'x 931 (Eleventh Circuit, 2016)
Kristin Sconiers v. FNU Lockhart
946 F.3d 1256 (Eleventh Circuit, 2020)
Boxer X v. Harris
437 F.3d 1107 (Eleventh Circuit, 2006)

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Burns v. Fugate, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burns-v-fugate-flmd-2020.