Burnett v. Herron

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedMarch 26, 2021
Docket5:18-cv-12471
StatusUnknown

This text of Burnett v. Herron (Burnett v. Herron) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Burnett v. Herron, (E.D. Mich. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Michael Burnett,

Plaintiff, Case No. 18-12471

v. Judith E. Levy United States District Judge Kristy Eelbode, et al., Mag. Judge Patricia T. Morris Defendants.

________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS [66] AND ADOPTING IN PART THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [63]

AND

ORDER DISMISSING DEFENDANTS JANE DOE 1 AND JANE DOE 2 WITH PREJUDICE

Plaintiff Michael Burnett filed two objections (ECF No. 66) to Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris’ Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the Court grant Defendants Kristy Eelbode and Pat Warren’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 49), deny Defendants Eelbode and Warren’s motion to file records under seal (ECF No. 48), deny Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery (ECF No. 44), deny Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (ECF No. 53), and deny Plaintiff’s motion for civil contempt (ECF No. 55). (ECF No.

63.) Judge Morris issued the R&R on January 12, 2021. (Id.) The parties

were required to file specific written objections, if any, within fourteen days of service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d). In a motion signed on January 22, 2021, Plaintiff requested an extension of time to

file objections to the R&R. (ECF No. 64.) The Court extended the objections deadline to February 24, 2021. (ECF No. 65.) Plaintiff’s objections are dated February 26, 2021 (see ECF No. 66, PageID.554),

and are therefore untimely. The Court nevertheless considers the merits of his objections, as well as Defendants’ response. (ECF No. 67.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s objections are granted.

The R&R is ADOPTED IN PART. Additionally, Defendants Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. I. Background

The factual and procedural background set forth in the R&R is fully adopted as though set forth in this Opinion and Order. II. Legal Standard A party may object to a magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation on dispositive motions, and a district judge must resolve proper objections under a de novo standard of review. See 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B)–(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)–(3). “For an objection to be proper, Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 72.1(d)(1) requires parties to ‘specify the part of the order, proposed findings,

recommendations, or report to which [the party] objects’ and to ‘state the basis for the objection.’” Pearce v. Chrysler Grp. LLC Pension Plan, 893 F.3d 339, 346 (6th Cir. 2018). Objections that restate arguments already

presented to the magistrate judge are improper, see Coleman-Bey v. Bouchard, 287 F. App’x 420, 422 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Brumley v. Wingard, 269 F.3d 629, 647 (6th Cir. 2001)), as are those that are vague

and dispute the general correctness of the report and recommendation. See Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). Moreover, objections must be clear so that the district court can

“discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.” Id. (citing Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985) (explaining that objections must go to “factual and legal” issues “at the heart of the parties’ dispute”). In sum, the objections must be clear and specific

enough to permit the Court to squarely address them on the merits. See Pearce, 893 F.3d at 346. Because Plaintiff is self-represented, the Court

will construe his objections liberally. See Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Pro se plaintiffs enjoy the benefit of a liberal construction of their pleadings and filings.”).

III. Analysis A. Defendants Eelbode and Warren Plaintiff’s objections relate exclusively to the R&R’s recommendation to grant Defendants Eelbode and Warren’s motion for

summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Plaintiff identifies his objections as follows:

Objection No. 1 To The Report And Recommendation Adopting The Defendants’ Argument That Plaintiff Did Not Exhaust His Step III Grievance Appeal In A Timely Manner. * * * Objection No. 2 To The Report and Recommendation Adopting The Defendants’ Argument That Plaintiff’s Step II Grievance Appeal Did Not Mention Eelbode or Warren By Name[.] (ECF No. 66, PageID.552–553.) Both objections involve the same grievance, which is identified by grievance number MRF-18-01-0016-

28E. (See ECF No. 49-10, PageID.345–348; ECF No. 61, PageID.468– 472.) The grievance was previously assigned grievance number MRF-18-

01-0016-12B.1 (See id.) Eelbode’s name appears in this grievance; Warren’s name does not. (See id.) i. Objection 1: The Timing of Plaintiff’s Step III Grievance Appeal Plaintiff first objects to the R&R’s conclusion that the grievance at issue “was not properly exhausted” because it “was filed untimely at the

Step III level.” (ECF No. 63, PageID.531–532.) The R&R states that the Supreme Court “reasoned [in Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 95 (2006),] that an untimely filed grievance must not be properly exhausted.” (ECF

No. 63, PageID.530.) The R&R also states that “[t]he Sixth Circuit, following this reasoning, has granted summary judgment based on

improper exhaustion where grievances were untimely filed.” (Id. (citing Cook v. Caruso, 531 F. App’x 554, 561–63 (6th Cir. 2013); Gardner v.

1 The Step III Grievance Response states that the “grievance tracking number” was changed “to reflect the grievance category code at Step III.” (ECF No. 49-10, PageID.345; ECF No. 61, PageID.472.) Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 18-1609, 2018 WL 8454299, at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 18, 2018)). The R&R finds that

[t]his standard and reasoning applies in this case, too. In Exhibit I [to Defendants’ summary judgment motion], which contains the grievance that names Eelbode, the response to that grievance at Step III includes the following language: “In accordance to PD 03.02.130 grievances are to be rejected when untimely. Pursuant to policy, this grievance was untimely filed by the grievant at the Step III appeal. The grievant’s Step III appeal was to be received by March 13, 2018, however it was not received until March 27, 2018.” (ECF No. 49, Exhibit I, PageID.345.) Indeed, PD 03.02.130 dictates that “[t]o file a Step III grievance, the grievance [sic] must send [the proper form] to the Grievance and Appeals Section within ten business days after receiving the Step II response or, if no response was received, within ten business days after the date the response was due, including any extensions.” MDOC PD 03.02.130(FF) (eff. July 9, 2007). As in Woodford, Cook, and Gardner, I suggest that this grievance, which was filed untimely at the Step III level, did not properly exhaust Plaintiff’s administrative remedies.

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Related

Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Willie Brumley v. Curtis Wingard
269 F.3d 629 (Sixth Circuit, 2001)
Coleman-Bey v. Bouchard
287 F. App'x 420 (Sixth Circuit, 2008)
Gregory Cook v. Patricia Caruso
531 F. App'x 554 (Sixth Circuit, 2013)
Randy Pearce v. Chrysler Grp. LLC Pension Plan
893 F.3d 339 (Sixth Circuit, 2018)
Miller v. Currie
50 F.3d 373 (Sixth Circuit, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
Burnett v. Herron, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burnett-v-herron-mied-2021.