Burks v. Williams

260 So. 2d 642, 261 La. 612, 1972 La. LEXIS 5154
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedMarch 27, 1972
DocketNo. 51392
StatusPublished

This text of 260 So. 2d 642 (Burks v. Williams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Burks v. Williams, 260 So. 2d 642, 261 La. 612, 1972 La. LEXIS 5154 (La. 1972).

Opinions

BARHAM, Justice.

The plaintiff brought executory proceedings seeking the balance due, with stipulated interest and attorney’s fees, on a promissory note secured by act of mortgage and vendor’s lien. The note, in the original amount of $60,000.00, was made payable to “myself”, and though signed by the defendant, was never endorsed. The proceeding was turned into an ordinary suit when the trial court held that the instrument indicating the debt was not a note and that the instrument purporting to be a mortgage was not entitled to recognition as a mortgage securing that debt. The trial court, however, in its last (second amending) judgment cast the defendant for $55,649.93 and recognized and ordered enforcement of the plaintiff’s vendor’s lien and privilege. The trial court apparently allowed and included in the money award stipulated 6 per cent interest on the debt from the date of the confection of the purported note and mortgage, December 23, 1957, until December 23, 1967, but it struck all interest thereafter when it sustained a plea of prescription.1

It was obvious to us from the record that under no construction of the evidence could the $55,649.93 judgment stand if interest terminated December 23, 1967, whether the rate of interest was 5 per cent or 6 per cent. The most that could be due as principal and interest was $49,892.95 under stipulated 6 per cent interest to De[616]*616cember 23, 1967, and $45,363.77 under the then applicable legal rate of 5 per cent interest.2

At this court’s request for additional briefs to explain the discrepancy in the trial court’s judgment awards, which was also carried into the appellate court’s opinion, the plaintiff, who is adversely affected by our noting of the discrepancy, has admitted that the maximum award he can obtain as principal and interest from 1957 to 1967 is $49,892.95 if the award includes stipulated interest and $45,363.77 if it includes legal interest.

The defendant, who gains several thousand dollars under either stipulation, wants whatever may come her way, but at the time her brief was received by this court, she would not stipulate the exact amount because she had not checked the computations. We therefore accept plaintiff’s stipulation, but will, as we had to do in order to discover the error, make and check our own computations.

The defendant appealed, but the plaintiff neither appealed nor answered the appeal. Therefore, without regard to the correctness of the trial court’s judgment, the plaintiff is not entitled to interest after 1967 or to attorney’s fees. Moreover, the defendant did not raise the question of the validity of the vendor’s lien and privilege in the appellate court. The only question which was presented for decision in the Court of Appeal was whether any interest (and if so, at what rate) was due on the credit portion of the sale price of a tract of land from December 23, 1957, the date of that sale, to December 23, 1967. That court held that no interest whatever could be charged on the credit portion of the price of the sale of the immovable. See 246 So.2d 690.

We granted writs, being of the opinion at that time that we should review the appellate court’s judgment denying interest in order to determine whether Civil Code Articles 1938 and 2553 would not require the credit sale to carry legal interest.3

[618]*618After a review of the record before us we conclude that we are not faced with the problem which caused us to grant the writ. We find in the record a deed setting forth the consideration for the sale and the terms and conditions (including interest) for the payment of that consideration, and purporting to secure the consideration by real mortgage and by vendor’s lien and privilege. It is impossible to determine how the appellate court recognized a sale of an immovable, which has to be reduced to writing, and yet could find no written terms of consideration in that sale requiring interest. The Court of Appeal simply held: “ * * * As there was no promise to pay the note and mortgage, there could be no promise to pay interest.” 4

We find that the deed is a contract for sale of an immovable for $6000.00 cash and a credit balance of $60,000.00 to be paid in installments bearing 6 per cent interest on the unpaid balance.5 Since there is a written contract stipulating the terms for the payment of the credit balance of the sale, which include stipulated interest, it was error to look beyond this instrument.

For the reasons assigned the judgment of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, is reversed, and it is ordered that the plaintiff, J. Spencer Burks, have judgment against [620]*620the defendant, Edwina E. Williams, in the sum of $49,892.95 with legal interest from date of judicial demand until paid. The defendant is to pay all costs.

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Related

Burks v. Williams
246 So. 2d 690 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1971)

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Bluebook (online)
260 So. 2d 642, 261 La. 612, 1972 La. LEXIS 5154, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burks-v-williams-la-1972.