Burke v. United States

8 Cl. Ct. 75, 1985 U.S. Claims LEXIS 985
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMay 8, 1985
DocketNo. 96-83C
StatusPublished

This text of 8 Cl. Ct. 75 (Burke v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Burke v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 75, 1985 U.S. Claims LEXIS 985 (cc 1985).

Opinion

OPINION

WOOD, Judge:

In this action, before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment, plaintiff, a former regular commissioned officer of the United States Air Force, sues to recover the basic pay and allowances of a captain, less appropriate offsets, from February 28, 1977, to about November 30, 1978, on the ground that his release from active duty as a commissioned officer February 27, 1977, was in violation of the provisions of 10 U.S.C. § 8913(b) (1976)1 and therefore unlawful.2

[77]*77In brief terms, plaintiff contends that under the provisions of section 8913(b), he was entitled to be retained on the active list of the Air Force in his “regular” commissioned grade because he was, at the time of his separation from active military service as a commissioned officer, within two years of becoming eligible for retirement, as an enlisted man, under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. § 8914.3 Defendant asserts that section 8913(b) confers no benefits upon plaintiff here. Defendant’s position is sound, and sustained.

I

The facts essential to a proper disposition of this matter are relatively few, and undisputed. Before stating those facts, however, a brief recitation of the statutory background out of which the case arose may be helpful to understanding.

A

During the time frame here relevant, the names of most commissioned officers on the active list of the Regular Air Force were carried on promotion lists, and those officers were referred to as “promotion-list officers.” 10 U.S.C. § 8296(a). A promotion-list officer whose regular grade was first lieutenant was to be considered for promotion to the regular grade of captain in due course, and “if recommended,” was to be promoted on the date on which he completed “7 * * * years of service with which he is entitled to be credited for promotion * * 10 U.S.C. § 8299(b).

A promotion-list officer considered for promotion to the grade of captain under section 8299, but not recommended for promotion, was termed a “deferred officer,” and was to be again considered by the next selection board considering officers of his grade and promotion list. 10 U.S.C. § 8303(a), (c). If not recommended by that selection board, the “deferred officer” was, if eligible, to be retired under section 8913; if not eligible for retirement under section 8913, but eligible for retirement “under any other provision of law,” to be retired under that law; and, if not eligible for retirement under either section 8913 or any other provision of law, to be discharged with severance pay. 10 U.S.C. § 8303(d).

Under section 8913(a), a deferred officer not recommended for promotion under section 8303(c) who had at least 20 years of service computed under 10 U.S.C. § 8927(a) was to be retired at a specified time thereafter. One not recommended for promotion under section 8303(c), and who was not eligible for retirement under section 8913(a), but who “is within two years of becoming entitled to retirement under subsection (a) or some other provision of law, shall be retained on the active list in his regular grade” until so entitled to retire, and then retired. 10 U.S.C. § 8913(b).4

B

As noted at the outset, plaintiff is a former regular commissioned officer of the United States Air Force.5 On February 27, 1977, while serving on active duty in the temporary grade of captain, Air Force of the United States, he was released from active duty by reason of what his complaint [78]*78terms “twice nonselection for promotion to the permanent grade of captain.” Cf 10 U.S.C. §§ 8299, 8303. As of February 27, 1977, plaintiff had completed a total of more than 18 years of active military service. He had then performed seven years, two months and 21 days of active service as a commissioned officer.6 The remainder of his active service had been performed as an enlisted man.

Following February 27, 1977, plaintiff enlisted in the Air Force in the grade of staff sergeant (E-5). He served on active duty in an enlisted status until he completed more than 20 years of active military service. On November 30,1978, he retired, as an enlisted man, pursuant to the provisions of 10 U.S.C. § 8914. See n. 3, supra.

At his separation from active commissioned status, plaintiff was not eligible for retirement as a commissioned officer, under either section 8913(a) or any other provision of law. Nor was he within two years of becoming eligible for retirement as a commissioned officer under any provision of law. In view of his February 28, 1977, enlistment in the Regular Air Force, and his enlisted service on active duty thereafter, however, he became eligible to—and in fact did—retire from active military service as an enlisted man under section 8914 on November 30, 1978, within the two-year period following his separation from active service as a commissioned officer. That eligibility underlies this litigation.

Parenthetically, by application, dated April 7, 1977, plaintiff presented to the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records the contention that his separation from active duty February 27, 1977, had been in violation of his statutory rights under section 8913(b). By letter, dated October 18, 1979, the Deputy Secretary of the Board advised plaintiff that his application had been denied, without a hearing, for plaintiffs failure to “demonstrate the existence of probable material error or injustice.” This action, commenced February 25, 1983, followed.

II

The fundamental inquiry in this case is whether plaintiffs involuntary separation from active duty as a commissioned officer was legally erroneous and in violation of statute. If so, redress by way of judicial action is available. “Where an involuntary separation from the military is precipitated by the commission of legal error, the action [may be] declared void and this court may award back pay to the aggrieved serviceman.” Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804, 813, 219 Ct.Cl. 285 (1979). See also Heisig v. United States, 719 F.2d 1153, 1155 (CAFC 1983); Horn v. United States, 671 F.2d 1328, 1330, 230 Ct.Cl. 18 (1982).7

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Related

David W. Heisig v. The United States
719 F.2d 1153 (Federal Circuit, 1983)
Sanders v. United States
594 F.2d 804 (Court of Claims, 1979)
Horn v. United States
671 F.2d 1328 (Court of Claims, 1982)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
8 Cl. Ct. 75, 1985 U.S. Claims LEXIS 985, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burke-v-united-states-cc-1985.