Burke v. State

887 P.2d 267, 110 Nev. 1366, 1994 Nev. LEXIS 172
CourtNevada Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 22, 1994
Docket23418
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 887 P.2d 267 (Burke v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Burke v. State, 887 P.2d 267, 110 Nev. 1366, 1994 Nev. LEXIS 172 (Neb. 1994).

Opinion

OPINION

Per Curiam:

For the second time this year, we address the failure of the law firm of Moran & Weinstock to comply with our procedural rules. In County Comm’rs v. Las Vegas Discount Golf, 110 Nev. 567, 875 P.2d 1045 (1994), we granted a motion for confession of error after Moran & Weinstock, counsel for respondent in that case, refused to comply with an expedited briefing schedule. *1367 Once again, Moran & Weinstock has failed to file a timely brief— this time in a criminal appeal. For reasons explained below, we remove the firm of Moran & Weinstock as counsel for appellant, remand this matter to the district court for the appointment of new counsel, impose monetary sanctions against counsel, direct that the firm of Moran & Weinstock be removed from the criminal appointment list for the Eighth Judicial District Court, and refer this matter to the State Bar of Nevada for further investigation.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On December 4, 1991, appellant James T. Burke was convicted pursuant to a guilty plea of one count of forgery and sentenced to five years in the Nevada State Prison. On December 11, 1991, appellant, in proper person, filed a timely notice of appeal.

Our preliminary review of the record indicated that appellant should be represented by counsel. Accordingly, on August 4, 1992, we remanded this matter to the district court for the appointment of counsel. Four days later, the district court appointed Andrew M. Leavitt of the firm of Moran & Weinstock to represent appellant, and on August 28, 1992, Leavitt filed a docketing statement on appellant’s behalf. See NRAP 14.

Following the filing of the docketing statement, Burke submitted an opening brief in proper person, which we ordered filed on September 15, 1992. Thereafter, no action was taken in this case by any party for the next year-and-a-half. Finally, on June 10, 1994, this court ordered appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the opening brief. We also ordered the law firm of Moran & Weinstock to show cause why it should not be sanctioned for its flagrant disregard of our orders and procedural rules.

In response, Leavitt filed a motion for a confession of error in which he asserts that the appeal should not be dismissed because appellant filed a proper person opening brief on September 15, 1992. Leavitt also argues that the firm did not disregard any orders or rules of this court, and that sanctions against Moran & Weinstock are unwarranted. In fact, Leavitt argues that this court should treat the State’s failure to respond to the proper person opening brief as a confession of error, and should reverse the judgment of conviction. 1

*1368 DISCUSSION

We are somewhat perplexed by Leavitt’s contentions. When we remanded this matter to the district court for the appointment of counsel, we obviously did so because we desired briefing by counsel, not a layperson. Indeed, our August 4, 1992, order of remand specifically directed counsel to file an opening brief on appellant’s behalf within 60 days from appointment. Nothing in our September 15, 1992, order permitting appellant to file a brief in proper person can be read to have relieved counsel of the obligation to file a brief on appellant’s behalf. The import of our orders being plain, we find highly incredible counsel’s assertion that he labored under the belief that the filing of a proper person opening brief fulfilled counsel’s obligation.

Additionally, we note that counsel did nothing to prosecute this appeal until 22 months after the State’s brief was purportedly due, when he finally filed a motion for confession of error. 2 The motion for confession of error itself, however, was clearly prompted by this court’s order to show cause. Thus, even if we were to accept counsel’s assertion that the filing of the proper person opening brief freed him from having to file a brief on appellant’s behalf — and, as noted, we emphatically reject such a contention — counsel has still failed to explain why he did nothing to prosecute this appeal beyond the filing of the docketing statement on August 28, 1992.

We have previously stated that we expect that all appeals brought in this court will be pursued in a manner meeting high standards of diligence, professionalism, and competence. See Cuzdey v. State, 103 Nev. 575, 747 P.2d 233 (1987); SCR 151. Further, a defendant in a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). A review of the proceedings in this case makes it quite clear that counsel’s performance has fallen below the “high standards of diligence, professionalism and competence” we discussed in Cuzdey. We therefore conclude that counsel’s performance in the present case could arguably give rise to future claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

Accordingly, we remand this matter to the Eighth Judicial *1369 District Court with instructions that the firm of Moran & Weinstock be removed as counsel of record for appellant. We further instruct the district court that neither the law firm of Moran & Weinstock, nor Andrew M. Leavitt shall be compensated in any manner for their handling of this appeal. The district court shall appoint new counsel to represent appellant within 15 days from the date of this opinion. The clerk of the district court shall immediately inform the clerk of this court of the appointment, and new counsel shall promptly enter an appearance with this court. Counsel shall have 60 days from the date of this opinion within which to file the opening brief. Thereafter, briefing shall proceed in strict compliance with NRAP 31(a)(1).

We further conclude that Leavitt’s handling of this appeal warrants the imposition of monetary sanctions. In City of Las Vegas v. Int’l Assoc. Firefighters, 110 Nev. 449, 452 n.3, 874 P.2d 735, 737 (1994), we warned practitioners that “we will not hesitate to impose sanctions for material violations of our procedural rules.” Because Leavitt has materially violated our procedural rules in this case, we hereby sanction him personally. Leavitt shall pay to the Clark County Law Library the sum of $1,000.00, and shall provide the clerk of this court with proof of such payment within 15 days from the date of this opinion. In addition, Leavitt shall serve a copy of this opinion on appellant, and shall provide the clerk of this court with proof of such service within 15 days from the date of this opinion. Leavitt’s failure to comply with these directives in a timely manner will result in the imposition of further sanctions, and, possibly, a citation for contempt of this court.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
887 P.2d 267, 110 Nev. 1366, 1994 Nev. LEXIS 172, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burke-v-state-nev-1994.