United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 93-8424.
Patricia BURGOS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE CO., Defendant-Appellee.
May 11, 1994.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before ALDISERT*, REYNALDO G. GARZA and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Burgos family appeals the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. on the
basis that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187, preempts their intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim. Finding no error, we
AFFIRM.
I. FACTS
Oscar Burgos was employed by Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
("Southwestern Bell") for over nineteen years. In 1989, Burgos was
a non-management employee with the title Communications Technician.
He was a member of the labor organization Communications Workers of
America, which was a party to a collective bargaining agreement
with Southwestern Bell. The agreement covered the conditions of
employment of Burgos and other employees similarly situated. In
* Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
1 August, 1989, Burgos was found to be suffering from a heart
condition known as idiopathic, congestive cardiomyopathy. After a
period of hospitalization, he recovered sufficiently to return to
work in October, 1989, on a restricted basis, the restriction being
that he was forbidden to lift anything heavier than twenty-five
pounds. With this restriction, Burgos was apparently able to
perform the duties of a Communications Technician, at least for a
few months. He was assigned to a group known as the Special
Services Group.
In March, 1990, Southwestern Bell made a management decision
to transfer the work being done by the Special Services Group in El
Paso to the Dallas office. Under the collective bargaining
agreement then in effect, Burgos had three options: (1) move to
Dallas with the Special Services Group; (2) seek and obtain
another position with the company in El Paso, or (3) take
termination, which entitled the employee to a termination
allowance. Burgos advised the company that his doctor advised him
not to move to Dallas with the Special Services Group. Rather than
taking termination, he decided to apply for another position with
the company in El Paso. Pursuant to the Job Vacancy Article of the
collective bargaining agreement, Burgos took four tests to
determine his qualifications for alternative positions within
Southwestern Bell. He failed all four tests, which the appellants
specifically attribute to his worsening medical condition.
On July 7, 1990, a position became available in network
switching and Burgos was placed in this position. Although his
2 title of Communications Technician continued, his duties were
changed significantly. He was sent to Dallas to attend a course in
electronic switching known as the "511A Training Course." Burgos
proceeded to fail a segment of this course, and he was deemed by
Southwestern Bell to have failed the entire course. As a result,
he was "retreated" back to El Paso to his former position in
Special Services. His continued efforts to obtain a new position
with Southwestern Bell in El Paso were unsuccessful. Finally, on
August 17, 1990, Burgos notified Southwestern Bell that he would
take termination. Accordingly, his employment was terminated and
he received termination pay of about $30,000.00. After this, his
heart condition worsened, and he was hospitalized. On October 3,
1990, Burgos died while awaiting a heart transplant.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The widow and children of the deceased, Oscar Burgos, brought
a civil action in the El Paso County Court, alleging negligence,
breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Southwestern Bell filed a notice of removal to the
Western District of Texas on the basis of diversity of citizenship
and federal question. The Burgos family abandoned all claims
except for their intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Southwestern Bell on the basis that section 301 of the LMRA
preempted the Burgos family's tort claim. The Burgos timely
appealed to this court.
III. DISCUSSION
3 The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court
properly granted summary judgment on the basis that federal law,
via the LMRA, preempts the Burgos' intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim.
A. Standard of Review
This court reviews the district court's rulings on motions
for summary judgment de novo. FDIC v. Laguarta, 939 F.2d 1231,
1236 (5th Cir.1991). A motion for summary judgment should be
granted only where competent evidence establishes the absence of a
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d
265 (1986). A defendant moving for summary judgment must
affirmatively demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of
material fact concerning each element of the plaintiff's claims for
relief. See, Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. An issue is
"material" if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law. See, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986). This court is required to resolve all reasonable doubts
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, and
then determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Wells v. General Motors Corp., 881 F.2d 166, 169
(5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923, 110 S.Ct. 1959, 109
L.Ed.2d 321 (1990).
B. LMRA Preemption
4 The Burgos family argues that the district court erred in
holding that their claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress is preempted by section 301(a) of the LMRA. They argue
that their claim is based on the conduct of the agents and
employees of Southwestern Bell who, with knowledge of Mr. Burgos'
serious heart condition, placed Mr. Burgos under such extreme
emotional distress that his physical condition deteriorated to the
point where he was forced to take voluntary termination and
succumbed to an untimely death soon thereafter. The Burgos family
argues that they do not complain of the particular Southwestern
Bell policies which set this course of harassment and stress into
effect. They further argue that their claim of intentional
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 93-8424.
Patricia BURGOS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE CO., Defendant-Appellee.
May 11, 1994.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before ALDISERT*, REYNALDO G. GARZA and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Burgos family appeals the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. on the
basis that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187, preempts their intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim. Finding no error, we
AFFIRM.
I. FACTS
Oscar Burgos was employed by Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
("Southwestern Bell") for over nineteen years. In 1989, Burgos was
a non-management employee with the title Communications Technician.
He was a member of the labor organization Communications Workers of
America, which was a party to a collective bargaining agreement
with Southwestern Bell. The agreement covered the conditions of
employment of Burgos and other employees similarly situated. In
* Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
1 August, 1989, Burgos was found to be suffering from a heart
condition known as idiopathic, congestive cardiomyopathy. After a
period of hospitalization, he recovered sufficiently to return to
work in October, 1989, on a restricted basis, the restriction being
that he was forbidden to lift anything heavier than twenty-five
pounds. With this restriction, Burgos was apparently able to
perform the duties of a Communications Technician, at least for a
few months. He was assigned to a group known as the Special
Services Group.
In March, 1990, Southwestern Bell made a management decision
to transfer the work being done by the Special Services Group in El
Paso to the Dallas office. Under the collective bargaining
agreement then in effect, Burgos had three options: (1) move to
Dallas with the Special Services Group; (2) seek and obtain
another position with the company in El Paso, or (3) take
termination, which entitled the employee to a termination
allowance. Burgos advised the company that his doctor advised him
not to move to Dallas with the Special Services Group. Rather than
taking termination, he decided to apply for another position with
the company in El Paso. Pursuant to the Job Vacancy Article of the
collective bargaining agreement, Burgos took four tests to
determine his qualifications for alternative positions within
Southwestern Bell. He failed all four tests, which the appellants
specifically attribute to his worsening medical condition.
On July 7, 1990, a position became available in network
switching and Burgos was placed in this position. Although his
2 title of Communications Technician continued, his duties were
changed significantly. He was sent to Dallas to attend a course in
electronic switching known as the "511A Training Course." Burgos
proceeded to fail a segment of this course, and he was deemed by
Southwestern Bell to have failed the entire course. As a result,
he was "retreated" back to El Paso to his former position in
Special Services. His continued efforts to obtain a new position
with Southwestern Bell in El Paso were unsuccessful. Finally, on
August 17, 1990, Burgos notified Southwestern Bell that he would
take termination. Accordingly, his employment was terminated and
he received termination pay of about $30,000.00. After this, his
heart condition worsened, and he was hospitalized. On October 3,
1990, Burgos died while awaiting a heart transplant.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The widow and children of the deceased, Oscar Burgos, brought
a civil action in the El Paso County Court, alleging negligence,
breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Southwestern Bell filed a notice of removal to the
Western District of Texas on the basis of diversity of citizenship
and federal question. The Burgos family abandoned all claims
except for their intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Southwestern Bell on the basis that section 301 of the LMRA
preempted the Burgos family's tort claim. The Burgos timely
appealed to this court.
III. DISCUSSION
3 The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court
properly granted summary judgment on the basis that federal law,
via the LMRA, preempts the Burgos' intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim.
A. Standard of Review
This court reviews the district court's rulings on motions
for summary judgment de novo. FDIC v. Laguarta, 939 F.2d 1231,
1236 (5th Cir.1991). A motion for summary judgment should be
granted only where competent evidence establishes the absence of a
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d
265 (1986). A defendant moving for summary judgment must
affirmatively demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of
material fact concerning each element of the plaintiff's claims for
relief. See, Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. An issue is
"material" if it involves a fact that might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law. See, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986). This court is required to resolve all reasonable doubts
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, and
then determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Wells v. General Motors Corp., 881 F.2d 166, 169
(5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 923, 110 S.Ct. 1959, 109
L.Ed.2d 321 (1990).
B. LMRA Preemption
4 The Burgos family argues that the district court erred in
holding that their claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress is preempted by section 301(a) of the LMRA. They argue
that their claim is based on the conduct of the agents and
employees of Southwestern Bell who, with knowledge of Mr. Burgos'
serious heart condition, placed Mr. Burgos under such extreme
emotional distress that his physical condition deteriorated to the
point where he was forced to take voluntary termination and
succumbed to an untimely death soon thereafter. The Burgos family
argues that they do not complain of the particular Southwestern
Bell policies which set this course of harassment and stress into
effect. They further argue that their claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress does not require any analysis of
the collective bargaining agreement. They conclude, therefore,
that their state-law claim is not preempted by section 301(a) of
the LMRA.
Southwestern Bell, in contrast, argues that the Burgos' tort
claim is nothing more than an attack on their procedures in
declaring force adjustments, filling job vacancies, and
effectuating terminations. Southwestern Bell claims that the
entire process through which Oscar Burgos passed in the spring and
summer of 1990 was the effectuation of their force adjustment
decision pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. As the
Burgos' tort claim is only another way of complaining about that
process and Oscar Burgos' ultimate termination from employment,
their claim is substantially dependent upon an analysis of the
5 collective bargaining agreement. Southwestern Bell concludes,
therefore, that the Burgos' tort claim is preempted by section
301(a) of the LMRA.
Section 301(a) of the LMRA states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
In Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,
405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1881, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988), the U.S.
Supreme Court held:
if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law (which might lead to inconsistent results since there could be as many state-law principles as there are States) is pre-empted and federal labor-law principles—necessarily uniform throughout the Nation—must be employed to resolve the dispute.
Prior to Lingle, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Allis-Chalmers
Corporation v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1916, 85
L.Ed.2d 206 (1985), held that "when resolution of a state-law claim
is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an
agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim
must be either treated as a § 301 claim, [authority omitted], or
dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law."
In Brown v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 901 F.2d 1250,
1253 (5th Cir.1990), an employee was told by his personal physician
that he was completely disabled and should not return to work.
6 Southwestern Bell, however, informed the employee that if he did
not return to work by a certain date, he would be terminated. Id.
The employee brought a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on the fact that Southwestern Bell forced
him to chose between his job and his doctor's advice. Id. This
court held that the employee's claim was essentially that his
absence from work pursuant to doctor's orders did not constitute a
just cause for discharge under the collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 1255. Thus, the court reasoned, his claim required an
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and was
preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. Id. at 1255-56.
The Fourth Circuit, in McCormick v. AT & T Technologies, Inc.,
934 F.2d 531 (4th Cir.1991) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----,
112 S.Ct. 912, 116 L.Ed.2d 813 (1992), dealt with a similar
situation. In McCormick, the plaintiff brought claims for
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, as well
as other claims based on AT & T's removal and discard of
plaintiff's personal belongings from his locker. Id. at 533. The
Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff had the burden of proving
wrongful conduct and that he must demonstrate not that the conduct
was wrongful in some abstract sense, but wrongful under the
circumstances. Id. at 535-36. The court went on to state that the
circumstances that must be considered in examining management's
conduct are not merely factual, but contractual, and the collective
bargaining agreement is a crucial component of these circumstances.
Therefore, plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress
7 claim was preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. Id. at 536.
We agree with the reasoning in Brown and McCormick. In order
to determine whether Southwestern Bell acted wrongfully in the way
it transferred Mr. Burgos from one section to another, required him
to take different tests, and ultimately effectuated his
termination, an analysis of Southwestern Bell's obligations under
the collective bargaining agreement is necessary. Since an
analysis of the collective bargaining agreement is necessary, the
Burgos' intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is
preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.
Therefore, we find that the district court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of Southwestern Bell.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of
summary judgment is AFFIRMED.