Burgess v. Knight Transportation Incorporated
Opinion
1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Thomas Burgess, No. CV-25-02944-PHX-DWL
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Knight Transportation Incorporated,
13 Defendant. 14 15 On April 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed the complaint in the Southern District of Florida. 16 (Doc. 1.) 17 On July 7, 2025, Defendant filed a motion requesting that the court take one of the 18 following actions: (1) determine that Plaintiff is a “vexatious litigant” and dismiss the case 19 with prejudice, (2) dismiss the action for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 20 Procedure 12(b)(6), (3) dismiss the action for improper venue, or (4) dismiss the complaint 21 as a “shotgun pleading.” (Doc. 8.) The motion later became fully briefed. (Docs. 18, 22.) 22 On August 11, 2025, the court determined that the case should be transferred to the 23 District of Arizona and ordered that “Defendant’s remaining arguments . . . remain 24 pending.” (Doc. 34.) 25 On August 15, 2025, the case was transferred to Arizona (Doc. 35) and assigned to 26 the undersigned judge. (Doc. 36.) 27 On September 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint (Doc. 42) 28 and lodged a proposed First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. 43). Plaintiff failed to 1 adhere to LRCiv 15.1(a), which requires that “[a] party who moves for leave to amend a 2 pleading must attach a copy of the proposed amended pleading as an exhibit to the motion, 3 which must indicate in what respect it differs from the pleading which it amends, by 4 bracketing or striking through the text to be deleted and underlining the text to be added.” 5 The deadline for Defendant to respond to the motion to amend expired without any 6 opposition from Defendant. LRCiv 7.2(c). Pursuant to LRCiv 7.2(i), Defendant’s failure 7 to oppose the motion to amend is “deemed a consent” to the granting of the motion, such 8 that the motion to amend is granted summarily. 9 Due to Plaintiff’s pro se status and the recent transfer to a new court, the Court will 10 excuse Plaintiff’s noncompliance with the requirement, pursuant to LRCiv 15.1, that every 11 amendment of the complaint must be accompanied by a redlined draft indicating what has 12 changed. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must familiarize himself with the District of 13 Arizona’s local rules, available on its website 14 (https://www.azd.uscourts.gov/sites/azd/files/local-rules/LRCiv%202024.pdf), and adhere 15 to those rules from this point forward. 16 As for the remaining arguments in Defendant’s July 7, 2025 motion (Doc. 8), the 17 Court denies the request to designate Plaintiff a vexatious litigant. Defendant has not 18 demonstrated that Plaintiff is abusing the judicial system. Filing multiple lawsuits is not, 19 itself, an abuse of the system. Moy v. United States, 906 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1990) 20 (“Since an injunction preventing the relitigation of claims restricts an individual’s access 21 to the court system, it is an extraordinary remedy that should be narrowly tailored and 22 rarely used. An injunction cannot issue merely upon a showing of litigiousness. The 23 plaintiff’s claims must not only be numerous, but also be patently without merit.”). 24 Defendant argues that Plaintiff has filed “at least four” actions asserting race discrimination 25 claims against trucking companies but offers no support for its contention that Plaintiff 26 “does not have an objective, good-faith expectation of prevailing” in these actions—nor is 27 being “not represented by counsel” indicative of frivolousness. (Doc. 8 at 5-6.) Plaintiff 28 responds that “there has not been one case he filed dismissed as frivolous” and that he “has 1 || been winning cases that he has filed pro se,” listing cases. (Doc. 18 at 2-3.) As for 2|| Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs “pattern of traveling through states where the □□ trucking companies are headquartered and sending photos of himself in front of the 4|| company, a state sign, or a rest area is disturbing and can be described as nothing less than || harassing” (Doc. 8 at 7), Plaintiff responds that he takes these photos as evidence to show 6 || to juries to demonstrate his travel throughout the country. (Doc. 18 at 5-6.) Although the 7 || Court does not entirely understand the purpose of the photographs, neither does the Court 8 || perceive them as “disturbing” or “harassing.” On this record, a vexatious litigant order is unwarranted. 10 The remainder of the July 7, 2025 motion (Doc. 8) is dismissed as moot due to the filing of the FAC. Ramirez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 12 || 2015) (“[A]n amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter 13 || as non-existent. ... Because the Defendants’ motion to dismiss targeted the Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, which was no longer in effect, we conclude that 15 || the motion to dismiss should have been deemed moot... .”). 16 Accordingly, 17 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to amend (Doc. 42) is granted. The Clerk 18 || of Court shall file the FAC, which is lodged at Doc. 43. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall familiarize himself with the 20 || District of Arizona’s local rules. 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to declare Plaintiff a 22 || vexatious litigant (Doc. 8) is denied. 23 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to 24 || state a claim (Doc. 8) is denied as moot. 25 Dated this 23rd day of September, 2025. 26 27 Lom ee” 28 f CC —— Dominic W. Lanza United States District Judge -3-
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