Burgess v. Gray

57 U.S. 48, 14 L. Ed. 839, 16 How. 48, 1850 U.S. LEXIS 1536
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedMarch 18, 1854
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 57 U.S. 48 (Burgess v. Gray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Burgess v. Gray, 57 U.S. 48, 14 L. Ed. 839, 16 How. 48, 1850 U.S. LEXIS 1536 (1854).

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a suit brought by petition in the Circuit Court of ■Jefferson county, in the State of Missouri, by the plaintiff in error, against the defendants.

“ The petition sets forth, in substance, that John Jarrott, alias Gerrard, in 1780, with the consent and permission of the officers of the Spanish government, settled upon a tract of land in what is now Jefferson county, in the State of Missouri, and that he continued to inhabit and cultivate it until about 1796, when he was driven off by the Indians. •' His son Joseph succeeded him in the possession of the lánd, and continued to reside upon and cultivate it until he sold it to Kendall, in the year 1812. Kendall file d a notice of the claim with the United States Recorder of Land Titles, who rejected it. The right of Kendall passed by descent to his heirs at law, who sold to the plaintiff, as appears by . conveyances filed with the petition. It appears, moreover, that the plaintiff has always been in possession since the purchase.of Kendall’s heirs. A plat of the claim was laid down on the maps of the public lands, in the Registrar’s office, representing it as being reserved to satisfy the claim of John Jarrott’s legal representatives. After the claim had been examined and rejected by the Recorder of LandHtles, no farther action appéars to have been taken on the claim.

“.In the years 1847 - 8, and 9, different portions of the same tract of land were entered-at the Registrars office, by different individuals, under' preemptions allowed to them; the entries being made at different times, each person purchasing in his own right and in his own individual name, separate and distinct from the others,. The several persons making these separate and different entries are-made the defendants to this suit.

“ The defendants demurred to the petition, and .assigned as causes of demurrer: first, that the plaintiff showed no right, in his petition, to maintain the action ; second, that separate and distinct causes of action against different pérsons were joined in the petition.

' “ The Circuit Court- of Jefferson County, sustained the demurrers. and the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of of Missouri. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court, and the plaintiff has brought his case before this court,, by writ of error, to reverse the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri.”

*62 In proceeding to deliver the opinion of the court, it is proper to observe, that by the laws of Missouri the distinction between suits at law and in equity has been abolished. The party proceeds by petition, stating fully the facts on which he relies, if he seeks to recover possession of land to which he claims a perfect legal title ; and he proceeds in the same manner if he desires to obtain an injunction to quiet him in his possession, or to compel the adverse party to deliver up to be cancelled evidences of title, improperly and illegally obtained, and he may, it seems, assert both legal and equitable rights in the same proceeding, and obtain the appropriate judgment.

This has been done by the plaintiff in error in the present case. His suit is brought according to the prayer of his petition to recover possession of land to which he claims title, and upon which, as he alleges, the defendants have unlawfully entered; and also to compel them to abandon (as he terms it) their illegal claim.

The demurrer admits the truth of the facts stated in the petition. And, consequently, if these facts show that he had any legal or equitable right to the land in question under the treaty with France, or an act of Congress, which the State court was authorized and bound' to protect and enforce, he is entitled to maintain this'writ of error, and the judgment of the State court must be reversed.

Now as regards any equitable and inchoate title which the petitioner may possess under the treaty with France, if is quite clear that the State court had no jurisdiction over it. For it has been repeatedly held by this court that, under that treaty, no inchoate and imperfect title derived from the French or Spanish authorities can be maintained in a court of justice, unless jurisdiction to try and decide it has first been conferred by act of Congress. Certainly no such jurisdiction has been given to any State court. And the Supreme Court of Missouri were right in sustaining the demurrer, as to .this part of the petition, even if .it had been of opinion, that the permit to settle on the land, and the long possession of it under the Spanish government, gave him an equitable right, by the laws of Spain, to demand a perfect and legal title. The court had no jurisdiction upon the question.. And the judgment of the State court cannot be reversed unless the plaintiff can show that he had a complete and perfect title derived from the Spanish or French authorities : or a legal or suitable title under the laws of the United States.

The petitioner does not claim a perfect grant from the French or Spanish government; nor a patent from the proper officers of the United States. But he insists that the act of Congress of March 3, 1807, 2d St at.. 440, vested.in..him a complete legal title, and needed no patent to confirm it.

*63 Undoubtedly Congress may, if it thinks proper, grant a title in that form, and it has repeatedly done so. And-we proceed to examine whether the title, claimed by the plaintiff, was confirmed to him by the act referred to.

The plaintiff relies on the second section as a confirmation of his claim. But it evidently will not bear that construction when taken in connection with the whole act. For the fourth section directed commissioners to be appointed, who were authorized to decide upon all claims to land under French or Spanish titles in the territories. of Louisiana or Orleans; and by the sixth section, whenever the final decision of the Commissioner was in favor of the claimant, he was entitled to a patent for the land, to be issued in the manner provided for in that section. The eighth section required the Commissioners to report to the Secretary of the Treasury their opinion upon all claims not finally confirmed by them — the claims to be classified in the manner -therein prescribed. And it was made the duty of the Secretary to lay this report before Congress for their final determination.

This act of Congress did not, proprio vigore vest the legal title in any of the claimants. For even when the decision of the Commissioners was final in their favor, yet a patent was still necessary to convey the title. The report was made conclusive evidence of the equitable' right, and nothing more. And when the final decision was against the validity of the claim, he was directed to report his opinion upon its merits; and Congress reserved to itself the ultimate determination.

The powers and duties of the Commissioner were subsequently transferred to the Recorder of Land Titles. And this claim was presented to him in 1812, with the evidence upon which the claimant relied to support it. It is a claim- under a settlement right derived from the Spanish authorities, and which the^ claimant insisted was within the provisions, and éntitled to con-’ firmation under the second section of the act of 1807.

The Recorder reported against it.

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Bluebook (online)
57 U.S. 48, 14 L. Ed. 839, 16 How. 48, 1850 U.S. LEXIS 1536, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burgess-v-gray-scotus-1854.