Burgess v. Alamo Drafthouse

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: April 20, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-2640
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JEWEL BURGESS,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25-02640 (AHA) v.

ALAMO DRAFTHOUSE, et al.,

Defendants.

Memorandum Opinion

Jewel Burgess sues her past employer, Alamo Drafthouse, and two people she identifies as

an owner and manager of the company. See ECF No. 10 at 2. Her amended complaint asserts

claims for wrongful termination, as well as age and race discrimination. Id. at 3. It alleges she was

fired after being “accused of making sexual explicit comment towards a guest” and requesting “a

meeting with the manager about another manager,” without further allegations. Id. at 4. The

defendants move to dismiss for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 12. For the reasons below, the

court grants their motion. 1

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must “state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The court “must take all the

1 As required at this stage, the court accepts the complaint’s well-pled allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in Burgess’ favor. See Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015). factual allegations in the complaint as true,” though it is “not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

In cases like this involving an unrepresented or “pro se” litigant, the court is careful to give

extra leeway. The court evaluates the complaint “in light of all filings, including filings responsive

to a motion to dismiss.” Ho v. Garland, 106 F.4th 47, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Of

course, an unrepresented plaintiff still “must plead factual matter that permits the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Jones v. Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Atherton v. District of Columbia, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C.

Cir. 2009)). While “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary, the plaintiff must furnish “more

than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Although Burgess does not identify specific causes of action in her amended complaint,

the court liberally construes her pleadings to assert age discrimination under the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and race discrimination under Title VII. To state a

claim under those laws, she must plausibly allege that her employer undertook (i) an adverse

employment action (ii) because of her age or race. Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196

(D.C. Cir. 2008). 2

Burgess alleges no facts from which the court can conclude she was fired because of her

age or race. In her amended complaint and response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Burgess

states she was fired after she was accused of making a sexually explicit comment to customers, an

2 To the extent Burgess seeks to bring a claim for wrongful termination premised on something other than age- or race-based discrimination, her amended complaint does not provide allegations from which the court can discern an applicable cause of action.

2 accusation which she denies, and after requesting a meeting with a manager to discuss another

manager’s conduct. See ECF No. 10 at 4; ECF No. 15. She also references discrimination because

of her age and race, but she provides no explanation of how her termination was connected to her

age or race and does not identify her age or race, as required to state a discrimination claim. ECF

No. 10 at 3; ECF No. 15; see, e.g., Pickett v. Brennan, No. 18-cv-1257, 2019 WL 13290799, at *2

(D.D.C. May 14, 2019) (dismissing age discrimination claim in part because plaintiff “never

provides his age”); Slate v. Pub. Def. Serv. for the Dist. of Columbia, 31 F. Supp. 3d 277, 299

(D.D.C. 2014) (dismissing race discrimination claim in part because plaintiff “failed to allege the

most basic fact necessary to plead a claim under Title VII—namely, that he is a member of a

protected class”). Burgess has therefore failed to plausibly allege she was fired because of her age

or race. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating a complaint cannot merely provide “naked assertions

devoid of further factual enhancement” (cleaned up)). 3

For these reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted and this action is dismissed

without prejudice. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

AMIR H. ALI United States District Judge

Date: April 20, 2026

3 The individual defendants also move for dismissal because they cannot be sued under Title VII or the ADEA. ECF No. 12 at 4–5; see Lang v. District of Columbia, No. 20-cv-1199, 2023 WL 2708820, at *10 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2023) (“Neither Title VII nor the ADEA authorize liability against individuals in their personal capacities—only against the employers themselves.” (citations omitted)). Burgess’ claims against the individual defendants would therefore be subject to dismissal even if she plausibly alleged discrimination under those laws.