Burgess Ex Rel. Burgess v. Mattox

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Burgess Ex Rel. Burgess v. Mattox

132 S.E.2d 577, 260 N.C. 305, 1963 N.C. LEXIS 679

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedOctober 9, 1963

Docket165

StatusPublished

Cited by22 cases

This text of 132 S.E.2d 577 (Burgess Ex Rel. Burgess v. Mattox) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Burgess Ex Rel. Burgess v. Mattox, 132 S.E.2d 577, 260 N.C. 305, 1963 N.C. LEXIS 679 (N.C. 1963).

Pincite

Opinion

PeR Curiam.

The plaintiff, voluntarily and without any obligation to do so, placed himself upon the hood of a truck in order to weight down its bumper so that the track might push an automobile until its motor started. He was fully aware that the hood was smooth and there was nothing on it to which he could hold. He also knew, or should have reasonably anticipated, that there might be jerks or bumps likely to cause him to lose his balance or to throw him from the truck while it was in motion. The injuries he sustained were the result of the risks to which he deliberately exposed himself. In thus placing himself in a position of obvious -peril, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which barred his right to recover as a matter of law and necessitated the nonsuit. Bogen v Bogen, 220 N.C. 648, 18 S.E. 2d 162; Barnes v. Horney, 247 N.C. 495, 101 S.E. 2d 315.

A seventeen-year old plaintiff is presumed to have sufficient capacity to understand and avoid a clear danger, and he is chargeable with contributory negligence .as a matter of law if he fails to do so. Tallent v. Talbert, 249 N.C. 149, 105 S.E. 2d 426; Van Dyke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 218 N.C. 283, 10 S.E. 2d 727; Rimmer v. R. R., 208 N. C. 198, 179 S.E. 753; Baker v. R. R., 150 N.C. 562, 64 S.E. 506; 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, § 205, p. 891; 3 Strong, N. C. Index, Negligence, § 16. There is no evidence in the record which would overcome this presumption.

Plaintiff now contends, however, that after he had placed himself in a position of peril, he was thrown from the truck only because Carter negligently increased its speed to forty-five miles per hour. This contention is not supported by either allegation or proof. We take judicial notice that a truck traveling forty-five miles per hour cannot be stopped in thirty-three feet as plaintiff’s evidence indicates *308 this truck was. Evidence which is inherently impossible will not take a case to the jury. Jones v. Schaffer, 252 N.C. 368, 114 S.E. 2d 105.

The question oí Carter’s agency and authority, debated in the briefs, is rendered moot by the plaintiff’s contributory negligence.

The judgment of the court below is

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PeR Curiam.

The plaintiff, voluntarily and without any obligation to do so, placed himself upon the hood of a truck in order to weight down its bumper so that the track might push an automobile until its motor started. He was fully aware that the hood was smooth and there was nothing on it to which he could hold. He also knew, or should have reasonably anticipated, that there might be jerks or bumps likely to cause him to lose his balance or to throw him from the truck while it was in motion. The injuries he sustained were the result of the risks to which he deliberately exposed himself. In thus placing himself in a position of obvious -peril, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which barred his right to recover as a matter of law and necessitated the nonsuit. Bogen v Bogen, 220 N.C. 648, 18 S.E. 2d 162; Barnes v. Horney, 247 N.C. 495, 101 S.E. 2d 315.

A seventeen-year old plaintiff is presumed to have sufficient capacity to understand and avoid a clear danger, and he is chargeable with contributory negligence .as a matter of law if he fails to do so. Tallent v. Talbert, 249 N.C. 149, 105 S.E. 2d 426; Van Dyke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 218 N.C. 283, 10 S.E. 2d 727; Rimmer v. R. R., 208 N. C. 198, 179 S.E. 753; Baker v. R. R., 150 N.C. 562, 64 S.E. 506; 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, § 205, p. 891; 3 Strong, N. C. Index, Negligence, § 16. There is no evidence in the record which would overcome this presumption.

Plaintiff now contends, however, that after he had placed himself in a position of peril, he was thrown from the truck only because Carter negligently increased its speed to forty-five miles per hour. This contention is not supported by either allegation or proof. We take judicial notice that a truck traveling forty-five miles per hour cannot be stopped in thirty-three feet as plaintiff’s evidence indicates *308 this truck was. Evidence which is inherently impossible will not take a case to the jury. Jones v. Schaffer, 252 N.C. 368, 114 S.E. 2d 105.

The question oí Carter’s agency and authority, debated in the briefs, is rendered moot by the plaintiff’s contributory negligence.

The judgment of the court below is

Affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

132 S.E.2d 577, 260 N.C. 305, 1963 N.C. LEXIS 679, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burgess-ex-rel-burgess-v-mattox-nc-1963.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack