BurgerFi International, Inc.

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware
DecidedOctober 2, 2025
Docket24-12017
StatusUnknown

This text of BurgerFi International, Inc. (BurgerFi International, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
BurgerFi International, Inc., (Del. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE In re: Chapter 11

BURGERFI INTERNATIONAL INC., et Case No. 24-12017 (CTG) al., (Jointly Administered)

Debtors. Related Docket No. 1927 MEMORANDUM OPINION This is a case in which it appears that the parties documented their various agreements based on a shared set of assumptions. In two respects, however, those assumptions turned out to be incorrect. The dispute is over how the relevant agreements should be construed in light of the fact that events have unfolded somewhat differently than the parties had expected when the agreements were signed. The answer is that when the language of the agreements is clear and unambiguous, that language must be given effect. But when the language, if read in a vacuum, might be amenable to more than one construction, the context of the agreements – here, the backdrop of the parties’ underlying legal rights and obligations against which these agreements were written – may clarify an ambiguity. The first assumption of the parties that turned out to be incorrect is that the liquidating trust has incurred expenses that were greater than expected in the claims resolution process. That, in turn, has given rise to a dispute over the relative rights of the trust and the prepetition secured creditor (who is also the DIP

lender and the buyer) over how the plan addresses the distribution of assets that come into the trust after the effective date (here, various unearned insurance premiums that are being returned). The second is that the debtors spent about $120,000 less than the parties had budgeted in the period between the closing of the

sale of the debtors’ assets and the effective date of the plan. The liquidating trust and the DIP lender dispute which party is entitled to those funds. For the reasons described below, the Court concludes that the unambiguous text of the plan provides that the assets that come into the estate after the effective date (including the unearned insurance premiums) are subject to the plan’s term stating that the liquidating trust’s expenses must be paid or reserved for before the funds flow through to the secured creditor. The Court rejects, however, the

liquidating trust’s contention that the plan subordinates the secured creditor’s recovery on account of its collateral until unsecured creditors receive $350,000 in distributions. With respect to the $120,000 of cash, however, the language and context of the agreement make clear that these funds are collateral that secures remaining obligations under the DIP loan, including various lender fees. Factual and Procedural Background The debtors in these bankruptcy cases were the owners, operators, and

franchisors of two restaurant chains – BurgerFi and Anthony’s Coal Fired Pizza & Wings. The basic trajectory of these bankruptcy cases was a common one in modern chapter 11 practice. The debtors filed these bankruptcy cases in September 2024, owing approximately $75 million to groups of secured creditors – approximately $60 million to TREW, their senior lender, and additional $15 million to a junior lender.1 The debtors had marketed their businesses prepetition and filed for bankruptcy seeking to complete a sale process.

TREW agreed to provide a debtor-in-possession loan to finance an expedited bankruptcy process under which it intended to acquire the debtors’ businesses by credit bidding its prepetition and DIP loans. Beginning after the formation of the Committee and running through a “second-day” hearing (which was pushed back for a week while the parties negotiated), the debtors, the Committee, and TREW agreed to a slightly longer process that would be funded by a slightly larger DIP loan than originally proposed. In the end, the Court approved a DIP loan of

approximately $6.75 million in new money and a sales process that would run through a sale hearing in early November – about 60 days after the petition date. In response to objections by the landlords raised at the second-day hearing that the budget was insufficient to allow the debtors to pay rent during the extended sale process, the Court made the customary observation about the need for a secured lender to “pay the freight” for a bankruptcy process being run principally

to maximize the value of its collateral. “[T]o the extent we’re going to run a bankruptcy process, the net result of which may be that, subject to … reasonable

1 D.I. 21 ¶¶ 14-19; D.I. 1348-1 at 2-3. TREW Capital Management Private Credit 2, LLC is referred to as “TREW.” The junior lender was CP7 Warming Bag, L.P., an affiliate of L. Catterton Fund. The Court relies on these facts as set forth in the first-day declaration (D.I. 21) and the combined plan and disclosure statement (D.I. 1348-1) solely by way of background. As further described below, the Court resolves this motion based solely on the language of the relevant agreements and orders, and basic set of stipulated facts that were read into the record and are attached hereto as Exhibit A. procedures and an auction, the secured creditor is going to take its collateral, that’s fine. What it can’t do is leave administrative creditors on the hook.”2 Ultimately, the debtors, the Committee, and TREW agreed to a budget that

the parties believed sufficient to pay administrative expenses until the closing of the asset sales, with cash left behind to fund the plan process. The agreement further contemplated that TREW (if it were the winning bidder) would contribute $250,000 to fund the post-confirmation trust. The parties agreed that the buyer (whether TREW or another winning bidder) would be responsible for the costs associated with operating the businesses upon and after the closing of the sale. The parties also agreed that certain estate causes of action would be contributed to the

post-confirmation trust, and they agreed on a formula for sharing the proceeds of any recoveries on those causes of action between general unsecured creditors and TREW, which would recover its share of those proceeds (40 percent of recoveries after other unsecured creditors receive distributions of $350,000) until its deficiency claim was paid in full.3 The bankruptcy process appears to have operated as intended, with

competitive auctions taking place for the assets related to both the BurgerFi business and the Anthony’s Coal Fired Pizza business.4 TREW, however, emerged as the successful bidder for both businesses – acquiring the BurgerFi assets for a

2 Oct. 15, 2024 Hr’g Tr. at 44 (edited slightly to translate the Court’s gibberish into more standard English). 3 Id. at 11-12. 4 D.I. 1348-1 at 5-6. credit bid of $10 million and the Anthony’s Coal Fired Pizza business for a credit bid of $44 million. Both sales were approved by the Court and closed in November 2024.5 The Court confirmed a plan, which was broadly consistent with the

agreement described by the parties at the October 2024 second-day hearing, in March 2025.6 Following confirmation, a dispute arose between TREW and the post- confirmation trust over the parties’ rights with respect to (a) certain unearned insurance premiums (in the amount of approximately $885,000) that were paid by the debtors and that the estates are entitled to have refunded; and (b) approximately $120,000 in cash that was reserved for wind down expenses but,

because the parties had budgeted conservatively, not paid. The liquidating trustee moved that the confirmed plan be “clarified” to make clear these amounts are the property of the liquidating trust.7 This dispute is primarily about the terms of various court-approved agreements: the DIP loan, the asset purchase agreements, and the plan. As noted above, the linchpin of this bankruptcy case was a settlement among the debtors, the

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