Burger Chef Systems, Inc. v. Burger Chef of Florida, Inc.

317 So. 2d 795, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 13828
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJuly 18, 1975
Docket74-1194
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 317 So. 2d 795 (Burger Chef Systems, Inc. v. Burger Chef of Florida, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Burger Chef Systems, Inc. v. Burger Chef of Florida, Inc., 317 So. 2d 795, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 13828 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975).

Opinion

317 So.2d 795 (1975)

BURGER CHEF SYSTEMS, INC., Appellant,
v.
BURGER CHEF OF FLORIDA, INC., and Wesley S. Woodson, Appellees.

No. 74-1194.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

July 18, 1975.
Rehearings Denied September 29, 1975.

*796 William E. Sadowski and John H. Ward, Helliwell, Melrose & DeWolf, Miami, for appellant.

William L. Eagan, Arnold, Matheny & Eagan, Orlando, for appellees.

WALDEN, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal by Burger Chef Systems (Franchisor) from an injunction preventing it from terminating its July 14th, 1966, franchise agreement with Burger Chef of Florida, Inc. (Franchisee). The injunction was entered upon a request by Franchisor for a declaratory judgment defining its right to terminate under the agreement. The trial court found the territorial franchise was terminable only for cause, and not terminable at the will of Franchisor without cause. We agree with the trial court's interpretation of the applicable franchise agreement clause, which reads as follows:

"ITEM VII
"In the event that Licensee or William P. Woodson, individually or collectively, own less than one hundred percent (100%) of the voting outstanding stock of an assignee corporation, or in the event of the death of both Licensee and William P. Woodson and the assignee corporation does not fulfill the Licensee's obligations under this agreement, which alleged failure to fulfill the obligations under this agreement shall be determined by Burger Chef, then this Territory Franchise Agreement shall be terminated. Burger Chef shall then take over the obligations of this agreement and Burger Chef will pay to Licensee, his heirs, executors, or assigns, or to assignees an amount equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the service charges collected from each store sold and installed by Licensee, said payments to continue for a period ending ten (10) years from date of termination; provided, however, that nothing contained herein shall require Burger Chef to continue the operation of stores sold and installed by Licensee if it should become impracticable to continue such operation. The payment of said twenty-five percent (25%) of the service charges collected shall be made only after such service charges have been received by Burger Chef from the store franchise owner."

The trial court continued, however, to grant an injunction against any action in termination by Franchisor:

"The ... [Franchisor] is hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from the cancellation or termination of the territorial franchise agreement issued by ... [Franchisor] to ... [Franchisee], WESLEY S. WOODSON, dated July 14, 1966, and assigned to ... [Franchisee], BURGER CHEF OF FLORIDA, INC., except in the manner provided in the instrument in case of default by ... [Franchisees]. The suspension of the operation and effect of the ... [Franchisor's] termination letter of May 21, 1973, as provided in the Court's temporary order of February 4, 1974, is confirmed and made permanent and the . .. [Franchisor], its agents, servants and employees are restrained from refusing to furnish customary accountings and reports, payments and remittances in accordance with the previous normal practice of the parties under the franchise agreement so long as it remains in effect."

We reverse this action of the trial court. The injunction, requiring as it does the continued performance of Franchisor, is essentially a grant of specific performance to Franchisee. 29A Fla.Jur., Specific Performance § 4 (1967):

"It is pertinently observed that certain other forms of action constitute, in effect, actions for the specific performance of contractual obligations. For example, injunction against breach of contracts, *797 or the enforcement of negative covenants in contracts by injunction against their breach, may result in specific performance of the contract, ..." Id. at 576.

We are aware of the individual characteristics of a franchise; the personal efforts and commitment on the part of a Franchisee to market the Franchisor's products, the consideration given by Franchisee for the exclusive right to market Franchisor's product and the singular personal service performed by a Franchisee in establishing the product of a Franchisor. Nonetheless, the rules of specific performance must govern, and it is improper to — in effect — grant this Franchisee a decree of specific performance. Mutuality of obligation and remedy must exist for a specific performance suit to succeed. Florida-Georgia Chemical Co., Inc. v. National Laboratories, Inc., 153 So.2d 752 (1st DCA Fla. 1963); Con-Dev of Vero Beach, Inc. v. Casano, 272 So.2d 203 (4th DCA Fla. 1973); see Sanchez v. Crandon Wholesale Drug Co., 173 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1965). 29A Fla.Jur., Specific Performance § 33 (1967):

"Insofar as mutuality of remedies is concerned, it is clear that there must exist a recognized mutuality of remedies in equity between the parties to the suit which can constitute a basis for awarding specific performance in equity to the complanant, as against the defendant." Id. at 621.

Franchisee here is bound by the agreement to perform certain personal services to Franchisor.[1] Personal services are not subject to a suit for specific performance.[2]Florida-Georgia Chemical Co., Inc. v. National Laboratories, Inc., supra; 29A Fla. Jur., Specific Performance § 111 (1967); see Sanchez v. Crandon Wholesale Drug *798 Co., supra. As a result, the order granting, as it does, specific performance to Franchisee, is in error — as no like order could be had for Franchisor.

Franchisee must seek his damages at law should Franchisor breach. We find that remedy of damages is adequate to compensate Franchisee, should Franchisor breach. The measure of damages would depend upon a jury evaluation of what would be a reasonable time for the contract duration. See Annot., 19 ALR3d 196, Termination by Principal of Distributorship Contract Containing No Express Provision for Termination (1968). In 62 Am.Jur.2d 769 § 12, Termination of Franchise (1972) it is noted:

"It is usually true that the actual understanding and expectation is that the franchisee will make a substantial commitment in time or money to develop and establish the business of selling the product of service of which the franchisor will also be a beneficiary, and it would therefore be unfair for the franchisor to wait until this is done and then arbitrarily terminate the contract without cause, and thus compel the franchisee to lose his investment in time and money.
"Generally, the franchise contract is for a specific term of years, and the agreement usually provides for renewals. A franchise agreement by means of which a franchisee is given the right to operate his franchise for a definite term of years cannot be said to be terminable at the mere option of the franchisor." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 770.

This contract spoke of no time duration, although it did provide that should Franchisee breach, and Franchisor, therefore, terminate for cause, Franchisee for ten years thereafter should receive 25% of all service fees generated from operative stores in his former franchise area.[3] It follows that Franchisee's damages for Franchisor's

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Bluebook (online)
317 So. 2d 795, 1975 Fla. App. LEXIS 13828, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burger-chef-systems-inc-v-burger-chef-of-florida-inc-fladistctapp-1975.