Burg v. Brown

2023 IL App (1st) 211449-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: July 24, 2023
• Docket: 1-21-1449
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2023 IL App (1st) 211449-U No. 1-21-1449

FIRST DIVISION July 24, 2023

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________

JASON BURG, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) No. 21 CH 00262 DAVID BROWN, SUPERINTENDENT OF ) POLICE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, EDDIE ) T. JOHNSON, FORMER SUPERINTENDENT ) OF POLICE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, and ) THE POLICE BOARD OF THE CITY OF ) The Honorable CHICAGO, ) Neil H. Cohen, ) Judge Presiding. Defendants-Appellees. )

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hyman and Coghlan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

Held: We affirm the decision of the Police Board of the City of Chicago finding plaintiff- appellant guilty of violations of Chicago Police Department Rules and terminating his employment as a police officer. Plaintiff did not establish that the delay in the filing of charges violated his right to due process, and he did not identity prejudice from the delay to support his affirmative defense of laches. 1-21-1449

¶1 In this administrative review action, plaintiff-appellant Jason Burg appeals from the circuit court

order affirming the decision of the Police Board of the City of Chicago (Board) finding him guilty

of charges filed by the Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department (Superintendent)) and

terminating his employment as a police officer. Burg contends that (1) the nearly nine-year gap

between the underlying incident and the filing of charges violated his right to due process of law

and (2) the doctrine of laches otherwise warranted dismissal of the charges. We conclude that,

notwithstanding the delay, Burg’s right to due process was not violated. Further, Burg did not

identify prejudice resulting from the delay, as required to support his laches defense. Accordingly,

we affirm the decision of the Board and the judgment of the circuit court.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 Burg was formerly employed as a Chicago police officer. This case stems from Burg’s response

to an incident in the early morning hours of June 26, 2010, near the Pavilion Apartments complex

in Chicago. On that date, Luis Cordero and his girlfriend Heather Rzany were assaulted by Chris

Gofron, an off-duty Chicago police officer. 1 The incident was witnessed by Angel De La Rosa, a

Pavilion Apartments security officer. Significant to this appeal, De La Rosa passed away before

the charges at issue were filed against Burg.

¶4 Burg was the first officer to respond to a disturbance call at the scene of the assault, although his

actions after he arrived at the scene are disputed. Burg maintained that the assailant was gone by

the time he arrived at the scene. However, Cordero and Rzany claimed (and the Board ultimately

found) that Burg spoke with Gofron and allowed him to leave the scene without arresting him.

¶5 Burg’s Reported Version of Events

1 Cordero and Rzany later married. Rzany is sometimes referred to as “Heather Cordero” in the record.

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¶6 Hours after the incident, Burg filed a Chicago Police Department (CPD) incident report, in which

he stated that the identity of the assailant was unknown. Burg reported that when he arrived at the

scene, he encountered Cordero lying on the ground and Rzany screaming for help. The report

reflected that Burg spoke with De La Rosa, who said he observed the altercation in which the

offender “struck [the] victims with [a] revolver type handgun.” According to the report, De La

Rosa said that the “[o]ffender proceeded to enter [De La Rosa’s] security vehicle at which time

offender stated he was police and needed assistance.” Burg’s report elsewhere reflected that Rzany

told him that the offender “flashed a badge” and “stated he was police but did not specify what

department.” De La Rosa reported that the unknown offender “fled” the scene.

¶7 Related Civil Litigation and De La Rosa’s Deposition Testimony

¶8 The record reflects that Cordero and Rzany disputed Burg’s version of events, claiming that Burg

allowed Gofron to leave the scene. In 2010, Cordero and Rzany commenced a federal lawsuit,

Cordero et al. v. City of Chicago et al., No. 10 CV 4193, in which the City of Chicago, Gofron,

and Burg were defendants.

¶9 In April 2011, De La Rosa was deposed in the federal lawsuit, during which he was questioned by

an attorney for Cordero and by an attorney representing the defendants. De La Rosa recounted that

he was working a shift as security for the Pavilion Apartments on the night in question. The

incident occurred sometime after midnight, when De La Rosa was patrolling the complex in a

Chevy Blazer that was labeled as a security vehicle.

¶ 10 De La Rosa was driving when Gofron waved him down, “jumped in the vehicle” and told him to

drive. 2 De La Rosa observed that Gofron was holding a beer, smelled like alcohol, and had come

from the direction of the “Cabana bar” in the apartment complex. De La Rosa then received a call

2 De La Rosa did not identify Gofron by name. However, there is no factual dispute that he was referring to Gofron.

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from another security officer, Ron Kazcmarek, about a noise complaint from a nearby picnic area.

De La Rosa drove to the picnic area, where he saw Cordero and Rzany at a picnic table. De La

Rosa told them the area was closed. Gofron (who was still in De La Rosa’s vehicle) began

screaming at Cordero and Rzany, and Cordero “started screaming back.” Gofron exited the vehicle

and engaged in a verbal altercation with Cordero, during which he displayed a badge and told

Cordero that he was a “cop.” After Cordero responded that he “was a cop killer,” Gofron drew a

gun and then struck Cordero repeatedly with the bottom of the gun. De La Rosa radioed Kazcmarek

and told him to call the police.

¶ 11 Eventually, Gofron re-entered De La Rosa’s security vehicle and told De La Rosa to “take him to

his car.” De La Rosa testified that he drove slowly with Gofron, hoping police would arrive. When

De La Rosa saw police, he stopped his vehicle, and both he and Gofron exited. De La Rosa testified

that he saw multiple police vehicles and “like five” officers, as well as Cordero and Rzany. De La

Rosa did not know the names of any of the responding police officers.

¶ 12 De La Rosa recalled that a number of officers spoke with Cordero, while another officer spoke

with Gofron. De La Rosa did not hear what was said between them. A short time later, De La Rosa

saw Gofron walking away. De La Rosa recalled that Rzany told the police that “he’s walking

away”, to which one of the officers responded with words to the effect of “[h]e can’t get away”,

or “[h]e won’t leave, or [h]e’ll be back.” De La Rosa was not sure which officer made that

statement. De La Rosa testified that Gofron “just left” and “didn’t come back” after walking away

from the scene.

¶ 13 The record reflects that the federal lawsuit was settled in 2012.

¶ 14 The Investigation into Burg’s Conduct

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¶ 15 The record reflects that in 2010, a complaint by Rzany and Cordero initiated an investigation by

the Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA) regarding Burg’s response to the incident. 3 IPRA

interviewed Rzany and Cordero in 2010. IPRA interviewed Burg on May 6, 2011. In that

interview, Burg stated that the offender was gone by the time Burg arrived at the scene. Elsewhere

in the interview, Burg recalled that Cordero told him that “police beat him up” and that Rzany said

the offender had flashed a badge. Burg also recalled that De La Rosa told him that the offender

had said “he was the police.”

¶ 16 Burg was subsequently accused of giving a false statement to IPRA in the May 6, 2011 interview.

In May 2012, Burg gave a statement to IPRA in which he “st[ood] by” his May 2011 statement

and maintained that he never saw or spoke with Gofron at the scene.

¶ 17 The record reflects (and the Superintendent does not dispute) that the investigation into Burg’s

conduct substantially concluded in 2014. The record reflects that as of May 2014, IPRA had

drafted a “Notification of Charges/Allegations” directed to Burg. 4 However, actual charges were

not filed until early 2019.

¶ 18 The Superintendent Charges Burg in 2019

¶ 19 On January 3, 2019, the Superintendent charged Burg with violating a number of CPD Rules and

Regulations. 5 The charges essentially alleged that: (1) Burg allowed Gofron to leave the scene; (2)

3 In 2017, the IPRA was succeeded by a new entity, the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA). 4 The record indicates that in 2015, IPRA completed “additional interviews in furtherance of the documentation of two witnesses [sic] statements regarding the incident” but the agency determined that “the findings and recommendation remain unchanged.” 5 Burg was charged with violating CPD Rule 2 (“Any action or conduct which impedes the Department’s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the Department”), Rule 3 (“Any failure to promote the Department’s efforts to implement its policy or accomplish its goals”), Rule 5 (“Failure to perform any duty”), Rule 6 (“Disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral”), -5- 1-21-1449

Burg’s incident report falsely indicated that the offender was unknown; and (3) Burg falsely stated

in his May 2011 IPRA interview that the offender was gone by the time he arrived on the scene.

¶ 20 Administrative Proceedings

¶ 21 The record reflects that De La Rosa passed away in 2019. In January 2020, the Superintendent

filed a motion before the hearing officer of the Board to admit De La Rosa’s deposition testimony

in the Board proceedings. The motion was granted.

¶ 22 In February 2020, Burg filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him. Among other arguments,

Burg averred that the Superintendent’s delay in bringing charges severely prejudiced him, in that

he no longer could cross-examine De La Rosa as to whether Burg had contact with Gofron. Burg

also asserted that the failure to bring charges in a timely manner violated his due process rights.

He argued that the nearly nine-year gap between the incident and the filing of charges in 2019

violated Chicago Police Department General Order G08-01, which called for “prompt”

investigations into officer misconduct.

¶ 23 Burg also argued that the doctrine of laches warranted dismissal of the charges. He pointed out

that there was no “meaningful investigation” after 2014. Burg claimed he was severely prejudiced

by the delayed filing of charges, as he could not locate additional witnesses or crime scene

evidence would not be able to cross-examine De La Rosa.

¶ 24 In opposing the motion to dismiss, the Superintendent argued that case law does not support a due

process claim based on a delay in filing charges against an officer, as opposed to a delay in

adjudication. The Superintendent asserted: “The reason that due process is not implicated by a

delay in investigation (as opposed to in adjudication) is because the officer is still working and

Rule 14 (“Making a false report, written or oral”), and Rule 21 (“Failure to report promptly to the Department any information concerning any crime or other unlawful action.”).

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getting paid.” The Superintendent stated that Burg had not been impacted financially by the filing

of the charges in 2019, “because he has been inactive and on duty disability since 2014” and his

receipt of disability benefits was “unaffected by the filing of charges.” 6

¶ 25 The Superintendent’s response elsewhere disputed Burg’s claim that an investigation was not

“promptly” initiated under General Order 08-01. The Superintendent claimed that preliminary

investigative steps were taken “soon after the CR [Complaint Register] was opened.” The

Superintendent acknowledged that the investigation had been “closed and reopened a couple of

times” “to ensure that a thorough investigation was conducted.” The Superintendent also stated

that “[o]n information and belief, at some point, the same allegations were being investigated under

two different CR files.” In any event, the Superintendent argued that even a violation of General

Order 08-01 would not warrant dismissal of charges.

¶ 26 With respect to Burg’s reliance on laches, the Superintendent argued that this doctrine requires a

showing of prejudice, and that Burg failed to show that the delay limited his ability to gather

evidence. Despite De La Rosa’s death, the Superintendent argued that there was no prejudice to

Burg, since De La Rosa’s account of events was “well-documented,” including in his deposition

testimony. The Superintendent otherwise argued that were not compelling or “extraordinary

circumstances” to justify laches, given the seriousness of Burg’s conduct.

¶ 27 The Police Board reserved ruling on Burg’s motion to dismiss, pending evidentiary hearing. The

evidentiary hearing occurred on August 13 and 14, 2020, and included testimony from Rzany and

Burg.

6 Burg subsequently testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had not been on active duty since being injured in an accident on January 1, 2014.

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¶ 28 Rzany described how Gofron assaulted her and Cordero after getting out of a vehicle driven by a

De La Rosa. After the assault, Gofron got back into the security vehicle. Around the time Burg

arrived, she saw the vehicle return and Gofron got out. She identified Gofron to Burg as the

attacker. According to Rzany, Gofron showed Burg a badge and told him that he was a police

officer. Burg then told Gofron to “[g]et out of here” and allowed him to walk away.

¶ 29 Burg denied ever having any interaction with Gofron. Burg recalled seeing De La Rosa pull up in

a security truck, but Burg stated he did not remember if there was another male in the vehicle.

Among other documentary evidence, the Board also considered a recording of Rzany’s 911 call,

recording of Burg’s police radio communications from the time of the incident, and deposition

testimony of Burg and De La Rosa from the federal lawsuit.

¶ 30 The Police Board’s December 2020 Findings and Decision

¶ 31 The Police Board issued findings and decision on December 17, 2020. By a vote of 8-1, the Board

(1) denied Burg’s motion to dismiss the charges; (2) found Burg guilty of each charged violation,

and (3) determined that he should be terminated.

¶ 32 With respect to the motion to dismiss, the Board stated that Appellate Court decisions had

“affirmed the Board’s decisions to deny motions to dismiss that make essentially the same

arguments,” citing Orsa et al v. Police Board, 2016 IL App (1st) 121709 and Chisem v. McCarthy,

2014 IL App (1st) 132389. The Board rejected Burg’s claim that due process was violated by the

timing of the charges. The Board recognized that in Lyon v. Dep’t of Children and Family Services,

209 Ill. 2d 264 (2004), our supreme court found that a teacher’s due process rights were violated

by a delay in an adjudication, during which time the teacher was prevented from working. The

Board found that Burg’s situation was “fundamentally different,” since he was “complaining about

the delay from the time of the incident to the bringing of charges, not the time it took to try him

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on the charges.” The Board pointed out that Burg was “paid his full salary and benefits from the

time of the incident until he went on disability” and was not suspended without pay until after the

charges were filed.

¶ 33 The Board also rejected Burg’s reliance on General Order G08-01 as a basis to dismiss the charges.

The Board reasoned that G08-01 did not “set any absolute deadline” to bring charges, and its

violation “does not provide a basis for automatic dismissal of charges against an officer.” The

Board stated that although it “d[id] not condone the protracted and long investigation in this case”,

it would not dismiss the charges for this reason.

¶ 34 With respect to Burg’s laches argument, the Board noted that the mere lapse of time is insufficient

to support that defense, without a showing of prejudice. The Board concluded that Burg had “not

demonstrated that the delay caused him the material prejudice that he is required to prove.” The

Board noted that although De La Rosa had died, he had testified in a deposition at which Burg’s

counsel had an opportunity to question him. The Board otherwise rejected as “speculative” Burg’s

suggestions that the delay prevented him from locating other witnesses or evidence. The Board

found no other “extraordinary” or “compelling” circumstances to warrant the application of laches.

¶ 35 After explaining why it denied Burg’s motion to dismiss, the Board found Burg guilty of each of

the charges. The Board relied on the “credible and convincing” hearing testimony of Rzany, The

Board found that certain aspects of her account were corroborated by De La Rosa’s deposition

testimony, as well as the recording of the 911 call. In contrast, the Board found that Burg’s hearing

testimony contained “inconsistencies, purported failure in memory, and incredible explanations.”

¶ 36 Dissent from the Majority Decision

¶ 37 In his dissent from the majority’s decision, Board member John P. O’Malley, Jr. expressed his

view that the delay in bringing charges was “inexcusable.” O’Malley emphasized that the Board

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never heard live testimony from De La Rosa and that his prior deposition testimony “never pointed

directly to [Burg].” O’Malley thus opined that the delay in bringing charges “weighed heavily”

against Burg’s ability to defend himself. O’Malley believed that Burg was not proven guilty, and

that the delay in bringing charges was “unconscionable.”

¶ 38 A portion of the majority’s findings specifically addressed the dissent. The majority stated: “While

we wholeheartedly agree with [O’Malley’s] point that the delay in this case is unconscionable, the

failures of the accountability system—which we have frequently criticized in our decisions—

should not be used to suggest that the evidence is not sufficient to support the ruling of the majority

nor a reason to overlook the strong case outlining the Rule violations of [Burg].” The majority

reasoned that “in spite of the delay in the case coming before the Board, there is more than adequate

evidence” that Burg told Gofron to leave the scene and then filed a false report.

¶ 39 Complaint for Administrative Review

¶ 40 On January 19, 2021, Burg filed a complaint for administrative review pursuant to the

Administrative Review Act, 735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq (West 2020). Within the complaint, Burg

asserted that the Board’s denial of his motion to dismiss violated the doctrine of laches, as well as

“the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the City of Chicago and The Fraternal Order of

Police Lodge 7, due process and Orders, Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Police

Department.” Burg asserted that his due process rights were violated by the Superintendent’s delay

in bringing charges, insofar as the death of De La Rosa during the delay deprived him of his

“constitutionally protected right to fair cross-examination.” Burg otherwise asserted that the

Board’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and misapplied the law. Burg

requested reversal of both the Board’s denial of his motion to dismiss, as well as its decision to

discharge him.

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¶ 41 The circuit court ordered Burg to submit a brief in support of the complaint. Burg filed that brief

on June 30, 2021. Within that brief, Burg maintained that he had not received the requisite due

process. Burg noted that the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the CPD and the

Chicago Fraternal Order of Police provides that, unless otherwise authorized by the

Superintendent, “no complaint or allegation of any misconduct concerning any incident or event

which occurred five (5) years prior to the date the complaint or allegation became known to the

Department shall be made the subject of a Complaint Register investigation.” 7

¶ 42 Burg also relied upon the language in CPD General Order G08-01 requiring “prompt, thorough

investigations” into allegations of misconduct. Chicago Police Department General Order G08-01

(eff. June 7, 2017). 8 Burg acknowledged that the term “prompt” was not defined in the General

Order, yet argued that the CBA indicates that the “Department itself does not consider a five-year

delay to be ‘prompt.’”

¶ 43 Burg acknowledged that he had been paid during the delay. Yet, he claimed that the delay “made

it nearly impossible” to develop his defense, as “[w]itnesses moved on, a material witness passed

away and evidence was not preserved.” He asserted that if charges were filed in a timely manner,

he could have sought out additional witnesses and evidence and cross-examined De La Rosa.

¶ 44 For similar reasons, Burg argued that the laches doctrine applied, as there was a lack of diligence

in bringing charges and resulting prejudice. He asserted there was no valid reason for the delay,

7 The CBA is not cited in appellant’s brief but is available at: https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/dol/Collective%20Bargaining%20Agreement3/FOPCBA2012- 2017 2.20.15.pdf. 8 At the time charges were filed against Burg, General Order G08-01 provided that “Prompt, through investigation will be conducted into allegations of misconduct to establish facts which can absolve the innocent and identify the guilty.” General Order, effective June 7, 2017. (available at https://home.chicagopolice.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/08/BIA-Revised-Policies-1.pdf). The current version of General Order G08-01 does not use the “prompt, thorough” phrase. However, it provides that investigations must be conducted “efficiently” and calls for “objective, comprehensive, and timely Log Number investigations into complaints.” General Order G8-01 (eff. Dec. 31, 2022), available at http://directives.chicagopolice.org/#directive/public/6362

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and the Superintendent “showed zero diligence” in pursuing the investigation. As to prejudice,

Burg reiterated his claim that his ability to develop a defense was hindered, especially as he could

not cross-examine De La Rosa. Burg acknowledged De La Rosa’s deposition in the civil lawsuit,

but asserted that Burg’s “interest and motivations” in the prior lawsuit were “not identical” in the

present matter. He averred that he would have pursued additional evidence for his defense, had he

known the “Superintendent would lie in wait for several years” while “evidence eroded.” He

otherwise argued that the nearly nine-year delay in this case established “extraordinary”

circumstances, justifying application of laches.

¶ 45 In his response brief, the Superintendent argued that Burg’s due process claim was foreclosed by

the Appellate Court decisions in Chisem, 2014 IL App (1st) 132389 and Orsa,2016 IL App (1st1)

121709, which found no violation of due process violations where the accused officers had been

paid before charges were filed. The Superintendent claimed that due process is triggered by “delay

in adjudication” during which an officer is suspended without pay, but not by a delayed

investigation when the officer continues to be paid.

¶ 46 Likewise, the Superintendent argued that Chisem and Orsa foreclosed Burg’s reliance on General

Order G08-01, insofar as those decisions observed that the General Order did not set “an absolute

deadline.” The Superintendent otherwise argued that even if an investigation was not “prompt”

under that General Order, it is not grounds for dismissal of the charges. To the extent Burg’s brief

relied on the CBA, the Superintendent asserted Burg waived the argument by not raising it before

the Board. The Superintendent otherwise argued that the cited language from the CBA did not

impose a time limit to file charges.

¶ 47 Regarding laches, the Superintendent emphasized that the doctrine does not apply to governmental

entities absent extraordinary circumstances.” The Superintendent disputed Burg’s claim that

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“evidence eroded” due to the delay, noting that De La Rosa had been deposed and cross-examined

by Burg’s counsel. Even without De La Rosa’s testimony, the Superintendent urged there was

“overwhelming evidence” supporting the Board’s decision.

¶ 48 The Circuit Court Affirms the Board’s Decision

¶ 49 On October 13, 2021, the circuit court affirmed the Board. With respect to Burg’s due process

claim, the court found that, “Like the officers in Orsa and Chisem, Burg was not deprived of any

property interest as he remained working and was then on paid disability” until the charges were

filed. The court also noted that Burg “had a full and fair opportunity to contest the charges at his

hearing.” The circuit court likewise relied on Orsa and Chisem to reject Burg’s reliance on the

language in General Order G08-01 calling for “[p]rompt, thorough investigations” into allegations

of police misconduct. The circuit court noted that “the general order did not contain any firm

deadline by which investigations must be completed” and that “nothing in the directive supported

automatic dismissal of charges for its violation.” The circuit court also found that Burg’s reliance

on the CBA was waived, and that in any event the cited CBA language “applies to the opening of

an investigation, not the filing of charges.”

¶ 50 The circuit court also rejected Burg’s laches argument. The court found that although there was a

“significant time lapse” between the conclusion of the investigation in 2014 and the filing of

charges in 2019, the record did not show that Burg had been prejudiced, or that there were

“extraordinary circumstances” to support the application of laches against a governmental entity.

The court noted that although De La Rosa had died, Burg’s counsel had a chance to cross-examine

him at the deposition in the civil litigation. The court found that Burg failed to identify any other

evidence that “eroded” due to the delay, and it was mere “speculation” for him to suggest that he

could have developed additional evidence or found additional witnesses.

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¶ 51 The circuit court otherwise rejected Burg’s contentions that the factual findings were against the

manifest weight of the evidence, or that the decision to discharge him was arbitrary and capricious.

¶ 52 Burg filed a timely notice of appeal on November 5, 2021.

¶ 53 ANALYSIS

¶ 54 On appeal, Burg does not raise any challenge as to whether the evidence supported the Board’s

factual findings or its ultimate decision to discharge him. Instead, he avers that the Board erred

when it denied his motion to dismiss the charges. He asserts that dismissal was warranted for two

primary reasons, namely: (1) his due process rights were violated by the Superintendent’s delay in

bringing charges and (2) the doctrine of laches warranted dismissal of the charges. For the

following reasons, we find these arguments lack merit.

¶ 55 Standard of Review

¶ 56 In an appeal from the judgment of an administrative review proceeding, we review the decision of

the administrative agency (here, the Board) and not the decision of the circuit court. Orsa v. Police

Board of City of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 121709, ¶ 47. “The applicable standard of review,

which determines the degree of deference give to the agency’s decision, depends upon whether the

question presented is one of fact, on of law, or a mixed question of law and fact.” AFM Messenger

Service, Inc. v. Dep’t of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 390 (2001). “An administrative

agency’s findings of fact are not reversed unless they are against the manifest weight of the

evidence, and questions of law are reviewed de novo. [Citation.]” Lyon, 209 Ill. 2d 264 (2004).

Agency decisions that present a mixed question of law and act are reviewed under a “clearly

erroneous” standard, under which an agency decision “will be deemed ‘clearly erroneous’ only

where the reviewing court, on the entire record, is ’left with the definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been committed.’” AFM Messenger Service, 198 Ill. 2d at 395. In this appeal, Burg

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does not dispute any findings of fact. Whether the issues in this appeal are considered pure

questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact, we find no error in the Board’s decision.

¶ 57 Whether the Timing of the Charges Violated Due Process

¶ 58 We first address Burg’s argument that his right to due process was violated by the “inexplicable

delay” before charges were filed in January 2019, nearly ten years after the underlying incident

and five years after the investigation was concluded. He cites the fourteenth amendment to the

United States Constitution, as well as General Orders of the CPD, the CBA, and a prior decision

by the Board in another matter. As discussed below, our case law does not support a due process

violation in these circumstances, and the other authorities cited by Burg are unavailing.

¶ 59 “Procedural due process claims question the constitutionality of the procedures used to deny a

person’s life, liberty, or property.” Lyon, 209 Ill. 2d at 273. “ ‘It is a well-established constitutional

principle that every citizen has the right to pursue a trade, occupation, business or profession”

which is a “property and liberty interest entitled to the protection of the law as guaranteed by the

due process clauses of the Illinois and Federal constitutions.” Id. (quoting Coldwell Banker

Residential Real Estate Services of Illinois, Inc. v. Clayton, 105 Ill. 2d 389, 397 (1985)).

¶ 60 “While the core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, it

is a flexible concept and requires only such procedural protections as fundamental principles of

justice and the particular situation demand.” Chisem v. McCarthy, 2014 IL App (1st) 132389, ¶ 14

(citing Callahan v. Sledge, 2012 IL App (4th) 110818, ¶ 27). “[D]ue process is a matter of federal

constitutional law, so compliance or noncompliance with state procedural requirements is not

determinative of whether minimum procedural due process standards have been met.” Lyon, 209

Ill. 2d at 273. At the same time, state requirements “are a useful reference because they represent

standards that the General Assembly and the [agency] concluded were sufficient.” Id.

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¶ 61 Burg relies on a number of sources as support for his claim that the Superintendent’s delay in filing

charges amounted to a due process violation. He notes that the CBA provides that, without specific

written authorization by the Superintendent, “no complaint or allegation of any misconduct

concerning any incident or event which occurred five (5) years prior to the date the complaint or

allegation became known to the Department shall be made the subject of a Complaint Register

investigation or be re-opened or re-investigated after five (5) years from the date the Complaint

Register number was issued.” Burg also relies heavily on General Order G08-01’s directive that

“prompt, thorough investigations will be conducted into allegations of misconduct.” CPD General

Order G08-01 (eff. June 7, 2017). He argues that the Superintendent’s delay in charging him was

not “prompt,” as that term is used in that General Order.

¶ 62 Burg recognizes that our court’s decisions in Orsa and Chisem rejected due process claims that

were also premised on the untimeliness of Board charges against CPD officers. See Orsa v. Police

Board of the City of Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 121709; Chisem v. McCarthy, 2014 IL App (1st)

132389. Yet, Burg claims those cases are distinguishable, because the delay in his case is

“inexplicable.” Burg instead argues that his circumstances are akin to those in a subsequent Board

decision that found dismissal of charges warranted, In the Matter of Charges Filed Against

Sergeant John Poulos, No. 17 PB 2932 (Feb. 28, 2018) (“In re Poulos.”).

¶ 63 The Superintendent responds that Burg received the requisite notice and opportunity to be heard ,

and that Orsa and Chisem establish that the mere timing of charges does not give rise to a due

process violation.

¶ 64 Our Precedent in Orsa and Chisem

¶ 65 As both parties discuss Orsa and Chisem, we review them here. In Chisem, a police officer

appealed from his suspension by the Board, citing the nearly three-year lapse between the

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underlying incident in February 2009 and the filing of charges in December 2011. Chisem, 2014

IL App (1st) 132389, ¶¶ 1-3. Chisem claimed the “untimely” charges against him violated his

right to due process. Id. ¶ 1. He also relied on CPD General Order 93-03 (effective April 15, 2011),

the predecessor to General Order G08-01, which likewise called for a “prompt” investigation. Id.

¶¶ 14, 17.

¶ 66 In the course of finding that his right to due process was not violated, our court noted that Chisem

relied on case law “involv[ing] a delay in the adjudication of allegations of misconduct after the

respective plaintiffs had been suspended *** not a delay in the investigation leading to an initial

suspension.” Id. ¶ 15 (citing Morgan v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 374

Ill. App. 3d 275, 303) (2007) and Lyon, 209 Ill. 2d at 282). The Chisem decision noted that,

although the officer had a property interest in employment, he “was working as a paid CPD officer

throughout the entire investigation and was only suspended after charges were officially filed.”

Chisem, 2014 IL App (1st) 132389, ¶15. Moreover, this court noted that Chisem was “immediately

given notice of the pending investigation and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Id. For these

reasons, we found “no violation of [Chisem’s] right to due process.” Id.

¶ 67 Chisem separately rejected the officer’s claim that the timing of the charges violated the CPD

General Order:

“We also observe no direct violation of General Order 93-03, which

requires a prompt and thorough investigation. Although the

investigation took a substantial amount of time, this directive does

not set an absolute deadline within which investigations must be

completed, but provides that if the investigation lasts more than 30

days, the investigator must seek and obtain an extension of time

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within which to complete the investigation. [Citation.] The IPRA

regularly sought and was granted extensions of time to complete its

investigation. *** And even if a violation occurred, nothing in the

directive suggests, and plaintiff provides no support, for the

proposition that automatic dismissal is the sanction. [Citation.]” Id.

¶ 17.

¶ 68 Two years later, this court rejected virtually identical arguments in Orsa v. Police Bd. of City of

Chicago, 2016 IL App (1st) 121709, which arose from an incident in which three off-duty officers

assaulted a civilian. The Superintendent waited more than four years after the incident to bring

charges; the Board ultimately discharged two officers and suspended the third. Id. ¶ 2. On

administrative review, the circuit court held that the Board violated the officers’ due process rights.

Id. ¶ 34.

¶ 69 This court affirmed the Board’s decision. As it had in Chisem, this court in Orsa rejected the

officers’ reliance on Morgan and Lyon, because those cases “involved a delay in the adjudication

of allegations of misconduct after the plaintiffs had been suspended from employment, not a delay

in the investigation.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 39. Orsa further noted that the officers “remained

employed with the CPD throughout the investigation until charges were officially filed”, they were

“immediately given notice of the charges,” and had a “meaningful opportunity to be heard during

a five-day hearing before the Board.” Id. For those reasons, we found that their “rights to due

process were not violated.” Id.

¶ 70 Our court in Orsa likewise rejected plaintiffs’ reliance on General Order No. 93-03’s requirement

of a “prompt” investigation. Id. ¶ 42. We reasoned that “[a]lthough the investigation took a

substantial amount of time”, the General Order did not “set an absolute deadline” and the “IPRA

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regularly sought and received extensions of time to complete its investigation.” Id. We also noted

that “even if a violation [of General Order 93-03] occurred, nothing in the directive suggests and

plaintiffs provide no support, for automatic dismissal.” Id.

Notably, the analysis in both Chisem and Orsa indicated that the question of whether due process

was violated was wholly separate from whether there had been a violation of General Order 93-

03’s requirement of a “prompt” investigation. That is, both decisions concluded that there was no

due process violation, before separately addressing whether General Order 93-03 was violated.

¶ 71 The Timing of the Charges Against Burg Did Not Constitute a Due Process Violation

¶ 72 To the extent that Burg argues his due process rights were violated by the timing of the charges,

we agree with the Superintendent that Chisem and Orsa are on point. Those cases illustrate that,

in contrast to a delayed adjudication after an employee has been suspended, a lengthy delay before

charges does not establish a due process violation, at least where the employee continued to be

paid. See Chisem, 2014 IL App (1st) 132389, ¶ 15 (“plaintiff was working as a paid CPD officer

through the entire investigation and was only suspended after charges were officially filed.”);

Orsa, 2016 IL App (1st) 121709, ¶39 (“While we agree that plaintiffs have a property interest in

their employment, they remained employed with the CPD through the investigation until charges

were officially filed.”). Likewise, Burg was not deprived of any property interest by the delay in

the filing of charges. There is no dispute that from the time of the incident until charges were filed,

he remained a CPD employee and received regular compensation, including disability benefits

following his 2014 injury.

¶ 73 More fundamentally, we keep in mind that “the core of due process is the right to notice and a

meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Chisem, 2014 IL App (1st) 132389, ¶ 14. Burg has not

suggested that he was not timely notified of the charges once they were filed. Further, the record

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reflects that he had a meaningful opportunity to be heard at the hearing before the Board, where

he was represented by counsel.

¶ 74 In re Poulos Does Not Support Burg’s Due Process Claim

¶ 75 In the course of his due process argument, Burg relies on a 2018 Board decision that dismissed

charges against an officer as untimely. In re Poulos, No. 17 PB 2932 (Feb. 28, 2018). 9 Burg claims

Poulos is more factually analogous to his situation than Chisem and Orsa. However, a close

reading of Poulos shows that it was not decided on due process grounds but was limited to General

Order G08-01. Moreover, the facts of Poulos are also distinguishable. We proceed to discuss both

Poulos and General Order G08-01.

¶ 76 In Poulos, the Superintendent charged Sergeant John Poulos in June 2017 with CPD rule violations

that allegedly occurred many years earlier. Specifically, Poulos allegedly failed to disclose certain

facts on his application become a police officer in 2000, and between July 2003 and September

2006 he allegedly violated a CPD rule by holding an ownership interest in a restaurant with a liquor

license. Poulos, 17 PB 2932 at 2. The investigation into the charges and disciplinary

recommendation was completed in 2007. Id. In June 2010, Poulos returned to work after an injury-

related leave of absence. Nevertheless, he was not charged until seven years later.

¶ 77 Poulos moved to dismiss the charges based on their untimeliness. When the Board inquired about

the reason for the delay, the Superintendent could not provide an explanation, but suggested that

“numerous administration and staffing changes” had contributed. Id. at 3.

¶ 78 Although Poulos asserted a number of bases for dismissal, including a due process claim, the Board

granted his motion solely on the basis of General Order G08-01. In addition to citing its

requirement of “[p]rompt, thorough investigations,” the Board recited General Order G08-01’s

9 The decision is available at https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/cpb/PoliceDiscipline/17PB2932.pdf

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language that “ ‘the Superintendent must ensure that internal investigations are conducted

consistent with the provisions outlined in this directive to provide Department members with the

fundamental principles of fairness and to ensure that members are afforded all their rights.’ ” Id.

at 4. (Emphasis added by Board).

¶ 79 The Board found that the “lengthy and unexplained delay in filing charges against Sergeant Poulos

violates these important provisions of General Order G08-01, and warrants dismissal of these

charges with prejudice.” Id. The Board expressly found that Poulos’ situation was distinct from

Orsa and Chisem, because in those cases “there was no lengthy delay between the completion of

the investigation and the filing of charges.” Id. The Board recognized that lengthy investigations

may be necessary in a complex case and that it had “not dismissed charges in cases where

investigations have taken several years.” Id. at 5. However, in Poulos’ case, “the delay took part

in the Superintendent’s office, long after the investigation was complete.” Id.

¶ 80 The Board also pointed out that the charges against Poulos “turned largely on documentary

evidence” and “should have been resolved promptly.” Id. Thus, Poulos was “quite different than

excessive-force cases and other cases that involve multiple and conflicting accounts by lay and

law enforcement witnesses, companion criminal and civil litigation, and the need for expert

evidence.” Id. The Board also emphasized that the Superintendent “offered no reasonable

explanation” for the ten-year delay between the end of the investigation and the filing of charges

in 2017.

¶ 81 Citing Orsa and Chisem, the Board’s In re Poulos decision reiterated that General Order G08-01

does not set an absolute deadline for the filing of charges, nor does it require automatic dismissal

for its violation. Id. at 6. The Board explained that, unlike a statute of limitations, “General Order

G08-01 is far more flexible and requires a careful balancing between the interests of a prompt

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investigation and a thorough investigation.” Id. at 6. The Board further cautioned that the General

Order “should only be invoked as a basis for dismissal in the most extraordinary and egregious

cases, like the present one.” Id. The Board thus dismissed the charges against Poulos solely under

General Order G08-01. Id. at 6 n. 4.

¶ 82 As Poulos did not discuss whether due process was violated, it provides no support for Burg’s due

process argument. Nevertheless, as Burg also relied on General Order G08-01 in his arguments to

the Board and on appeal, we proceed to discuss why that General Order is also unavailing.

¶ 83 General Order G08-01 Did Not Warrant Dismissal of the Charges

¶ 84 We again point out that although Burg’s brief discusses General Order G08-01 as part of his due

process argument, Chisem and Orsa illustrate that the due process inquiry is separate from the

question of whether the General Order was violated. In any event, we conclude that General Order

G08-01 did not entitle Burg to dismissal of the charges. We reach this conclusion for several

reasons.

¶ 85 First, Burg relies on the portion of the General Order that provides for “prompt” investigations.

However, the crux of Burg’s appeal is not about the timing of the investigation, which the record

reflects was initiated in 2010 and completed in 2014. Rather, all of his arguments stem from the

timing of the charges filed in January 2019, nearly five years after the investigation had completed,

and more than eight years after the underlying 2010 incident. Burg simply does not identify any

specific language in the General Order that purports to set any requirement for when charges must

be filed. This is consistent with our decisions in Orsa and Chisem, which found no violation of the

same “prompt” investigation requirement in General Order 93-03, the predecessor to General

Order G08-01. Orsa, 2016 IL App (1st) 121709, ¶ 42; Chisem, 2014 IL App (1st) 132389, ¶ 17.

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¶ 86 We recognize that in Poulos, 17 PB 2932, the Board found dismissal appropriate under General

Order G08-01, where the charges were filed nearly 17 years after the earliest alleged CPD rule

violation, and a decade after the investigation had concluded. However, we find Poulos

distinguishable from Burg’s situation, especially given the Board’s comments in Poulos explaining

the uniqueness of that decision. Significantly, that decision emphasized that the charges against

Poulos “turned largely on documentary evidence” rather than witness testimony, so that the case

was “quite different than excessive force cases and other cases that involve multiple and conflicting

accounts by lay and law enforcement witnesses” and “companion criminal and civil litigation.” 17

PB 2932 at 5. In stark contrast to those circumstances, the charges against Burg essentially turned

on conflicting witness testimony regarding Burg’s actions. Further, unlike Poulos, the underlying

incident gave rise to companion civil litigation, in which Burg was a named defendant.

¶ 87 Moreover, Poulos emphasized that “the particular facts of each case must be considered” in

deciding whether General Order G08-01 has been violated, and that even a violation does not

automatically warrant dismissal of charges. Id. at 6; see also In re John Haleas, 14 PB 2848, at 5

(Aug. 21, 2014) (recognizing there is no provision in General Order G08-01 order “requiring the

extraordinary remedy of dismissal of the case as a sanction” for its violation). That is, General

Order G08-01 “should only be invoked as a basis for dismissal in the most extraordinary and

egregious cases.” Poulos, 17 PB 2932 at 6. This is consistent with our recognition in Orsa and

Chisem that nothing in General Order G08-01’s predecessor (General Order 93-03) suggested that

its violation would call for automatic dismissal of charges. Orsa, 2016 IL App (1st) 121709, ¶ 42;

Chisem, 2014 IL App (1st) 132389, ¶ 17. Thus, even if we were to conclude that the timing of

Burg’s charges violated General Order G08-01’s requirement of a “prompt and thorough

investigation” (which we do not), that violation would not require dismissal.

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¶ 88 For the foregoing reasons, we cannot say that the Board erred in declining to find that dismissal

was warranted under General Order G08-01.

¶ 89 Burg’s Reliance on the CBA Is Unavailing

¶ 90 We briefly address Burg’s reliance on language of the CBA for his due process challenge. In

particular, Burg notes the provision in section 6.1 of the CBA that:

“Unless the Superintendent of Police specifically authorizes in

writing, no complaint or allegation of misconduct concerning any

incident or event which occurred five (5) years prior to the date the

complaint or allegation became known to the Department shall be

made the subject of a Complaint Register investigation or be re-

opened or re-investigated after five (5) years from the date the

Complaint Register number was issued.” 10

¶ 91 Burg’s reliance on the CBA is misplaced. First, as the circuit court recognized, Burg did not

reference the CBA in support of his motion to dismiss before the Board. Thus, he has forfeited

reliance on it. “[O]n administrative review a party forfeits any issue that it failed to raise in

proceedings before the administrative agency.” Demesa v. Adams, 2013 IL App (1st) 122608, ¶

52; see also Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Bd., 228 Ill. 2d 200, 212

(2008) “[I]f an argument, issue, or defense is not presented in an administrative hearing, it is

procedurally defaulted and may not be raised for the first time before the circuit court on

administrative review.”).

10 The CBA is available at https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/dol/Collective%20Bargaining%20Agreement3/FOPCBA2012- 2017_2.20.15.pdf

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¶ 92 Moreover, even if we disregarded the forfeiture, the referenced CBA provision does not support

Burg’s position. Contrary to Burg’s suggestion, it does not impose a time limit in which to bring

charges after an alleged incident misconduct. Rather, it provides that an incident of alleged

misconduct that is over five years old will not “be made the subject of a Complaint Register

investigation”, absent specific authorization from the Superintendent. That is, it concerns the time

period in which an investigation must be initiated. It does not suggest any violation premised on

when charges are filed.

¶ 93 Burg Has Not Identified the Requisite Prejudice for Laches

¶ 94 We have thus rejected Burg’s due process challenge, along with his reliance on General Order

G08-01 and the CBA. This brings us to Burg’s alternative contention, that the untimeliness of the

charges warranted their dismissal under the doctrine of laches. For the following reasons, we

conclude that—notwithstanding the troubling delay in the filing of charges—Burg did not show

the requisite resulting prejudice to support laches. Accordingly, the Board did not err in rejecting

that defense.

¶ 95 Our supreme court has explained that “[l]aches is an equitable defense asserted against a party

‘who has knowingly slept upon his rights and acquiesced for a great length of time, [citation] and

its existence depends on whether, under all circumstances of a particular case, a plaintiff is

chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to institute proceedings before he did.’ ” Tillman

v. Pritzker, 2021 IL 126387, ¶ 25 (quoting Pyle v. Ferrell, 12 Ill. 2d 547, 552 (1958)). “The

doctrine is grounded in the equitable notion that courts are reluctant to come to the aid of a party

who has knowingly slept on his rights to the detriment of the opposing party.” Id. (quoting Tully

v. State, 143 Ill. 2d 425, 432 (1991)).

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¶ 96 “Laches is an affirmative defense that is unrelated to the merits of the suit.” PNC Bank, National

Ass’n v. Kusmierz, 2022 IL 126606, ¶ 28. Accordingly, “[t]he party asserting laches bears the

burden of establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.]” Id. ¶ 26. “Two

elements must be established for laches to successfully defeat a claim: (1) lack of diligence by the

party asserting the claim, and (2) prejudice to the opposing party resulting from the delay.

[Citation.]” Id. Absent prejudice, a “mere lapse in time” is insufficient to support a laches defense.

Chisem, 2014 IL App (1st) 132389, ¶ 18.

¶ 97 Furthermore, “as a general rule, the doctrine of laches does not apply to governmental entities

absent extraordinary circumstances because laches could impair the functioning of the

government.” Orsa, 2016 Il App (1st) 121709, ¶44; Chisem, 2014 IL App (1st) 132389, ¶ 18

(same). Our supreme court has recognized there is “considerable reluctance to impose the doctrine

of laches to the actions of public entities unless unusual or extraordinary circumstances are

shown.” Van Milligan v. Board of Fire and Police Com’rs of Village of Glenview, 158 Ill. 2d 85,

90 (1994).

¶ 98 “The decision with respect to whether laches should be invoked is generally a discretionary

matter.” Chisem, 2014 IL App (1st) 132389, ¶ 18 (citing Van Milligan, 158 Ill. 2d at 91). We will

not disturb the Board’s determination regarding laches unless it was “so clearly wrong as to

constitute an abuse of discretion.” Orsa, 2016 IL App (1st) 121709, ¶ 44; Chisem, 2014 IL App

(1st) 132389, ¶ 18.

¶ 99 In denying Burg’s motion to dismiss, the Board found laches inapplicable because Burg did not

demonstrate that the Superintendent’s delay in bringing charges caused him the requisite prejudice.

In arguing for reversal, Burg initially suggests that prejudice may be presumed due to the length

of the delay in his case. However, the case law simply does not support that proposition. To the

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contrary, our precedent is clear that the mere passage of time is insufficient. Laches requires actual

prejudice “resulting from the delay.” Kusmierz, 2022 IL 126606, ¶ 26; see also Pyle v. Ferrell, 12

Ill. 2d at 552 (1958) (laches is “neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with a

lapse of time *** and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party.”) (emphasis

added.). “If the defendant is not injured by the delay, laches is inapplicable.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) LaSalle National Bank v. Dubin Residential Communities Corp, 337 Ill. App. 3d

345, 351 (2003).

¶ 100 Burg otherwise argues that De La Rosa’s death before the charges were filed caused him prejudice,

as Burg lost the ability to cross-examine him at the evidentiary hearing. Burg asserts that De La

Rosa was a “key witness” upon which the Board’s decision relied.

¶ 101 We recognize that De La Rosa was one of the only identified eyewitnesses to the incident. His

recollection was undoubtedly important, since he was impartial and he observed events before,

during, and immediately after the altercation. However, De La Rosa provided detailed testimony

about the events in question at his civil deposition in the civil litigation brought by Rzany and

Cordero. Importantly, there is no dispute that De La Rosa was subject to cross-examination by the

attorney who represented Burg and the other defendants.

¶ 102 De La Rosa’s prior testimony, at which Burg’s counsel had a fair opportunity to cross-examine

him regarding the pertinent events, weighs against a finding of prejudice resulting from that

witness’s unavailability at the evidentiary hearing. Notably, while Burg claims that he was

deprived of the opportunity to question De La Rosa about “pertinent facts”, Burg does not specify

any particular relevant topics that were not covered at De La Rosa’s civil deposition. Nor does

Burg suggest any reason why, had De La Rosa been available at the hearing, he would add any

new pertinent information or qualify his prior sworn testimony. Indeed, it is speculative to suggest

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that De La Rosa’s recollection of the night in question would be substantially different (or more

favorable to Burg) at a new proceeding. This is particularly true where De La Rosa’s deposition

testimony merely corroborated Rzany’s. Unlike Burg’s testimony, which the Board found to be

inconsistent, vague, and contradictory, Rzany’s was supported by De La Rosa’s testimony, a 911

tape, and the recording of the police dispatch. There is no basis in the record for us to depart from

the Board’s conclusion that Burg offered no credible argument as to how he was prejudiced by

being deprived of another opportunity to question De La Rosa, particularly where his testimony

was in line with the only other material witness’s testimony and the other evidence. Thus, we do

not find any prejudice to Burg’s case resulting from De La Rosa’s absence.

¶ 103 Burg otherwise claims that he was prejudiced by the delay because he “lost the chance to develop

evidence, such as additional eyewitnesses to refute the allegations” against him. He states he had

no reason to do, once the civil litigation was settled. He suggests that had the charges been filed

earlier, he could have discovered evidence that has since “eroded.”

¶ 104 However, these claims are likewise speculative. Burg offers no specific reason to believe that there

were any unidentified witnesses to the underlying incident, or additional evidence that could have

been discovered. Burg has not presented any reason to conclude that he could have found any

additional evidence to overcome De La Rosa’s prior testimony, Rzany’s testimony, and all of the

corroborating evidence. Speculative assertions are insufficient to show the requisite prejudice

supporting a laches defense. We thus agree with the Board that Burg did not show the requisite

prejudice to support the application of laches.

¶ 105 Moreover, we do not find that the mere length of the delay before the charges gives rise to the

“compelling” or “unusual or extraordinary circumstances” required to apply laches against a

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governmental entity. Van Milligan, 158 Ill. 2d at 90-91. Thus, we cannot say that the Board abused

its discretion in rejecting his reliance on the laches doctrine.

¶ 106 We thus find that none of Burg’s challenges have legal merit. Before we conclude, however, we

emphasize that our decision should not be read to condone the administrative delay in this case.

There is no apparent reason (other than administrative oversight or negligence) why charges were

not filed against Burg until January 2019, more than four years after the investigation was

concluded and more than eight years after the underlying 2010 incident. Indeed, the Board’s

decision found the delay was “unconscionable.” Nevertheless, there is apparently no

administrative rule or statute specifying a deadline for the Superintendent to bring charges for such

misconduct, and it is not our role to create one. As discussed, our case law does not support a

finding of a due process violation or laches under these circumstances.

¶ 107 In summary, we conclude that the Board did not err in denying Burg’s motion to dismiss the

charges against him.

¶ 108 CONCLUSION

¶ 109 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Board and the judgment of the circuit

court of Cook County.

¶ 110 Affirmed.

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