Burchett ex rel. Ezell v. South Denver Windustrial Co.

42 P.3d 19, 2002 Colo. LEXIS 196, 2002 WL 334741
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado
DecidedMarch 4, 2002
DocketNo. 01SA338
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 42 P.3d 19 (Burchett ex rel. Ezell v. South Denver Windustrial Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Burchett ex rel. Ezell v. South Denver Windustrial Co., 42 P.3d 19, 2002 Colo. LEXIS 196, 2002 WL 334741 (Colo. 2002).

Opinion

Justice BENDER

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

I. Introduction

In this original proceeding, we review the trial court's denial of a motion to postpone the deadline for disclosure of expert testimony and to continue the trial date. This tort case involves an airplane accident in which the pilot and passenger were killed. The surviving children of the passenger sued the estate of the pilot for wrongful death.

The trial was set eight months from the time the case was at issue. Four months before the trial date, and two weeks before the deadline for disclosure of expert testimony, the plaintiffs moved, with the agreement of the defendants, to postpone this deadline and to continue the trial date because both parties were waiting for the issuance of the accident investigation report from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Two weeks after the deadline for disclosure of expert testimony passed, the trial judge denied both motions. The plaintiffs then sought, with no opposition from the defendants, an extraordinary writ in this court. We issued an order to show cause.

We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant the plaintiffs' motions to postpone the deadline for disclosure of expert testimony and to continue the trial, Hence, we make the rule absolute.

II. Reasons for Granting Writ

C.AR. 21 permits this court, at its discretion, to exercise original jurisdiction over this case. Redden v. SCI Colo. Funeral Servs., Inc., 38 P.3d 75, 80 (Colo.2001); People v. Miller, 25 P.3d 1230, 1231 (Colo.2001); City & County of Denver v. Dist. Court, 939 P.2d 1353, 1360-61 (Colo.1997). We may grant relief under C.A.R. 21 only when the trial court has abused its discretion or no other adequate remedy exists. Id.

We exercise jurisdiction under CAR. 21 when a case "raise[s] issues of significant public importance that we have not yet considered." Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 194 (Colo.2001). Trial courts must process each case in a timely, efficient, and fair manner. Although the parties moved to postpone the deadline for expert disclosure and sought to continue the trial date because both wanted the benefit of the NTSB investigation report before hiring experts and engaging in serious settlement negotiations, the trial court denied the parties' requests.

Appellate review is an inadequate remedy in this case because, at the time we granted the writ, the deadline for disclosure of expert testimony had passed, the trial date was pending, and the parties would have been forced to hire expensive expert witnesses to investigate the airplane accident instead of waiting for the same information from the NTSB.

III. Facts and Proceedings Below

The plaintiffs' mother was killed in an airplane accident that also killed the pilot. The Colorado probate code required the plaintiffs to file suit against the pilot's estate sixty days after the personal representative denied the claim-long before the parties had the benefit of the NTSB's1 accident [21]*21investigation report. The parties stipulated that without the report, there would be little chance of settlement because questions of fault and negligence would remain unanswered. In addition, the parties agreed that once the report is issued,2 many questions regarding equipment failure and pilot error will likely be resolved and settlement discussions may become more viable.

The trial court that was assigned the case has a case management policy of scheduling cases for trial six months, or as close as possible thereto, from the time the case is at issue. The case became at issue in May 2001 and, although the parties requested the trial date be set a year away (May 2002) to await the issuance of the NTSB report, the court set trial for January 29, 2002. Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(C)(I), the plaintiffs' deadline for disclosing expert witness reports is 120 days before trial. Hence, the deadline for disclosure of expert testimony was October 1, 2001.

On September 12, 2001, the plaintiffs, with agreement by the defendants, moved to postpone the deadline for disclosure of expert testimony and to continue the trial date on the bases set forth above. On October 15, 2001, the trial court denied both motions.

IV. Analysis

A. Caseflow Management

Sound caseflow management plans are essential not only to ensure timely justice but also to provide a just process. Well-designed management plans are realistic, encourage settlement, encourage preparedness for trial by attorneys, reduce the costs of litigation, and increase the quality of the outcome of cases. David C. Steelman, Case-flow Management: The Heart of Court Management in the New Millennium 9 (2000); Bureau of Justice Assistance, Differentiated Case Management 4-5 (1998). As we noted in Todd v. Bear Valley Village Apartments, 980 P.2d 973, 976 (Colo.1999), "delay devalues judgments, creates anxiety in litigants and uncertainty for lawyers, results in loss or deterioration of evidence, [and] wastes court resources."

A key component of caseflow management is strict adherence to trial-setting and continuance policies that create expectations on the part of attorneys that trials will start on the date set. Id. See also Steelman, supra, at 9. Likewise, a solid plan emphasizes attorney preparedness and encourages settling of cases. Id. Empirical research reveals that when attorneys perceive that the court rarely grants continuances, attorneys more actively seek settlement before trial and are more prepared when the set trial date arrives. Id.

This court supports the principle that trial courts, not attorneys, should closely control the management of dockets and cases. We applaud a trial court's efforts to design a case management system that will increase the efficiency of its docket. In keeping with this principle, trial setting and the granting of continuances are within the sound discretion of the trial courts. Furthermore, continuances "shall be granted only for good cause." CR.C.P. 121 § 1-11; Todd, 980 P.2d at 976.

The goals of caseflow management must be harmonized with the ultimate goals of the court system-dispensing of cases fairly and expeditiously. Courts and litigants may not benefit from caseflow management plans that attempt to treat all cases similarly. A case management plan must make a reasonable effort to treat some cases differently, according to the specific needs of each case, and retain flexibility to provide exceptions to its management scheme. "Cases differ substantially in the time required for a fair and timely disposition." Bureau of Justice Assistance, supra, at 1; see also James S. Kakalik, et al., Averting Gridlock: Strategies for Reducing Civil Delay in the Los Angeles Superior Court 103 (1990) ("What is appropriate for one sort of case may not be appropriate, or may be counterproductive, for another.").3

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42 P.3d 19, 2002 Colo. LEXIS 196, 2002 WL 334741, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burchett-ex-rel-ezell-v-south-denver-windustrial-co-colo-2002.