Burbridge Realty Co. v. Cravey & Arms Corp.

24 Fla. Supp. 2d 24
CourtCircuit Court for the Judicial Circuits of Florida
DecidedJune 9, 1986
DocketCase No. 85-7219-CA
StatusPublished

This text of 24 Fla. Supp. 2d 24 (Burbridge Realty Co. v. Cravey & Arms Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Circuit Court for the Judicial Circuits of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Burbridge Realty Co. v. Cravey & Arms Corp., 24 Fla. Supp. 2d 24 (Fla. Super. Ct. 1986).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

A.J. SOUD, JR., Circuit Judge.

This cause came on for trial without jury on May 29, 1986.

The Plaintiffs were represented by Edward A. White, Esquire, and the Defendants by B. Thomas Whitefield, Esquire.

In this Final Judgment, the Plaintiffs will be referred to as “BUR-BRIDGE” and the Defendants herein as “ARMS” to facilitate findings, conclusions, and opinion.

Testimony and exhibits were received into evidence. Arguments of counsel were heard. All has been duly considered and weighed.

From the evidence, the Court makes the following essential findings of fact.

ESSENTIAL FACTS

BURBRIDGE as landlord-lessor leased its premises consisting of two separate offices to ARMS. At inception, the written lease (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit #1) was for a six-month term from February 1, 1983, through July 31, 1983, for 1124 South Edgewood Avenue. On June 1, 1983, ARMS negotiated to lease the adjacent space at 1120 South Edgewood Avenue and the latter space was thereupon included within the lease terms for the new twelve-month period from August 1, 1983, to July 31, 1984 (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit #2). The lease permitted an annual adjustment to the rental rate in accordance with the Consumer Price Index compiled by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The lease permitted either party to terminate with 60 days advance notice in writing. ARMS leased the premises in “as is” condition.

Before ARMS made improvements, the premises were air conditioned and partitioned. 1120 had old carpet and 1124 was furnished with old vinyl tile flooring. The office space had evidence of roof leaks because of water stains in the tile ceiling. The interiors were musty and needed a cosmetic dress-up. The lease terms were not negotiated to conclusion until BURBRIDGE gave its approval to ARMS for tenant improvements. No meeting of the minds ever occurred as to the intention of BURBRIDGE to pay for same or credit the expense of same to ARMS’ rental. ARMS installed interior wall partitions with electrical wiring and outlets, a drop ceiling, exterior wall paneling, air [26]*26condition and heat duct work, and new carpeting in 1120, and with costs exceeding $7,200.00. Subsequently, ARMS requested payment or credit from BURBRIDGE for the improvements. Except for an $800.00 compressor installed by ARMS, BURBRIDGE never paid or credited ARMS for same.

The lease expired on July 31, 1984; however, ARMS physically stayed over through October 31, 1984. On September 4, 1984, BUR-BRIDGE wrote a letter to ARMS (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit #11), setting forth the twelve-month increase of 4.1% according to the Consumer Price Index figures which increased the rent from $563.33 to $586.43 per month with an additional retroactive adjustment to the August, 1984, monthly period. ARMS concurred and acquiesced to the written terms of BURBRIDGE’S letter of September 4, and paid the increased rent for August, September, and October. On September 25, 1984, ARMS sent its 60-day notice, in writing, to terminate the lease effecting October 31, 1984 (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit #6). At inception of the lease, ARMS had paid a last month’s rent of $550.00.

ARMS vacated the premises between October 1 and October 15, 1984, when it authorized its project manager to supervise a crew that would dismantle the improvements therein. The dismantling process covered a period of five days. BURBRIDGE had no access whatsoever to the premises prior to October 31, 1984. The key in its possession furnished by ARMS was unusable because ARMS had changed all locks. ARMS was in control and possession of the premises, though not physically present, through October 31. Said lease did not expire on October 31 but November 30, 1984. On November 3, 1984, the first working day following ARMS’ vacating of the premises, BURBRIDGE reentered and discovered that all improvements made during the tenancy had been removed by ARMS, namely: the drop ceiling had been removed, leaving exposed the underlying 15-year ceiling with numerous holes and missing tiles produced by ARMS, together with loose electrical wiring for fixtures and outlets; the paneling on the exterior walls was unsightly because of the space between the top of the paneling and the older ceiling caused by the removal of the drop ceiling; the carpeting in 1120 which had been laid after the placement of the interior partitions was unusable because of the removal of the interior partitions; the majority of the duct work had been dismantled and removed, leaving the remaining portion in shambles, disjointed, and of no use; the electrical wiring afforded no functional service to the premises; and, a large amount of trash, evidencing the dismantling of the premises, was stacked to the rear of the property.

As installed by ARMS, the partitions in 1124 were adequate for [27]*27future use by BURBRIDGE; however, a portion of the interior partitions in 1120 was not adequate to future use by BURBRIDGE because private office spaces were too small.

Subsequently, on March 1, 1985, BURBRIDGE re-leased the premises to a law firm which required customizing the interior to the needs and purposes of the new tenants. However, some of the improvements required greater expenditures by BURBRIDGE for portions of the damaged freehold caused by ARMS. ARMS did not leave the premises in as reasonably a functional facility as when it took possession. BURBRIDGE was deprived of an adequate ceiling, a portion of the interior walls, the ability to produce and distribute hot and cool air to the property, and the ability to provide reasonable electric service for the tenant. BURBRIDGE expended $1,420.00 for a replacement ceiling, $3,619.00 for interior partitions, of which it is entitled to recover one-half (ARMS, upon entry to the premises, removed what interior walls were there.); $1,400.00 for air conditioning and heating repairs, of which it is allowed to reocver $1,000.00, to restore the unit to the capability of delivering and returning conditioned air; and, $2,475.00 for electrical wiring and fixtures to restore the premises to the capability of reasonable use from a lighting and outlet viewpoint. Although claimed by BURBRIDGE, it suffered no consequential damages to the exterior walls, carpeting, portions of replacement to the interior partitions, or the heating and cooling system for reasons hereafter explained.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. The September 4, 1984, letter from BURBRIDGE to ARMS setting forth the twelve-month increase in the Consumer Price Index for rents acquiesced in and utilized by ARMS to pay the increased rental for August, September, and October, 1984, is a “further instrument in writing” as required by Section 83.04, Florida Statutes, to bind the tenant to a renewal of the lease and subject to its terms. With the requirement of a 60-day notice to terminate, ARMS was obligated for rent to BURBRIDGE through November 30, 1984. Credited with its $550.00 deposit as a last month’s rent, ARMS owes $36.43.

II. Improvements made by ARMS to the ceiling, interior partitions, heating and air conditioning system, and electrical services were annexed to the realty, appropriate to the use or purpose of the realty to which they were connected and were intended by ARMS to be a permanent accession to the freehold. Wetjen v. Williamson, 196 So.2d 461 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967). These improvements could not be removed without material and substantial injury to the freehold. Dependable Air [28]*28Conditioning and Appliances, Inc., v.

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Related

Wetjen v. Williamson
196 So. 2d 461 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1967)

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Bluebook (online)
24 Fla. Supp. 2d 24, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burbridge-realty-co-v-cravey-arms-corp-flacirct-1986.