Bundy v. Stang

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedNovember 19, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-00234
StatusUnknown

This text of Bundy v. Stang (Bundy v. Stang) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bundy v. Stang, (N.D. Ind. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA HAMMOND DIVISION

ADRIENNE BUNDY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:24-CV-234-GSL-AZ

CHERYL STANG, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER Adrienne Bundy, proceeding pro se, wishes to sue a community health center and its supervisor, Cheryl Stang. [DE 1]. Because she is unable to pay the filing fee, she has moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. [DE 2]. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against Cheryl Stang are dismissed with prejudice, and her claims against the Community Diagnostic Center are dismissed without prejudice. Consequently, her motion to proceed in forma pauperis is denied, but she is granted leave to refile. Ordinarily, a plaintiff must pay a statutory filing fee to bring an action in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An indigent party may commence an action in federal court, without prepayment of costs and fees, upon submission of an affidavit asserting an inability “to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Here, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [DE 2] establishes that she is unable to prepay the filing fee. However, before Plaintiff’s case may proceed, the Court must examine whether her action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Wartman v. Branch 7, Civ. Div., Cnty. Ct., Milwaukee Cnty., State of Wisconsin, 510 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1975); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A. Cheryl Stang In Neitzke v. Williams, the Supreme Court said that a complaint is frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), formerly § 1915(d), when it lacks “an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it rests on an indisputably

meritless legal theory. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326. For example, it is frivolous to assert a claim rooted in a nonexistent legal interest. Id. at 327. Bringing a set of claims to a court that is without the power to grant relief on those claims is another example. In April 2021, Plaintiff arrived at the Community Diagnostic Center in Munster, Indiana, for a scheduled mammogram. [DE 1-1].1 Defendant Stang, the supervisor of the Center, asked Plaintiff to wear a facemask in accordance with the Center for Disease Control’s COVID-19 guidelines. [Id.]. Plaintiff refused because it was against her religion, as a Christian, to wear one. [Id.]. Plaintiff elaborates in her complaint: “The Bible (Jesus) says, ‘Do not add or subtract anything to the Word or God will remove that person’s share in the tree of life and in the holy city that are described in this book.’” [Id.]. Defendant Stang called the police, who upon arrival

said that Plaintiff could not be refused treatment. [Id.]. As a result, she was placed in a waiting room by herself, though it is unclear if she saw a doctor. [Id.]. Plaintiff says her noncompliance with the mask mandate did not affect the Center, and that this was “proof that Christians don’t get the Death Plague . . . because Death Plagues only come for people in sin[.]” [Id.]. In November 2022, Plaintiff again was told she needed to wear a mask in order to participate in a scheduled CT scan. [DE 1-1]. She refused to wear one, and she contends that this refusal of service was based on race and religion. [Id.]. Plaintiff left after staff members called

1 Plaintiff is pro se, so it would be overly stringent to hold her to the standards of a pleading drafted by a lawyer. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). So, the Court considers all materials as part of the complaint, which includes Exhibit A [DE 1-1]. the police. [Id.]. In December 2022, Plaintiff arrived for a mammogram. [Id.]. She refused to wear a mask, and the police were called. [Id.]. She says that Stang purposefully scheduled Plaintiff’s appointments at the Community Diagnostic Center to entrap her into being arrested. [Id.]. Plaintiff claims that this action by Stang, as well as Stang adding notes to Plaintiff’s file

that Plaintiff is verbally abusive, led to Plaintiff’s doctor dropping her as a patient. [Id.]. Finally, Plaintiff believes that Stang orchestrated both 2022 incidents in retaliation for what happened in April 2021. Based on these facts, Plaintiff claims that she was (1) discriminated against based on race and religion under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, (2) harassed by Stang, (3) defamed by Stang, and (4) the victim of emotional distress inflicted by Stang. [DE 1]. This Court follows the Supreme Court’s direction that “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Even so, the maxim that federal courts are “courts of limited jurisdiction” applies to all litigants. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). One such

limitation comes from the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which says that lower federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to review state court civil decisions. See Edwards v. Illinois Bd. of Admissions to Bar, 261 F.3d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Federal courts are obligated to “inquire into the existence of [such] jurisdiction sua sponte.” Evergreen Square of Cudahy v. Wisconsin Hous. & Econ. Dev. Auth., 776 F.3d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 2015). This is not Plaintiff’s first time trying to litigate this matter. In fact, she twice attempted to litigate it in Lake County Small Claims Court. The first time, when it was transferred to the Plenary Court, she withdrew the case. See Bundy v. Stang and Women’s Diagnostic Center Munster, Case No. 45D12-2305-SC-002368 (Super. Ct. Lake Cnty. Ind. Nov. 11, 2023). The second time, after transfer to the Plenary Court, Defendant Stang moved for a more definite statement. Bundy v. Stang, Case No. 45D07-2401-PL-000033 (Super. Ct. Lake Cnty. Jan. 19, 2024). In response, Plaintiff filed a more detailed statement of her claim titled, “Exhibit A.” Bundy v. Stang, Case No. 45D07-2401-PL-000033 (Super. Ct. Lake Cnty. Mar. 18, 2024).

Defendant Stang’s ensuing motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was granted, and the case was dismissed with prejudice. Bundy v. Stang, Case No. 45D07-2401-PL-000033 (Super. Ct. Lake Cnty. May 20, 2024). “Exhibit A,” which served as Plaintiff’s complaint in state court, is the exact same as the Exhibit A before the Court today. Compare Bundy v. Stang, Case No. 45D07-2401-PL-000033 (Super. Ct. Lake Cnty. Mar. 18, 2024) and [DE 1-1].

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Related

Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America
511 U.S. 375 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
George McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch
694 F.3d 873 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Edwards v. Illinois Board of Admissions to the Bar
261 F.3d 723 (Seventh Circuit, 2001)
Khan v. Midwestern University
147 F. Supp. 3d 718 (N.D. Illinois, 2015)
Coleman v. Labor & Industry Review Commission
860 F.3d 461 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
In re Lisse
905 F.3d 495 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)

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Bluebook (online)
Bundy v. Stang, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bundy-v-stang-innd-2024.