Bulova Watch Co. v. United States

21 C.C.P.A. 156, 1933 CCPA LEXIS 187
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMay 22, 1933
DocketNo. 3608
StatusPublished

This text of 21 C.C.P.A. 156 (Bulova Watch Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 21 C.C.P.A. 156, 1933 CCPA LEXIS 187 (ccpa 1933).

Opinion

Lenroot, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Appellant in November, 1931, imported at the port of New York 12 watch movements, each having seven jewels and eight mechanical devices or parts, technically known as “bouchons” or “bushings.” The movements were classified by the collector and duty thereon was assessed at the rate of $2.95 each as watch movements under the following provisions of paragraph 367 of the Tariff Act of 1930:

Par. 367. (a) Watch movements, and time-keeping, time-measuring, or time-indicating mechanisms, devices, and instruments, whether or not designed to be worn or carried on or about the person, all the foregoing, if less than one and seventy-seven one-hundredths inches wide, whether or not in cases, containers, or housings:
(1) If more than one and one-half inches wide, $1.26 each; if more than one and two-tenths inches but not more than one and one-half inches wide, $1.40 each; if more than one inch but not more than one and two-tenths inches wide, $1.56 each; if more than nine-tenths of one inch but not more than one inch wide, $1.75 each; if more than eight-tenths of one inch but not more than nine-tenths of one inch wide, $2 each; if more than six-tenths of one inch but not more than eight-tenths of one inch wide, $2.25 each; if six-tenths of one inch or less wide, $2.50 each;
[158]*158(3) any of the foregoing having more than seven jewels shall be subject to an additional duty of 15 cents for each jewel in excess of seven;
*******
(i) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 368 the term “jewel” includes substitutes for jewels.

In assessing said watch movements with duty, the collector held that said bouchons or bushings, hereinafter called bushings, were substitutes for jewels and therefore, under the provisions of said paragraph, should be regarded for tariff purposes as jewels.

There was no marking upon the movements stating that they contained eight substitute jewels, and the collector, holding that said paragraph 367 required such marking, declined to deliver them to appellant until they were so marked.

Appellant protested the classification made by the collector and the assessment for duty upon the movements, claiming them to be dutiable under said paragraph 367 at $1.75 each; that there were no “substitutes for jewels” in the merchandise, and therefore the provisions of subdivision (3) of said paragraph 367 (a) are not applicable to the merchandise involved.

Another ground of protest was the claim that the requirement of the collector with respect to the markings to indicate the presence of eight substitute jewels was unlawful and illegal.

It appears that thereafter appellant did mark the movements as required by the collector and thereupon the merchandise was delivered to it.

Upon the trial in the lower court, voluminous testimony was taken for both parties, and samples of the movements involved were placed in evidence.

The lower court held that said bushings were “substitutes for jewels” within the meaning of said paragraph 367, and with respect to said marking required by the collector it held that, the movements having been marked as demanded by the collector, and appellant having received delivery of the goods, the question of whether such demand of the collector was unlawful and illegal had become moot, and therefore would not be decided.

Judgment overruling appellant's protest was entered accordingly, and from such judgment this appeal is taken.

With respect to the question of unlawful marking, the lower court was unquestionably correct in holding that by appellant's action the question had become moot; but in any event the conclusion which we have reached with respect to the proper classification of said watch movements renders further discussion of this point unnecessary.

The crucial question in the case is whether the eight bushings found in each of the movements here involved are “substitutes for jewels,” within the meaning of those words as used in said paragraph 367.

[159]*159The lower court in its decision said:

The record is voluminous, but there is little disagreement therein as to the essential facts. Therefore, irrespective of the question of alleged illegal marking, we find from the uncontradicted testimony (1) that watch jewels are removable frictional bearings; (2) that in cheap watch movements these metal bouchons or bushings serve as bearings instead of jewels; (3) that the functions of each are precisely the same in that each is removable, each has provision for lubrication and for taking up the “end shake,” and each'operates to make the watch movement more readily adjustable; and (4) that the sole difference between the two classes of articles is that the jewels are more durable.

We are inclined to agree with the foregoing four findings of the lower court, construing the third finding as not stating all the functions of a jewel but only those which are similar to the functions of. a bushing, but we are of the opinion that one additional fact should be considered, a fact not contradicted in the testimony, and of which we may take judicial notice by reason of its being a matter of common knowledge, and that is that the only reason that a jewel is ever used in a watch movement in preference to a pivot bearing of metal is because of the hardness of the jewel and the smaller amount of friction encountered in its use.

The lower court, after stating its findings as above set out, said:

Hence, since these metal bouchons or bushings actually take the place of jewels and perform all the functions thereof, they are “substitutes” for jewels, giving to that word its common and ordinary meaning. Such bouchons or bushings are therefore jewels as expressly provided for in said subdivision (i), and we so hold.

With this conclusion of the lower court we are unable to agree, for the reasons hereinafter stated.

Both appellant and the Government produced witnesses highly expert in the art of watch making, As stated by the lower court, there is little disagreement in the testimony as to the essential facts, and for the most part such testimony must be regarded merely as an aid to the court in determining the meaning of the words “jewels” and “substitutes for jewels,” as those words are used in said paragraph 367.

The word “jewel” as applied to watch movements is defined in standard dictionaries as follows:

Webster’s New International Dictionary, 1932:

3. A bearing for a pivot in a watch, formed by a crystal or precious stone, as a ruby.

Funk & Wagnalls’ New Standard Dictionary, 1931:

5. A bit of precious stone, crystal, or glass used to form a durable bearing, as for a watch-pivot.

The Century Dictionary & Encyclopedia, 1913:

4. A precious stone used in watchmaking, on account of its hardness and resistance to wear, as where a pivot turns in a socket.

[160]*160Knight’s American Mechanical Dictionary:

1. (Watchmaking.) A crystal or precious stone forming a bearing for the pivot of an arbor; especially used in watches.

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Bluebook (online)
21 C.C.P.A. 156, 1933 CCPA LEXIS 187, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bulova-watch-co-v-united-states-ccpa-1933.